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Ukraine Does Not Sign UN Nuclear Arms Document

LD0911101993 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0900 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] Eleven CIS states, including Russia, share the international community's concern over the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems. They reaffirm their commitment to prevent this.

A statement to this effect from CIS countries—with the exception of Ukraine, which is not mentioned in the document—was released on 8 November at the UN headquarters as an official document of the General Assembly session. The document says the 11 CIS countries are prepared to set up on their territory an effective system of control over exports of materials that can be used for the manufacture of mass destruction weapons and delivery systems.

Christopher, Baltic Ministers Cited on Russian Troops

PM0511151793 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Nov 93 p 3

[Report by Colonel Igor Golin of the Northwest Group of Forces Press Center: "Russia and United States Do Not Have Agreement on Skrunda Installation. U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher Discusses Problem of Russian Troop Withdrawal During Latvia Visit"]

[Text] The withdrawal of the Russian Army from Latvia and Estonia and security in the Baltic region were the main topics of U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher's conversation with the Latvian leadership and Baltic foreign ministers. During the press conference after the conversation W. Christopher recalled that the United States advocates the Russian troops' speediest, full, and regulated withdrawal. It was stressed that matters pertaining to the creation of a social base in areas of redeployment and the idea of temporarily keeping the Skrunda radar as a Russian Armed Forces military installation are the key problems impeding the troops' speediest withdrawal.

The U.S. secretary of state denied a report that Russia and the United States have any agreement regarding the Skrunda installation. What is more, he said that the question of the Russian Army's withdrawal from Latvia and Estonia comes within the purview of U.S. President Bill Clinton. Moreover Clinton had sent a letter to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, reminding him of the money that the United States had allocated for the construction of apartments for Russian servicemen withdrawn from the Baltic countries.

Lithuanian Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys said that Lithuania does not feel entirely secure despite the withdrawal of the Russian troops from its territory. The reason being, according to the head of the Lithuanian foreign policy department, that the republic is next door to militarized Kaliningrad Oblast.

With regard to the Russian Army withdrawal from Estonia, Estonian Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste noted that it is quite feasible for the Army to withdraw by the end of 1993, but the money allocated by the United States for housing construction is not enough for the troops being withdrawn from Latvia and Estonia. In this context it should be mentioned that the Baltic Assembly held in Tallinn 29-31 October adopted an appeal to the U.S. and Russian presidents and governments. While thanking the United States for the money allocated for the provision of facilities for the Russian troops being withdrawn, the Baltic Assembly called for the use of the financial aid provided to be effectively monitored.

CSCE Mission To Reduce Tension in Latvia

LD0911113393 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1000 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] Officials of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe will form a mission this month which will go to Latvia to attempt to reduce the tension between the government and the Russian-speaking inhabitants. The four-person mission will be led by Hugh Hamilton, a representative of the U.S. Department of State who is in charge of East European questions.

The mission will stay in Latvia for approximately six months and will collaborate with Max van der Stoel, entrusted by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to deal with the question of national minorities. Van der Stoel has already called on Latvia to urgently adopt a citizenship law which is more liberal than the drafts and which will enable an assimilation of the Russian-speaking inhabitants of Latvia.

Russian, Central Asian Security Chiefs Hold Talks

LD0911094293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0837 GMT 9 Nov 93

[By TIA-KHOVAR correspondent Nabi Karimov for TASS]

[Text] Dushanbe November 9 TASS—The coordinating council of the leaders of security agencies and special services of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation met in Dushanbe on November 8 and 9 to discuss cooperation and interaction in ensuring the security of the state border between the Republic of Tajikistan and Afghanistan, which is generally seen as part of the Commonwealth's external frontier. The conference also worked out coordinated measures aimed at settling the situation in the Republic of Tajikistan.

The discussion showed that the measures earlier taken by the heads of state of these Central Asian Republics and the Russian Federation to normalize the situation in Tajikistan and strengthen the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan were timely and effective.

Participants were unanimous in recognizing the need for a system of concerted efforts to protect the Commonwealth's external borders and ensure the security of the Commonwealth member countries.

The leaders of the security services of the participating countries signed a protocol on cooperation and agreed on specific guidelines for their interaction.

The leaders of the delegations from the security and special services of the five countries were received by Tajik leader Imamali Rakhmanov.

Measures Outlined To Strengthen Tajik-Afghan Border

PM0811161393 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Nov 93 p 1

[Valeriy Kovalev report: "There Will Be a Collective Lock on the Tajik-Afghan Border"]

[Text] The latest, seventh, session of the Council of Commanders of CIS Member States' Border Guard Troops, was held in Minsk 4 November. Representatives of all the Commonwealth countries with the exception of Moldova and Tajikistan took part in it.

The Council of Border Guard Troops Commanders examined the question of the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border. A number of specific measures to strengthen its protection by the collective forces of Russia and four Central Asian republics—Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan—have been outlined.

'Maastricht Route' Seen as Model for Economic Integration

PM0811154193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Nov 93 p 2

[Aleksandr Golts article under the "Theme of the Week" rubric: "Maastricht and Us"]

[Excerpts] Russian citizens can now complain about shortages of many things. But not a shortage of events. This week there were enough to have kept another state going for months. Here we have the growing election battles, the laying down of plans for future economic reform, and the adoption of the military doctrine. But in my view the most important was the subject of Russia's future federal system. Its fundamental importance for the country was illustrated by the fairly trenchant debates during the president's meeting with the heads of the republics and regions. These debates ended, as might have been expected, with a decision for the future constitution not to refer to sovereignty in the context of the Russian republics.

It would be blatant oversimplification to reduce all these disputes (and they are not yet over, I think) to a desire on the part of the regional elite for autonomy and to attempts by Moscow to limit this autonomy. I think that now, two years after the breakup of the Union, the seriousness of the problems that come in the wake of recognizing the sovereignty of a particular part of a recently unified state is becoming obvious.

Especially since it was this week that we saw how difficult the process of integration is. I am not only talking about the abortive attempts to create a new ruble zone in the CIS, which will evidently result in Kazakhstan's and Uzbekistan's introducing their own currencies. I am also talking about a process that is going quite well. The Maastricht Treaty formalizing the European union of 12 states has just come into force. [passage omitted]

Now let us look at the mishaps that have befallen the single ruble zone. Quite recently, when it was decided to set it up, I, like many people, probably saw this as a positive step toward restoring the economic ties that had been severed so rudely. You would have thought that reviving the single economic area does not present too much difficulty given that the system of production in the Soviet Union was highly interconnected and interdependent, given the real and obvious need for cooperation, and, lastly, given the fact that the post-Soviet area is and will be in the near future the only real market for the goods produced there.

However, the reality proved far tougher. Two years of sovereignty were enough to destroy, such as it was, the single intra-Union market. And now states that would like to join the new ruble zone, Kazakhstan for instance, are extremely different from Russia in terms of their economic system and potential. FINANSOVYYE IZVESTIYA cites the following data. Today per capita output in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan respectively is two-thirds and one-fifth of that in Russia. Moreover, Kazakhstan today exports three times and Uzbekistan 6.5 times less than Russia.

And that is at a time when every sovereign state is pursuing its own economic policy. And these policies differ radically from one another. As far as I can judge, Kazakhstan places the emphasis on state control over industry and a desire for centralized production and equally centralized distribution of output. Russia is taking a totally different path. In these conditions the introduction of a single ruble would effectively result in Russia's providing its partners with nonrepayable loans and would give them an opportunity to buy Russian goods with Russian money. And the least that would do would be to whip up what is already considerable inflation.

It looks as though the market is so dislocated that it is necessary to revive it in a roundabout way by introducing transitional currencies, coordinating economic approaches at the time, and formulating a single customs and credit-finance policy. That is, take the Maastricht route. And then introduce a single currency. But it has proved possible to achieve that level of disintegration in just two years. Destruction, as the saying goes, does not mean construction. At one time political will was enough to counter the crazy sovereignization of the economies. Today neither that nor obvious economic necessity (the severing of interrepublic ties is responsible, experts believe, for around 60 percent of the decline in Russian production) is enough to reintegrate the economy.

Understanding of that, understanding of what is indeed a very serious economic threat to Russia itself behind the slogan of regional sovereignization, was also the reason for the tough nature of the disputes this week in Moscow. I do not think that they are over. At any rate they will crop up ahead of the referendum on the constitution. And everyone must realize the consequences that recognizing individual republics' sovereignty may have amid crisis conditions. And supposing in a year or two we have tremendous difficulties and losses in reviving the now-unified Russian market just as we are now trying to revive the Union market. Look enviously at Western Europe, which thought it possible to subordinate not fabricated, but real sovereignties to unified aims.

CIS Official Interviewed on CIS Armies

PM0811131793 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 3 Nov 93 p 3

[Interview with Vyacheslav Panov, chairman of the Council of Directors of the CIS Information and Analytical Support Center, by Roman Zadunayskiy; place and date not given: "'Blue Helmets' for CIS"]

[Text] The mission of the CIS countries' national armies to stabilize sociopolitical conditions, or at least to make a show of force to extinguish explosive interethnic conflicts in certain Commonwealth states, is now acquiring a special significance. Outlying areas of the CIS are increasingly being dragged into the orbit of civil and interethnic wars. The threat of external aggression against certain CIS countries in various forms (Afghanistan, Turkey, Romania) is also increasing, and unprecedented pressure is already being put on a number of CIS countries with the aim of drawing them into various military-political alliances (for example, a Pan-Turkic, Islamic, or pro-NATO alliance). In anticipation of such developments, in 1992 the CIS Joint Armed Forces Main Command began elaborating projects aimed at creating coalition forces for maintaining peace and eliminating local conflicts on the CIS' external borders. However, centrifugal processes in the CIS thwarted these projects. Is there a chance of integrating the armed forces of the former USSR today? To answer this question, it is essential to know precisely what the happened to the former USSR Armed Forces, what sort of national armies and army leaders there are today, and whether the CIS top brass is ready for military alliances. For the first time in the history of the CIS, answers to these and many other questions are given in systematized form in the CIS Joint Armed Forces Main Command report "Toward Security Via Cooperation," submitted to the leaders of the Commonwealth countries in September 1993. The report was prepared by the Commonwealth states Information and Analytical Support Center (IASC) in conjunction with the CIS Joint Armed Forces Main Command. Our correspondent talks to Candidate of Economic Sciences Vyacheslav Panov, chairman of the IASC Council of Directors, about the topicality and the particular features of the document.

[Zadunayskiy] Vyacheslav Ivanovich, much has been written on the problems of ensuring the security, organizational development, and functioning of the Commonwealth Armed Forces. Where does the novelty of your work lie?

[Panov] For the first time anywhere we are offering for free distribution official analytical material on the CIS Armed Forces. The goals, principles, maintenance, structure, and practical activity of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Main Command from the moment of its formation are revealed with unprecedented fullness.

The main attention is focused on covering questions of developing specific cooperation between the Armed Forces of the republics which formerly belonged to the CIS on the problems of ensuring collective and international security. The views of the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces Main Command on the development of the strategic situation in the world and in the CIS are logically presented, and the legal basis of military cooperation in the Commonwealth is analyzed. The evolution of approaches to the organizational development of the CIS Joint Armed Forces is reflected persuasively and in detail. The report examines the approaches adopted by the Commonwealth States' top military leadership and the CIS Joint Armed Forces Main Command to the organization of cooperation in the sphere of averting local conflicts on the CIS' external borders and carrying out peacekeeping operations in order to respond effectively to possible armed conflicts between and within the Commonwealth states. It reflects the processes involved in establishing cooperation among the Commonwealth states in the sphere of coordinating military-economic activity. At the same time, it also reflects the views of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Main Command and the basic approaches to the formation of partnership relations between the CIS countries and states further afield.

[Zadunayskiy] Is it possible to accelerate the process of integration in the CIS defense sphere?

[Panov] We could not undertake to answer a question whose solution is determined by the course of contradictory economic, social, and political processes within the Commonwealth states. The document is intended for "decisionmakers"—primarily politicians, analysis organization and mass media specialists, and also voters interested in making their own independent assessment of the military-political factors involved in ensuring security in the modern world. It is they who will ultimately answer your question.

[Zadunayskiy] Nevertheless, the IASC has employed a scientific approach to setting out the almost 600 pages of material in the report, has it not?

[Panov] The report's scientific concept was formulated by a collective of writers under the leadership of Doctor of Historical Sciences Pavel Timokhin, a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences. The contemporary political situation is analyzed in the context of this concept. The conclusion is drawn that, with the end of global confrontation along the East-West axis, the influence of cultural and ethnic contradictions on the development of political processes in the world has sharply intensified. The sources of these cultural and ethnic contradictions are objectively dictated where the territorial settlement of ethnic communities (or groups) does not coincide with existing borders. The culture—especially the political culture—of certain ethnic communities may enter into contradiction with the culture of other communities and thereby generate tension.

Because conflicts rooted in cultural or ethnic contradictions on CIS territory tend to become protracted in character and urgently require the development of a "preventive" policy to avert them, the wider integration of Commonwealth states in various spheres of cooperation, not least in the military sphere, acquires an increasing topicality. Military force remains an important instrument for maintaining peace and ensuring collective and national security. Such a conclusion is at first sight at odds with claims which obtained a broad currency in the 70's and 80's of a reduced role for military force in the overall system of means of ensuring national and international security. In this connection, two important factors of the problem under examination must be stressed.

First, the nuclear aspect. Extensive research and analysis of the "nuclear winter" phenomenon and of the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster furthered understanding of the unacceptability of the use of nuclear weapons. In conditions whereby only a small nuclear club exists the role of nuclear armed forces as a means of political influence has also decreased.

However, in recent years the circle of so-called "threshold" and "subthreshold" countries, that is to say states capable, given the political decision, of joining the "nuclear club" relatively quickly, has significantly expanded. The growth of nuclear capabilities is accompanied by the launch of the production of missiles capable of carrying payloads of up to 500 kg for hundreds, even thousands of kilometers. By comparison with the old bipolar world structure, the new multipolar structure puts far fewer obstacles in the way of realizing adventurist political ambitions. In view of this, the thesis of the reduced role of military force in the nuclear type of confrontation should at the very least be submitted to thorough analysis.

Second, there is the existing experience of the "limited" use by the United States of military force in Southeast Asia, which testifies to the insignificant or even negative results of such intervention.

Obviously there is no sense in denying or contesting the logic of this line of argument, but at the same time we must take into account the conditions for the use of force in the era of bipolar confrontation. On the other hand we must remember that it is inappropriate to apply the "rules of the game" of the bipolar world in conditions in which a "multipolar" model of the politicoeconomic structure of international relations is taking shape. The bipolar system (primarily Warsaw Pact-NATO, USSR-United States) organized international relations according to a rigid structure and ensured the realization of coordinated programs of political, economic, and strongarm influence. The system of "multipolar" world organization now emerging makes it more difficult both to elaborate and coordinate such programs and to implement them.

At the same time, as the facts show, attempts by individual countries or groups of countries in various regions of the world to pursue a policy aimed at regional or global domination on the basis of military-strongarm approaches cannot be ruled out. The internationalization and escalation of national and religious crises and the disintegration of multiethnic states can also lead to military clashes. This is why the idea of the nonuse or threat of force is currently being reevaluated taking into account the nature of ongoing processes in world development.

[Zadunayskiy] What other topics are examined in the report?

[Panov] The second part examines the problems of forming a system of military cooperation among the Commonwealth states across a broad spectrum of spheres of cooperation. It covers in detail questions involved in the establishment of military cooperation, its aims and organizational principles, and the formation of a system of collective security and examines problems of the organization of bilateral and multilateral relations between the Commonwealth member states in the process of defense building.

The nucleus of the system of military cooperation being set up among the Commonwealth states is the Treaty on Collective Security. The treaty's underlying principles are developed in subsequent documents prepared by the CIS Joint Armed Forces Main Command and the CIS Council of Defense Ministers. In addition to the activity of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Main Command and the CIS Council of Defense Ministers, increasing significance in the organization of military cooperation is attaching to bilateral relations between commonwealth states, above all between Russia and other CIS members. The main problems arise in connection with the presence of Russian troops on the territory of Commonwealth states or their withdrawal to Russian territory.

The question of the former USSR's strategic forces occupies a special place among the problems of ensuring the collective security of the CIS. In this connection the report examines in considerable detail the aims and tasks of the strategic forces, their structure and composition (including the components), their leadership and development prospects. A significant place is devoted to the analysis of problems of exercising control over nuclear weapons on the territory of Commonwealth member states and questions of compliance with international treaties and agreements on the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive weapons.

The third part of the report is devoted to problems in the organizational development of the CIS member countries' national armed forces. The factual material in the sections on the Commonwealth member states' armed forces is arranged under key headings dealing with the common problems of military organizational development, which makes it easy to use in systems analysis of a problem and in comparative evaluations. The following key rubrics have been compiled in the sections of the report on the CIS countries: the state's geopolitical position, military doctrine, defense organization, armed forces building, recruitment system, and social and legal protection for servicemen.

Committee Session 'Tentatively Scheduled' for 15 Nov

PM0811115993 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 5 Nov 93 p 3

[Report from the "News" column roundup of reports by correspondents of ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI, ITAR-TASS, INTERFAX, and POSTFACTUM: "CIS Committee Session May Take Place in Moscow 15 November"]

[Text] The next session of the CIS Coordination-Consultative Committee, which includes deputy prime ministers of the CIS countries, has been tentatively scheduled for 15 November in Moscow. The conference will discuss a set of agreements connected with the restoration of economic ties in the Commonwealth. The Committee will examine agreements on cooperation in the areas of investment policy, production-sharing, and direct ties between sectors and enterprises, and the implementation of a coordinated antimonopoly policy.

The preliminary agenda includes a discussion of proposals on the terms for affiliation of states as associate members of the Economic Union within the framework of the CIS.

In addition, the committee will prepare proposals on the contents of the agenda of the next session of the CIS Heads of Government Council. The exact date of the session has not been fixed yet.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 9 Nov

LD0911080593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0732 GMT 9 Nov 93

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, November 9 (TASS)—KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on October Revolution anniversary celebration by Communists:

"Meetings and demonstrations on November 7 took place in 119 cities of Russia, with more than 60,000 people taking part".

TRUD on the same subject:

"A large number of the citizens of Russia and other republics of the former Soviet Union still consider the revolution anniversary date as a major holiday of theirs."

PRAVDA on celebration of revolution anniversary by Communists in Moscow.

"For the first time in many years, there was no festive fireworks display in Moscow. But a meeting to mark the occasion did take place, not in Moscow, though, but outside it, in a forest park beyond the ring road".

ROSSIISKAYA GAZETA on revolution anniversary events:

"Following the recent October events in Moscow, it seems that even the most intransigent people come to realise that one can express one's political attitudes without going on a rampage."

ROSSIISKAYA GAZETA on the causes of contemporary Georgia's plight.

The newspaper carries an article by Vladimir Kuznechevsky under the headline "Eduard Shevardnadze Looks For a Way Out of the Geopolitical Impasse". "Georgia has no other way out apart from an alliance with Russia. Geopolitical logic dictates the need to accept that also because Tbilisi will not be able, if acting alone, to put out the flames of the civil war on its territory", Kuznechevsky concludes.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA on the conclusion of the first phase of preparations for elections to the Federal Assembly.

"So far 21 electoral blocs have been allowed to participate in the elections. The main electoral associations have collected the following number of signatures: The Agrarian Party of Russia—500,000, the Party of Russian Unity and Accord—222,000, Russia's Choice—200,000, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation—187,000, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia—173,000, the Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin Bloc—170,000, and the Russian Democratic Reform Movement—135,000 signatures.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA on principles for a federative set-up of the country.

The newspaper carries an article by Vice-Premier Sergey Shakhray. "The revival of the Russian state is possible provided three conditions are met. First, a socially-oriented market economy is created. Second, a genuinely federative state is established. Third, local self-government develops on a large scale"," Shakhray points out.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (RED STAR) runs an account of the meeting between President Boris Yeltsin and media chiefs on November 6 when he made an important political statement on his intention to stay in office until his presidential mandate expires in 1996. Previously, an early presidential election is known to have been slated for June 1994.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on remarks by CIS combined peacekeeping force commander in Tajikistan.

"We do not intend to threaten anyone or try to resolve any internal political problems through the use of force. Our tasks are, together with Russian border guards and units from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, as well as government troops of Tajikistan, to seal the border as tightly as possible and to ensure its reliable guarding and defence," Colonel-General Boris Pyankov, commander of the CIS combined peacekeeping force in Tajikistan, told the newspaper.

PRAVDA on the land issue.

The newspaper tries to forecast a situation following the issue of the Russian president's decree on the regulation of agrarian relations and believes that the purchase and sale of land and other land-related deals should be limited.

ROSSIISKAYA GAZETA on Russia's space technology sector.

The newspaper carries an article by Mikhail Rebrov.

"Russia's space technology sector lift lead the country to a new orbit....U.S. experts believe that already in the near future the volume of sale on the space technology market will mount up to 10,000-15,000 million U.S. dollars.

"Our achievements in the field of cosmonautics used to delight the world. Funds which the state assigns must be used primarily for the development of space science, not for the satisfaction of individual enterprises' aspirations for 'sovereignisation'," Rebrov points out.

Foreign Reaction to Yeltsin Move on Election Viewed

PM0811191993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Nov 93 First Edition pp 1-2

[Gennadiy Charodeyev report: "World Reaction to Yeltsin Statement"]

[Text] The Russian president's decision that it would not be expedient to hold early presidential elections in June 1994 has been dictated by "the logic of his victory" won over the opposition parliament, the influential French newspaper LES ECHOS writes editorially.

The LES ECHOS commentators believe that the idea of holding early presidential elections next June, which Russia's head of state floated 23 September, was an attempt to reach a compromise with deputies who were trying to secure simultaneous parliamentary and presidential elections. But because parliament chose the path of mutiny, which led to bloodshed, this concession fell out of the equation of its own accord, the newspaper stresses. Moreover, if the president remains in office until the expiry of his mandate in 1996, this would enable Russia to avoid the instability that will ensue during the six-month period immediately following the parliamentary elections.

Bearing in mind that representatives from about 20 different political formations representing extremely different tendencies are fighting for deputies' mandates, in these conditions, even if Russia's new Constitution gives definite advantages to the executive branch, the instability caused by vagueness about who is going to be head of state, together with the presence of a "multicolored" parliament, could bring about very serious consequences, LES ECHOS notes.

Yeltsin's latest remarks are being interpreted differently in Germany. The newspaper NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG believes that Boris Yeltsin will make a huge mistake if he does not agree to presidential elections next June. The Russian president should have kept his word. Yeltsin's recent remarks, in the newspaper's opinion, demonstrate a lack of confidence and power fatigue, which could have fatal consequences for the country. After December's parliamentary elections, the president will have to confront representatives of the people who are irreproachable in terms of their legitimacy. Moreover, the German newspaper notes, we have to bear in mind that conservative forces will also be represented in parliament. Yeltsin could easily become a victim of the propaganda put about by these deputies, whose attitude toward the reforms is hostile. They would be able to rely on their new mandate of trust from the population in order to accuse the president of breaking his word. The confrontation would therefore take on an entirely different character from that of previous conflicts between the reformers and people who are forever yesterday's men. We can therefore only hope that Yeltsin will quickly change his mind and reaffirm his decision to hold presidential elections 12 June, NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG writes.

Washington is also trying to make up its mind about the Russian leader's recent remarks. U.S. President B. Clinton has restated his support for President Yeltsin. THE NEW YORK TIMES reports that Clinton has announced that he will continue to support his Russian colleague provided the latter remains committed to carrying out reforms. According to administration officials, Yeltsin may be using his latest statement "to indicate to voters his preferred option of presidential elections over a referendum on the issue of the Constitution," the article notes. White House officials are also stating that Yeltsin may also be indicating his choice of candidate legislators, who may have to address the said question after they are elected.

R. Dole, the leader of the Republican minority in the U.S. Congress, commenting in a CBS-TV program on reports that the Russian president was against holding early presidential elections in June 1994, stated: "My support for B. Yeltsin becomes less firm when he says things like this. I had hoped that he would hold presidential elections at the same time as elections for parliament. I also believed that it would be in his interests to agree to this. But he decided to wait until next year. And now he says he wants to complete his term in office.

"It may be that President Clinton is right too. As long as Yeltsin supports democracy we should support him as well. But I think it would be far better if the Russian president were to stick to the promises he made earlier," Dole believes.

U.S. 'Prepared To Forgive'

PM0911094593 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Nov 93 pp 1,3

[Vladislav Drobkov article: "View From Washington. He Gave and He Has Taken Away..."]

[Text] Washington, 8 Nov—The United States is prepared to forgive Yeltsin for going back on his promise to hold early presidential elections, but expects a "new main player" to appear in December in the shape of the Russian parliament.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin's statement Saturday that he intends to remain in power until the end of his term in 1996 came as a big surprise to many Americans, although some Soviet scientists here, who have now requalified as CIS specialists and know Moscow political ethics, did not make a particular drama out of what has happened, seeing it as further evidence that Boris Nikolayevich is still true to his word. He gives, and he taketh away...

Admittedly, the U.S. Administration has found itself in a fairly delicate position. After all, during the October crisis in Moscow, when the U.S. White House clearly sided with Yeltsin, U.S. President B. Clinton and other high-ranking representatives of the leadership here doggedly justified this stand by saying that the Russian president is willing to hold early elections shortly and once again "submit to the verdict of the electorate."

It has now transpired that this promise will not, to put it mildly, be carried out. It is no coincidence that the White House and the State Department refused Saturday to make any comment on the news from Moscow, saying that they do not have the written text of the Russian president's statement.

It is therefore not surprising that Clinton was, I thought, somewhat embarrassed by a blunt question put to him during Sunday's NBC TV program "Meet the Press" regarding his opinion of Yeltsin's actions "going back on his public promises." Clinton first agreed that he had not indeed spoken to Boris Nikolayevich at that time. He then said that contradictory interpretations of the president's statement and of what he intended are still coming in from Moscow.

It was only afterwards that the head of the White House said that, although it was previously "always thought that he would seek re-election," in his statements Yeltsin has now "clearly hinted that he does not want to do that." And "he may want to just finish his term." According to Clinton, as long as Yeltsin "supports democracy, supports human rights, and advances reforms, I think that the United States should support him."

At the same time the U.S. President said, probably assessing the reaction of Russia's citizens to Yeltsin's decision, that he is "confident that they will have something to say about this after December's parliamentary elections." He voiced the hope that "President Yeltsin has clearly realized that it is not a good thing for him to be the only source of legitimate democratic power in Russia." "After December," the U.S. President said, "we will have another main player, like the President and the Congress here, and, as we understand it, there will be another source of legitimate democratic power and we will see how that works."

M. Gorbachev, former president of the former USSR, speaking here on Saturday on a CNN TV program, remarked on this subject that Boris Yeltsin "should keep his word." In Gorbachev's opinion, the chances of Yeltsin's being successful in the event of early presidential elections next spring would depend to a decisive degree on how the situation in Russia develops after December's parliamentary elections. If Yeltsin's government continues to implement reforms in the old chaotic, ill-conceived way, the former president said, the people will not support it.

It is curious to note that U.S. Secretary of State W. Christopher was kind of prophetical Friday, hinting during hearings in the U.S. Congress House of Representatives Foreign Relations Committee at the possibility of Yeltsin's going back on his unequivocal promise to hold early elections. What is more, Christopher assured the congressmen that the United States would not "put pressure" on the Russian president and get him to hold these elections. By way of justifying the U.S. stand it was said that B. Yeltsin would like to give the parliament newly elected in December the right to tackle the question of organizing early elections.

As we can see, that argument did not hold water for long. The day after Christopher's statement in Congress a report arrived from Moscow that the Russian president wants to serve out his term. There was no longer any mention of the parliament, which is to be elected in a few weeks...

Yeltsin's decision to abandon the idea of holding the promised early elections, THE NEW YORK TIMES states, should draw public attention to the "unlimited power that the president has received over the last few weeks—a trend which alarms even some of his most devoted supporters."

Analyzing the reasons that impelled B. Yeltsin to go back on his previous promise, THE WASHINGTON POST noted that, in the opinion of many of the Russian president's advisers, he could still win the December elections, but will inevitably "be weakened by six months delay in a country ravaged by political and economic disorder."

As political commentators in the glorious past loved to conclude such discussions, "it is hard to argue with this opinion from THE WASHINGTON POST."

Clinton Foreign Policy Said in 'Crisis'

PM0911101193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Nov 93 p 3

[Mikhail Pogorelyy article: "Washington's Foreign Policy Crisis"]

[Text] The Clinton administration has been in power for nine months but Washington has not yet produced a coherent and clear foreign policy strategy. The "omnivorous" nature of U.S. activity outside its state borders is a consequence of the excessive globalism of U.S. foreign policy, and this in turn is leading to a loss of clear guidelines and a knee-jerk reaction to events which sometimes have a highly notional bearing on U.S. vital interests.

Such criticism is being made of the U.S. leadership increasingly often. It is being expressed by legislators (primarily the Republicans, of course) and political and public figures in America. The president and his team are being accused of disregarding Americans' own interests for the sake of some rather abstract ideas of world leadership. In practice, critics note, this most often means participation in the kind of multinational actions where the financial burden and sometimes tangible human and material losses are borne by the United States but at the same time it is not absolutely obvious who gains from this. After the collapse of the peacemaking mission in Somalia the failure to "restore democracy" in Haiti has only deepened the crisis of U.S. diplomacy.

The massive rejection of the administration's foreign policy has forced its top officials to issue lengthy explanations on this subject in recent days. President Clinton, for example, speaking on NBC TV, said that the most important area of foreign policy is cooperation with Russia, work to create the North American free-trade zone, and the fight against the spread of weapons of mass destruction. He stated that U.S. troops will leave Somalia before 31 March 1994 and spoke cautiously about support for Haiti's ousted President Aristide.

Secretary of State Christopher, speaking in Congress, named the six priorities of U.S. foreign policy activity: America's economic security, th[illegible]lopment of relations with Russia, the renewal of [illegible]TO alliance, the creation of a new Asia-Pacific co[illegible]unity, the achievement of a Near East settlement, and the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. Somalia, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia did not feature on the list.

Nevertheless... rumors persist in Washington that the President is considering the question of replacing the officials who have been responsible for implementing U.S. foreign policy. They include Warren Christopher, national security adviser Anthony Lake, and even Defense Secretary Les Aspin and CIA chief James Woolsey. We will see in the near future just how well-founded these rumors are. But it is obvious that the Clinton administration must pay increased attention to a vigorous foreign policy activity which, most important, yields a practical return.

Congressmen Demand Action Against Metals Dumping

PM0911095993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Nov 93 First Edition p 3

[Elmar Guseynov report: "Canadians Can Get the 'IZVESTIYA' Prize They Won Many Years Ago"]

[Text] Over 50 members of the U.S. House of Representatives led by Speaker Thomas Foley have insistently requested that President Clinton immediately embark on talks to regulate the import of nonferrous metals from Russia and CIS countries. They are asking him to recognize that the supplies coming from the former USSR basically constitute dumping.

The congressmen's appeal applies to practically the entire range of nonferrous metals, but primarily to aluminum, titanium, and nickel. Aluminum exports from CIS countries to the United States have increased by 1,600 percent over the last few years.

Consequently the market price of aluminum has almost been halved since 1988. The congressmen are not urging Clinton to adopt unilateral prohibitive measures. They are talking about the need to galvanize talks with Russia about the conclusion of multilateral agreements that would also involve the Europeans and would place Russian dumping within the framework of mutually agreed quotas. Russian-U.S. talks on aluminum already began 20 October.

Just over 10 years ago, during an ice hockey tournament for the "Izvestiya" prize, one of the trophies was made from metal containing some titanium. The trophy was to have been received by the Canadians, but it was apparently impossible to present: At the time titanium was thought to be a strategic raw material in the USSR, and the export of articles made from it was banned. Instead of a metal trophy, the Canadians got a porcelain snowman from Gzhel.

How much everything has changed since then....

Entrepreneurship Fund With U.S. Begins Work

PM0811142993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Report by Igor Karpenko: "Russian-American Entrepreneurship Fund Begins Work"]

[Text] At the State Committee for the Administration of State Property Anatoliy Chubays presented Gerald Corrigan, chairman of the Russian-American Entrepreneurship Fund, to Russian and foreign journalists. Those present at this 4 November meeting described the structure and features of the work of the fund, for whose activity the U.S. Government has earmarked $340 million.

U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering has assessed the fund's creation as the first serious step in establishing business partnership between the countries.

"I have often been asked: What is the state of our partnership in Russia and where is the aid which America promised it? Now I am pleased to say that partnership and aid really exist."

The Russian-American entrepreneurship fund is a unique organization because the government of the two states will not take part in the management of its enormous funds or in its administration. Everything will be decided by an independent council of directors consisting of U.S. and Russian specialists. Here its role does not consist in allocating funds—here pure credits are likely to be the exception, the rule being direct investments in production and technical aid to a few thousand small and medium enterprises (with fewer than 2,000 workers). Here the firms must be private and privatized. The two states will make no debt or credit commitments under the fund.

The fund sees its main task in ensuring that each of the selected enterprises is, as G. Corrigan put it, brought to full success—stable profits and high quality of output. The fund itself, as a noncommercial organization, will put its entire share of the profit back into new investments to support Russian enterprises.

In the future it is the intention of the fund's organizers that its capital should be swelled by attracting funds from investors in Russia and other states. The fund can also create joint ventures with Russian and U.S. firms and also with investors from other states (on condition that the venture has at least one U.S. investor).

The choice of enterprises for investments will be made in many sectors of industry and various regions of Russia so that their experience in the sphere of small and medium business can serve as a unique model for organizing matters on the country's entire territory. The only "sectorial" ban for the fund is enterprises of the military-industrial complex, and it will not take part in conversion programs.

The fund's headquarters will be in New York and before the end of this year one branch will open in Moscow and by the spring another will open in the Far East. Later other branches may be created. According to G. Corrigan, in the very near future staff recruitment will begin as will a broad publicity campaign throughout Russia about the fund's aims, policy, and activity, the elaboration of technical aid programs, and so forth. Before the end of this year the Russian Government must also propose its managing directors for the fund. The U.S. directors have already been appointed by President Clinton; they are well-known businessmen, financiers, and scientists. E. Gerald Corrigan, the chairman of the fund's board of directors, is a very important financier known throughout the world who used to head the U.S. Federal Reserve fund.

U.S. Defense Official Visits Nizhny Novgorod

LD0911115193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1134 GMT 9 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Evald Kessariiskiy]

[Text] Nizhny Novgorod November 9 TASS—U.S. Undersecretary of Defence Willian Perry paid a one-day visit here on Tuesday [9 November]. He toured a number of defence-industry enterprises which operate under the conversion program.

Results of U.S. Official's Visit to China Examined

PM0811162993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Nov 93 First Edition p 3

[Vladimir Skosyrev report: "...While the Americans Have Already Reached Agreement With the Chinese Army on Cooperation in Combat Conditions"]

[Text] The three-day visit to China by U.S Assistant Secretary of Defense Charles Freeman is over.

For the first time since the events of 1989, when the Chinese Army suppressed student demonstrations, the White House chief has instructed his military department to unfreeze contacts with the leadership of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

Among other things, Freeman raised the issue of the sale of M-11 surface-to-surface missiles by China to Pakistan. In Washington's view, these deliveries are a direct violation of the international agreement on missile technology, which Beijing has pledged to observe. However, on this matter the U.S. side was unable to achieve anything. In reply, Freeman's Chinese interlocutors stated that the United States has decided to supply up-to-date combat aircraft to Taiwan, which is an example of how the United States is itself encouraging arms proliferation.

Washington has authorized one of the biggest arms deals of recent years—the sale of 150 F-16 fighters to Taiwan.

On the other hand, the U.S. and Chinese military have agreed to find a common language regarding cooperation in peacekeeping operations under UN auspices. As Freeman said, the Chinese Army is one of the largest in the world, and it is very likely that in the future the Chinese could operate together with U.S. units in whatever hot spots the United Nations may send them. In such a situation, U.S. and Chinese officers would need to know how to operate together.

Following his visit, Freeman remained vague on the question of whether the United States intends to lift the ban on supplying U.S. arms and "dual-purpose" civilian technology—which can have military applications—to China. For the time being the embargo remains, but we know that U.S. military industrialists would like to return to the Chinese market.

Grachev Begins Meetings With Chinese Counterpart

LD0811170993 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1430 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] An official delegation from the Russian Defense Ministry headed by Pavel Grachev arrived today in Beijing. This is a return visit after a visit of the Chinese minister to Moscow. It is expected that an agreement on bilateral cooperation will be signed. The delegation will familiarize itself with the life and activity of the Chinese Armed Forces. Here is our correspondent Vladimir Kulikov.

[Kulikov] Beyond the protocol one can really see true signs of recent changes in relations between the military departments of the two countries. The Russian and Chinese military doctrines exclude from the relations between our states such concepts as an enemy figure or possible enemy figure. Russian and Chinese diplomats have done a lot to ensure that trust is established on borders, that the number of troops there is reduced, and that military and technical cooperation develops successfully. Matters of conversion are also decided jointly. Commanders of many types of troops who arrived here as part of the delegation have already established direct contacts with their Chinese colleagues who had previously visited Russia. Military academies of the two countries as well as military districts are also cooperating with each other. Laying a wreath at the monument to the heroes of the people on Tiananmen Square, the Russian defense minister and the officials accompanying him remembered the heroes of many tragic events in China.

Grachev began his talks with Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian, which will cover a wide range of topics on global cooperation and communications in the military sphere. Later the delegation will visit a naval base and the town of Port Arthur [Lushun], normally closed to foreigners, which gives an indication of the high level of Russian-Chinese relations.

Increased Military Cooperation Urged

LD0811190593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1835 GMT 8 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Grigoriy Arslanov and Vladimir Fedoruk]

[Text] Beijing November 8 TASS—The Russian and Chinese defence ministers have called for further development of Sino-Russian cooperation in the military sphere.

Visiting Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev expressed satisfaction with the development of Russian-Chinese relations, noting that President Boris Yeltsin's visit to China and his talks with the Chinese leadership have given impetus to bilateral relations between the two countries. The development of friendly contacts between the Russian and Chinese Armed Forces meet the interests of both countries, Grachev said.

He informed his Chinese counterpart Chi Haotian about the situation in Russia and major principles of Russia's new military doctrine.

Haotian stressed that China prioritises the development of ties with Russia, including in the military sphere. He assured Grachev that whatever the international situation, China will always seek to strengthen and develop mutually beneficial cooperation with Russia.

On Tuesday, Grachev is expected to meet with Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng, Deputy Chairman of the Central Military Council Zhang Zheng and visit one of the divisions of the Beijing military garrison.

Foreign Ministry Assesses Kozyrev-Zlenko Talks

PM0811170993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Nov 93 First Edition p 3

["Own information" report: "Moscow and Kiev Switch Off Megaphones"]

[Text] Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and his Ukrainian colleague Anatoliy Zlenko, who have met in Odessa, were able, despite forecasts, to avoid a new quarrel between Moscow and Kiev.

In the opinion of a spokesman for the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the sides have moved away from "megaphone" diplomacy to quiet diplomacy, which predicates an attentive and well-balanced study of one another's positions, and not dramatic "appeals" to public opinion.

All the main accords reached by the two presidents in Massandra were confirmed in Odessa, the expert claimed. Questions of dual citizenship and the social protection of the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine and the Ukrainian population in Russia were also discussed.

Discussion of the highly contentious question of a possible suspension of deliveries of Russia oil and gas in the event that Ukraine does not give up nuclear weapons went extremely smoothly, but did not lead to any specific accords.

Evidently, this can happen only after parliamentary elections have been held in the two neighboring states and internal political certainty has been achieved.

Chernomyrdin Continues Visit to Austria

LD0811163293 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1118 GMT 8 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Ivan Ivanov, Aleksandr Kuzmin]

[Text] Vienna, 8 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—An agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Austria on trade and economic cooperation was signed today at the level of the ministries for external economic ties of the two countries within the framework of the official visit by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. According to the document, both countries grant one another most favorable trading status.

An intergovermental agreement on air communications was also signed at the level of the ministries of transport.

Russia and Austria undertook a commitment to not only seek to continue within the framework of current opportunities the traditional mutual supplies of goods, including Russian fuels to Austria, but also to expand the range of mutual commodity circulation. Transactions and payments between the two countries are to be carried out in freely convertible currency in accordance with the national legislation.

Taking into account the centuries-old foreign economic ties and existing level of economic, industrial, technical, and technological cooperation, Russia and Austria defined the following spheres for long-term cooperation: agriculture, food industry, light industry, power engineering, public health and medicine, chemical and petrochemical industry, timber-processing and pulp industry, electronics, and other industries.

Both sides believe that cooperation can take the form of setting up joint enterprises, missions, and branches of firms; direct investment and participation in the capital of enterprises; granting technologies; exchanging patents and licenses and providing financial and banking services.

Under the agreement, Russia and Austria will devote particular attention to all types of cooperation in the sphere of oil and gas industry, taking into account their particular significance for the economic development of both countries.

Russia and Austria also agreed to set up a joint Russian-Austrian commission on trade and economic cooperation, whose tasks will include, for example, the drawing up of proposals for improving and expanding commodity circulation and economic cooperation.

An intergovernmental agreement on air communications was also signed at the level of ministries.

Comments on Future Role

LD0811153593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1155 GMT 8 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Ivan Ivanov and Aleksandr Kuzmin]

[Text] Vienna, 8 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—"For the time being I am not thinking about whether to remain in the post of prime minister after the elections of 12 December. At the moment I am paying more attention to the work of the present government and to the implementation of the president's and government's economic program."

This is what Viktor Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russia Federation Council of Ministers, who is here on an official visit, said in an interview for Austrian television.

The premier said: "I think that in this difficult transition period we, the government, should be thinking less about whether we will remain in the cabinet after the elections." However, he voiced the hope that after the elections "the main backbone of the government would be retained."

Replying to a question whether he found it easy working with such a strong president as Boris Yeltsin, Viktor Chernomyrdin said that in his view "the stronger the top leader, the easier it is to work." "For me, for instance, there are no problems whatsoever there. Our main views coincide," the premier noted.

Encourages Austrian Investment

LD0811225493 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1728 GMT 8 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Ivan Ivanov and Aleksandr Kuzmin]

[Text] Vienna, 8 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—Speaking today to representatives of Austrian business circles at the Federal Economic Chamber, Viktor Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Council of Ministers, encouraged "Austrian investers to go to Russia more boldly." He added that there is a need for more active Austrian investment in the Russian economy, noting that the Russian Government is already taking measures to create favorable conditions for foreign investors.

V. Chernomyrdin said that the example of the functioning of the Austrian state system model is really interesting. In this connection, he proposed establishing cooperation with federal and regional bodies and firms from both countries in a joint comprehensive cooperation program which would enable Russian and Austrian experts to inform each other about the best achievements in various economic spheres.

The premier said that Russia and Austria have considerable experience of mutually beneficial cooperation, and that Austrian industry is playing an important role in satisfying Russia's need for many goods. At the same time, Austria is an important market for a number of Russian goods. "Despite a number of problems halting the development of our bilateral relations, the traditionally favorable conditions and prerequisites for a new dynamism are still present, and there is a very real potential for developing new mutually beneficial projects," Chernomyrdin said.

For most of his speech, V. Chernomyrdin informed Austrian business circles about the present conditions and prospects for the development of the Russian economy, and about the political situation on the eve of the elections on 12 December. In this regard he underscored the fact that "Russia's foreign policy remains unchanged." It will continue to be aimed at ensuring Russia's national and state interests through good-neighborliness, the strengthening of the CIS, partnership with the United Nations, the CSCE, and with democratic states.

The head of the Russian Government also said that "in the very near future" there will be radically important changes in conditions in which private foreign investors can operate in Russia. They will be connected with changes in current tax laws regulating foreign investments. The government, he continued, also wants to formulate laws on free economic zones, concessions, and other matters.

More on Chernomyrdin's Activities

LD0811214193 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Report by Natalya Chernyshova; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Excerpts] Even though Austria is among the top five of our main partners, and we have no political disagreements, it is not easy for the Russian delegation to conduct talks here. Our relations are marred by nonpayments. Their total value has now exceeded 67 billion schillings. Against the backdrop of a decline in Austria's industrial production, this is felt particularly painfully. Therefore, business circles have slowed down on joint contracts, and in 1992 the volume of trade went down by 10 percent. Understandably, the Russian side is keen to ease tensions in the sphere of trade and finance and to stimulate interest in our market.

We also have a lever—a possible increase in supplies of Russian gas—at acceptable prices. At least this is what the Viennese mayor repeatedly hinted at. And the reply from the prime minister was not long in coming: We've learned your lesson on how to determine prices, so rest assured that we'll set the right price this time. [passage omitted]

The prime minister laid wreaths at the monument to Soviet soldiers killed in action during the liberation of Vienna and at the monument to those who died fighting for Austria's freedom.

As we file our report, the head of our government is having a meeting with representatives of Austria's business circles at the Federal Economics Chamber.

Visit Focuses on Economic Ties

PM0911121193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 9 Nov 93 p 1

[Pavel Vasilyev report under the "Visits" rubric: "Russia Gives 'Green Light' To Austrian Capital"]

[Text] Viktor Chernomyrdin and Franz Vranitzky have reached agreement on extending trade and economic ties between their two countries.

Viktor Chernomyrdin's official visit to the Republic of Austria continued yesterday with talks with the Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky. Since arriving in Vienna Saturday, the guest from Moscow has been using his time profitably: He held a whole series of meetings Saturday and Sunday with Austrian politicians and businesspeople at his out-of-town residence at Gstadterboden. The sheer number of contacts being made by the head of the Russian Government can be explained. Despite the difficulties connected with the switch to the market economy and the implementation of economic and political transformations, our country remains an important trading partner for Austria. Forums of entrepreneurs from the two countries have recently taken place in Vienna, Graz, Linz, and other Austrian cities, indicating that local businessmen are showing a lot of interest in investing capital in Russia. At the present time more than 200 Russian-Austrian joint enterprises and firms have already been set up, and as a result of their activity Austria has very definitely become one of our most active trading partners.

But they face plenty of problems. Specialists believe that in order to continue this course we need first and foremost to provide the right political conditions and establish an appropriate juridical base. "Austrian businessmen," Michael Pecher, director of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber Administration for Contacts With East European Countries, said among other things, "frequently lack relevant information about the situation in the Russian market, investment opportunities, and new projects. But the Russian market has huge potential, and this factor could be a major stimulus to galvanizing trade contacts."

We may depend on it that the partners' interests were satisfied yesterday. As a result of the Vienna talks, Viktor Chernomyrdin and Franz Vranitzky signed an agreement on trade and economic cooperation under which both sides have granted each other most favored nation status. In other words, Russia and Austria have pledged to strive within the framework of their existing potential not only to continue with traditional reciprocal goods deliveries, including supplies of Russian energy sources to Austria, but also to extend the range of goods covered by reciprocal commodity exchange. According to Chancellor Vranitzky, Austrian firms could get more actively involved in developing new technologies, constructing new railroads on Russian territory, and developing the health care network and social facilities.

Kozyrev Views Veto on Increased Sanctions Against Libya

LD0811193293 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 8 Nov 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] As is already known, Russia has said that it will block new sanctions against Libya. These sanctions were proposed by the UN Security Council in retaliation for the failure to surrender of two terrorists connected with the blowing up of a U.S. plane in 1988. Nevertheless, there have been reports in the press that the resolution on tightening the sanctions would be passed with Russia's participation. Our correspondent asked Minister Andrey Kozyrev to explain.

[Begin Kozyrev recording] Today we are saying that we will even apply the veto, if we have to, in order to block this resolution, not because we are protecting terrorists, but because this resolution must take into consideration Russia's economic interests. The point is that Libya owes us a considerable amount of money for previously supplied goods. This means that Libya must pay its debt to us. We will only agree to adopt this resolution when its text unequivocally states that the new sanctions do not free Libya in any way from its responsibility of repaying its debt to Russia. [end recording]

'Clear-Cut' Resolution Sought

LD0811222293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2143 GMT 8 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Sitnikov]

[Text] United Nations November 9 TASS—Russia has called for a clear-cut resolution denouncing Libyan terrorists suspected of blowing up an American passenger plane over Lockerbie in 1988, but said its economic interests should not be infringed upon.

Commenting on the U.N. Security Council closed-door discussions on a draft resolution toughening sanctions against Libya proposed by the United States, France and Britain, Russian Ambassador to the U.N. Yuliy Vorontsov said that there have been much talk about "Russia's special position" on the draft resolution.

"The problem of terrorism is important for Russia now as never before, following what happened in our country in October. Therefore we will be very tough on any manifestations of terrorism both in our country and in the world. This part of the resolution is important to us. But equally important is the protection of Russian interests, especially financial and economic, which can be infringed upon by U.N. decisions. We are engaged in a very serious and thorough talk with the co-authors of the resolution in order to make sure that it does not infringe upon Russia's economic and financial interests. It is common knowledge that Libya has a big debt to Russia, but it does not pay the money for our economic and other assistance. And we do not want this resolution to deprive Libya of the possibility to pay off its debt," Vorontsov said.

He stressed that the Russian side and the co-authors have already reached "an understanding of the importance of this issue and the need to reflect this in the draft resolution." The draft resolution has been amended to include the following provision: "Nothing in this resolution will affect Libya's obligations to fulfil its commitments concerning the servicing and paying off of its foreign debt." The voting on the resolution is expected to take place this week.

Yeltsin Issues Instruction on Haiti Sanctions

LD0811174993 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1657 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow, 8 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—The press service of the Russian Federation president today issued for publication the instruction by President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin on Russian compliance with the UN Security Council sanctions against Haiti. It states:

In connection with the imposition by the UN Security Council of mandatory sanctions against the state of Haiti (resolutions 841 and 873), from 18 October 1993 until a decision to revoke them is passed:

1. It is established that:

Enterprises, institutions, organizations, and private individuals under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation are henceforth and until special instruction prohibited from selling, supplying, or transferring oil and petroleum products, weapons, military hardware and materials for them, including ammunition, uniforms, and equipment of the internal affairs bodies and spare parts for that equipment, and other material resources to any persons or bodies of Haiti, or to any other persons or bodies for any transaction by them on the territory or from the territory of Haiti, or from using for these purposes vessels sailing under the flag of the Russian Federation and aircraft, and also from any other activity that promotes the sale, supply or transfer of the above-mentioned material resources and property to the state of Haiti.

All forms of transport carrying these material resources and property are prohibited from being on the territory of Haiti or entering Haitian territorial waters.

All finances belonging to Haiti or directly or indirectly controlled by Haiti which are situated on the territory of the Russian Federation must be frozen in order to prevent their being used by the de facto authorities in Haiti. These funds may be released at the request of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide or Prime Minister Robert Malval.

2. The Russian Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations, the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Russian Ministry of Transport, the Russian State Customs Committee, and the Russian Bank:

Are to adopt the necessary measures to ensure the fulfillment by all enterprises, institutions, organizations, and individuals of the restrictions set out in the first paragraph of this instruction;

Are to present to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs information about measures to be adopted regarding the fulfillment of the resolutions of the UN Security Council.

Nuclear Weapons Dismantling To Be Discussed With Japan

LD0511215493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1842 GMT 5 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Kutakhov]

[Text] Tokyo November 5 TASS—The first session of a joint Japanese-Russian commission for cooperation in eliminating nuclear weapons subject to cutbacks in the Russian Federation and the storage of radioactive materials is to be held on November 12.

A decision to set up such a commission was taken during Russian President Boris Yeltsin's recent visit to Japan.

Main attention at the commission's first session is to be given to determining specific measures of Japanese-Russian cooperation in dismantling nuclear weapons and to procedural matters, the KYODO TSUSHIN news agency reported on Friday referring to the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

On the Russian side, the session will be attended by representatives of the Russian Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, and the nuclear power industry. Japan will be represented by Akira Hayashi, deputy foreign minister in charge of arms control and science, as well as by Sumio Edamura, Japanese ambassador to the Russian Federation.

At G-7 foreign and finance ministers' meeting in Tokyo in April this year, Japan announced the allocation of 100 million U.S. dollars for the dismantling of nuclear weapons in Russia.

A venue of the commission's session has not been reported. However, it is not ruled out that the commission will meet in Moscow.

Naval Engineer Says Nuclear Dumping Lawful

LD0511232593 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 2120 GMT 5 Nov 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] The recent dumping of radioactive waste in the sea by the Pacific Fleet is still being discussed by experts. The chief engineering administration of the Russian Navy believes that the international convention permitting the dumping of waste up to a specified concentration level still remains in force. At the same time the fleet's liquid waste storage cisterns are virtually full, while a total of 3.5 billion rubles are required to reprocess our submarine fuel.

[Begin recording of Ye. Karabanov, deputy head of the chief engineering administration of the Russian Federation Navy] It is now November, and we have so far received only three percent of the funds allocated for the construction of these purification installations. There is no reason why waste-dumping as such should be considered illegal because there is an international convention in force. The Americans are doing the same thing; they have not solved this problem either. Therefore, this is a matter of the future - when the state provides us with money, then we shall tackle the problem and build the facilities. But at present what happened around this whole conflict is probably just political games. [end recording]

Japanese Paper on Buildup of Russian Deposits Abroad

PM0811111093 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Nov 93 First Edition p 3

[Sergey Agafonov report: "Russian Banks' Foreign Deposits Top $15 Billion"]

[Text] Tokyo—Russian banks' total deposits in foreign banks and financial institutions currently exceed $15 billion, YOMIURI's London correspondent reports, citing reliable financial circles in Europe. According to the Japanese data, at the start of the current year this figure was considerably lower—of the order of 10 billion. In the last six months dollars have flowed out of Russia at an astronomical rate—over 1 billion a month. Analysts attribute this phenomenon to Russia's domestic instability and the desire of Russian companies and bankers to place their resources somewhere reliable backed up by appropriate Western guarantees. At the same time, as YOMIURI writes, the exodus of Russian resources to Western banks on such a scale clearly indicates that the Central Bank of Russia is unable to exercise its control functions and deal with the situation connected with the flows of currency.

Tokyo is more concerned by the problem of servicing foreign debt: Russia's liabilities already approach the $80 billion mark, but Moscow in practice is not paying its debts, citing the difficulties of the transitional period and extracting from its creditors one deferment after another for payment of interest on the principal. However, according to the calculations of specialists, the annual interest due on the total debt comes to around $5 billion. As Russia has $15 billion in current accounts in the West it is clearly in a position to pay at least the interest on its existing liabilities—the Japanese put the question precisely that way, dropping a heavy hint that major problems will arise for the Russian side at talks with creditors.

According to people in the know, there is another version of events which is not widely talked about at present but which could provide yet another explanation for the buildup of Russian deposits abroad. This relates to the increased trade in Russian debts. In the last six months the Japanese alone have sold over 300 million dollars' worth of this commodity. Old, "hopeless" Soviet debts inherited by Russia are being sold on tempting terms. The sellers are people who need working capital and cannot afford to wait forever, while certain anonymous investors in Europe are doing the buying. Tokyo sources do not confirm this directly, but do grant that Russia may currently be entering into some kind of complex financial arrangement in the debt market for which foreign assets are essential.

ROK, DPRK Business Activities in Khabarovsk Outlined

SK0911094693 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean 1000 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Summary of article from Moscow INTERNATIONAL LIFE: "Primorskiy Kray in Khabarovsk on the Threshold of the Pacific Era," from the "Various Aspects of Cooperation" program; date not given]

[Text] According to (Victor Mikiev), director of the Administrative Department in Primorskiy Kray in Khabarovsk, more than 10,000 businessmen a year from the North and the South have visited Primorskiy Kray in Khabarovsk. Of course, they do not visit Primosky Kray in Khabarovsk with the intention of viewing its beautiful scenery. ROK and DPRK businessmen have visited Primorskiy Kray due to its geological conditions. (Victor Mikiev) said that Primorskiy Kray in Khabarovsk can be the center of the economy of the Far East region.

The monthly magazine, INTERNATIONAL LIFE, reported: By using the developed transportation system in Primorskiy Kray, various countries in the Asia-Pacific region are securing a bridgehead to launch into Russia, other CIS countries, and East European countries. Khabarovsk is linked with Seoul and Pyongyang along the same sea route. This will play an important role. Because there are restaurants run by Korean compatriots in Primorskiy Kray in Khabarovsk, the representatives of business circles of the ROK and the DPRK can [words indistinct].

[Word indistinct] company, a joint venture company by the United States and Russia, has made frequent telephone contacts with (?Western) countries. This will be helpful to the brisk [word indistinct].

Samsung, Hyundai, Daewoo, and Lucky Goldstar are promoting joint ventures with Primorskiy Kray enterprises. This has been a reason for businessmen to visit Primorskiy Kray frequently. ROK companies have a great interest in [words indistinct]. According to a future project, petrochemical plants, fertilizer production plants, and foodstuff plants will be established in Primorskiy Kray.

The monthly magazine, INTERNATIONAL LIFE, reported: Stores that sell products imported from ROK companies appear in Primorskiy Kray. Local residents there are greatly interested in the goods.

Fourteen joint venture companies are operating in Primorskiy Kray with the participation of ROK companies. Russian and ROK businessman regard the ship building industry, ship repair industry, light industry, electric products, and machine tools as joint venture tasks.

In addition to expanding economic contacts with the ROK, Primorskiy Kray in Khabarovsk has maintained traditional friendly and cooperative economic relations with the DPRK. Enterprises in Primorskiy Kray have constantly provided petroleum products and timber to the DPRK.

For a long time, DPRK loggers have logged forests in Primorskiy Kray. Primorskiy Kray has met a demand for timber and building materials. INTERNATIONAL MAGAZINE reported: In a word, Primorskiy Kray in Khabarovsk has promoted cooperation with near neighbors, the ROK and the DPRK.

Vladivostok Seminar Views Banking Cooperation With ROK

PM0811145793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Nov 93 First Edition p 3

[Text] An international seminar attended by representatives of Russian and South Korean banks has opened in Vladivostok.

The meeting of representatives of the largest banks in Siberia, the Far East, and South Korea was initiated by the Far East's Association for Korean-Russian Cooperation (AKRC), which is also the chief sponsor. Opening the seminar, AKRC representative Yun Son-sun [name as transliterated] noted that this meeting constituted the first serious step in the development of cooperation between the banking systems of Russia and the ROK.

Vietnam Granted $40 Million Credit

LD0811100393 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0800 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] The turnover in trade between Russia and other former Soviet republics and Vietnam should be $130 million this year. This was reported by the VIA agency. It notes that this year Russia will grant Vietnam credit worth around $40 million for implementing programs in the field of power engineering and the construction of a number of enterprises.

Finnish Election Race Revives Claim to Karelia

PM0911111393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Nov 93 First Edition p 3

[Marat Zubko report: "Finland's Presidential Candidates Dream of Return of Karelia"]

[Text] Helsinki—A struggle for the post of head of state has begun in Finland: A presidential election will be held in 1994. Mauno Koivisto, who has occupied the post since 1982, has decided not to run and thus opened the way for other contenders. There are now 10 of them.

The present election campaign has a characteristic feature—it is taking place without interference from Moscow for the first time in the entire postwar period.

And here is the first surprise: Almost all of the contenders for the presidency advocate holding talks with Russia on the "Karelia question."

Even in the past there were forces in Finland wanting to secure the return of the areas in Karelia which went to the USSR under the 1944 Armistice Agreement and then the 1947 Paris peace treaty, but they were mainly right-wing groupings and the "Karelia" society.

Officials and established parties avoided supporting these demands. In January 1992 the fundamentally important Treaty on the Principles of Russian-Finnish Relations was signed, the first article of which enshrined the sides' aspiration to rely on the principles of the inviolability of borders and territorial integrity.

Presidents Mauno Koivisto of Finland and Boris Yeltsin of Russia, who met in July 1992, confirmed that our countries have no territorial claims on one another.

But the majority of presidential contenders are now departing from this line. Martti Ahtisaari, Social Democratic Party candidate and one of the leaders of the

Finnish Foreign Ministry who, according to polls, leads the pre-election marathon, has stated that he is prepared to enter into talks with Russia about Karelia provided that he perceives in its leadership a willingness to discuss the issue.

Admittedly Ahtisaari did warn that he would not like the Karelia problem to be a cause of conflict between Finland and Russia.

National Coalition (conservative) Party candidate Raimo Ilaskivi expressed himself in a more aggressive tone: He called on the Finnish Foreign Ministry directly to clarify when and on what terms talks on Karelia can begin. And former Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen noted that he could assist in the creation of conditions which will enable dialogue with Russia to begin, but "in accordance with the treaty on good-neighborliness."

Keijo Korhonen, the Independence Front candidate, proposed that Karelia should be leased from our country for 99 years.

Import of Finnish Nuclear Waste for Reprocessing Resumes

PM0811161193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Nov 93 First Edition p 3

[Marat Zubko report: "Finns Are Packing Off Their Radioactive Waste to Russia"]

[Text] Helsinki—A special train from Russia arrived at the nuclear electric power station near the city of Loviisa, which was built with Russian help, where it loaded up with 25 tonnes of spent nuclear fuel and set off in the direction of Chelyabinsk-65.

Spent fuel has been sent from Finland to our country since 1981. A pause then ensued in 1990, which has continued until the present time. Finnish specialists attribute this to a "muddle over prices."

But this is far from being the whole story. At parliamentary hearings held in Helsinki in September 1992 on the problem of burying nuclear waste, it was mentioned that a law had been adopted in Russia banning the import of spent fuel from other countries. Admittedly the Finns knew that exceptions to this law had been made for Hungary and the former Czechoslovakia. Helsinki was clearly hoping that a similar exception would be made in its own case. The indications are that an exception has indeed been made if a train has arrived from Chelyabinsk-65 in order to take waste away.

Finnish journalists asked Ossi Koskivirta, chairman of the Imatran Voima firm which operates the nuclear electric power station at Loviisa, to say how much it is costing to send spent fuel to Russia. He declined to give a direct answer, but said that "it is cheaper than building our own waste reprocessing facility." It could also be intimated from what he said that the company has a storage facility that can ensure stockpiling of spent nuclear fuel for several years in advance, and that that facility can be substantially enlarged if so desired. Nevertheless radioactive waste is being exported to Russia!

Sweden Charges Four Russians With Attempted Kidnapping

PM0811133793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Nov 93 First Edition p 3

[Marat Zubko report: "Visitors from St. Petersburg Had Secret Spetsnaz Equipment"]

[Text] Stockholm—Swedish Prosecutor General Kjell Ljljeholm has officially charged four Russians and a Swedish citizen of Polish origin with plotting to kidnap Peter Wallenberg, the industrial magnate and banker, and also with illegally importing military equipment into the country and using forged documents. IZVESTIYA described this attempted kidnap in its report entitled "How Our Divers Surfaced in a Swedish Jail" (issue No. 171).

Let me remind you that four members of the group were arrested outside Wallenberg's mansion in Stockholm and the fifth member was discovered in a cave on an island in the archipelago, where the police believe the banker was to have been taken. The kidnappers, using an underwater naval craft, intended to make the exchange (for $10 million) in the middle of Stockholm bay.

Now the men have been charged but the investigators still have quite a few questions unanswered. For example, how did the gang members manage to bring the equipment that they needed for the underwater voyage into Sweden?

The Swedes have established that our spetsnaz [special purpose] forces possess such equipment. Furthermore, as stated at a news conference in Stockholm, the aqualungs that they used are of the very latest design and were new even to Swedish military experts.

The Swedish police have not established the identity of the Russians although they have appealed to our law enforcement agencies for assistance. It transpires that the four Russians arrived in Helsinki by bus as part of a tour group from St. Petersburg. They passed through Finnish border control using Russian passports and then set off for Sweden on a Viking Line ship using forged Polish documents.

"The mysterious thing," Gosta Persson said, "is that, on its return journey, the bus carried the same number of tourists as entered Finland in the first place. Perhaps the kidnappers had an accomplice there who somehow managed to conceal the four men's absence..."

If the Russians did have passports of citizens from our country, why were the Swedes not able to establish their identity accurately? The fact is that specialists at Sweden's national forensic laboratory did establish that at least two of the passports had been filled out by one and the same person although they had been issued, according to the stamps in them, by different Russian militia agencies. That is why the investigators do not rule out the possibility that these documents are forgeries.

The Russians are saying that the Polish Swede duped them: He promised to find them work as drivers and divers and, when he took them to Wallenberg's home, he tried to make them help him rob the banker. Consequently there was a fight outside the building during which the police appeared on the scene and arrested them all [as published]. The Swedish police claim that no one offered any resistance and they all surrendered their weapons at once.

Government Position on European Security Assessed

LD0811181693 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1810 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Commentary written by Anatoliy Potapov; read by announcer]

[Text] Statements by Russian leaders and Russia's steps in the European scene eloquently speak of Moscow's approach to European security. This is the opinion of Anatoliy Potapov:

The first thing to be mentioned is the foundation of the European concept. Russia stands for an all-European security system, which means that such an objectives can be reached only together through the joint efforts of all countries of Europe. President Boris Yeltsin stressed the point in his recent interview for the German magazine STERN. Hence, the all-European support of Russia for the strengthening of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Moscow is trying to cooperate with other members of the conference in this sphere.

The latest example is the joint declaration of Russia and Denmark, signed during the recent visit to Copenhagen by the Russian prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin. It stresses that both sides consider many-sided cooperation in the framework of the conference as the best instrument of guaranteeing security and stability.

Russia's policy of building an all-European security system largely explains Moscow's interest in the French initiative that provided for signing a treaty with all European countries with the purpose of strengthening stability. The details of the idea were described by the French prime minister, Edouard Balladur, during his recent visit to Moscow. Russia intends to actively take part in the French initiative.

There is also another important circumstance. The Russian concept of building a continental security system provides for strengthening lasting neighborly relations with countries of East and Central Europe in the new political conditions. This makes clear the negative attitude of Russia to the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Such an expansion would not remove the key threat of Europe today—ethnic conflicts. At the same time, NATO would be opposed to the all-European scale of the Helsinki conference, which would be fraught with a new split of Europe.

There is a better alternative to the expansion of NATO: the concept of partnership for peace. The concept approved by the NATO leaders does not affect the national interests of any countries, including Russia, and it can promote the joint efforts of European countries to maintain peace in Europe. That is why Russia has expressed readiness to contribute to the development of the constructive idea of such a partnership.

Council of Europe 'Experts' To Observe Election

PM0511170193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Nov 93 First Edition p 3

[Yuriy Kovalenko report: "Council of Europe To Help Russia Stage Elections"]

[Text] Paris—Council of Europe experts will arrive in Russia in mid-November to cooperate closely with the Central Electoral Commission.

They will be making their assessments of the organization of the elections in Russia, including access to the mass media. Moreover, the Council of Europe will be sending observers to the actual elections—three groups of five people each who will be working in Moscow and two other cities.

UK To Participate

PM0911093993 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 6 Nov 93 p 1

[Unattributed, untitled report from the "Focus of Attention" column]

[Text] Great Britain will send 20 representatives to Russia to observe the parliamentary elections in December. The British party of experts, which will include parliamentarians, will work in Russia together with similar groups from other countries and international organizations. They will be given free access to study all aspects of the elections, including press coverage.

Forum Ponders Relations with East Europe

PM0811140393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Nov 93 First Edition p 3

[Stanislav Kondrashov article: "East Europe and Russian Policy. Critical View of Foreign Policy Council"]

[Text] At what stage are relations between Russia and East Europe now, relations which had quite recently been described in unambiguous terms by the Soviet Union as "eternal inviolable friendship" within the Warsaw Pact and CEMA?

At least three answers were evident in the speeches by participants in the latest session of the public consultative Foreign Policy Council, who met Wednesday on the seventh floor—home to the leadership—of the Foreign Ministry skyscraper.

That we are at a "new stage" when we will have to clear away the obstacles of the past "not even from scratch, but from a negative position."

That we are at a "long stage of restoring our positions" in the East European region, without which it will be impossible for the new Russia to have the status of great power.

Or that we are at the stage of the "end of a whole era"—and that it would be a good idea to end one era and begin another with a "policy speech" on the same scale (but with different content) as Churchill's 1946 speech at Fulton.

The first answer shows the dominant official optimism of the diplomat, the second the sober assessment of the historian. The economist voices alarm backed up by facts. For instance, more than one-half of our rail locomotives came to us from the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, but with our current financial chaos the price of each one has leapt to 2 billion rubles [R]; the functioning of the Trans-Siberian Railroad is in jeopardy, since funds can be found for "Snickers" bars but not for locomotives. An international affairs specialist added that, because of the distribution of duties within CEMA, virtually all medicines were produced in East Europe. Now they are being shipped neither to us, where they are needed, nor to West Europe, where better versions are available.

Yes, we are clearing the obstacles away and concluding new top-level political treaties. We have apologized for Katyn and for Budapest 1956, but even in the former "fraternal" countries there are hundreds of thousands of people out of work or threatened with the loss of their job because of the loss of the Soviet, Russian market. Are we not "morally responsible" after tying them to us for decades and then suddenly dumping them by refusing to countenance the clearing system and making the adventuristic transition to transactions in hard currency? Since the Russian system of foreign economic relations is disorganized, people in the countries of Central and East Europe are already looking past Russia to China. In the future, as one speaker put it, China may play the same role in their system of foreign economic relations as the Soviet Union did until recently.

Thus Russia, in recreating its relations with its immediate, further-flung, and "intermediate" neighbors, is encountering different attitudes, in which today's rather than yesterday's disadvantages outweigh tomorrow's benefits. Beneath the "thin layer" of "new-generation" treaties signed by the president there is a lack of any mechanisms to produce new effective forms of cooperation. And there is one other unofficial characteristic—"the region has changed from an area where Moscow's influence predominated into a region with a cool, restrained, mistrustful, and sometimes even unfriendly attitude toward us."

The Foreign Policy Council was meeting to take a critical look at the situation, and its members set about their job with such a will that the idea immediately arose of requesting the press to leave the session.

Our former allies in the former Soviet Union are eager to join NATO, which embarrasses not only Russia—suddenly facing the prospect of isolation in Europe—but even NATO itself, which is trying to avoid any growth in Russian suspicions or any dilution of its ranks with countries of another sort. The Americans have dreamed up the face-saving formula of "partnership" with NATO. Secretary of State Christopher gave it a successful airing before his NATO colleagues in Brussels recently and before the Russian leadership in Moscow.

Addressing the Council session, Andrey Kozyrev welcomed the U.S. initiative as a way out of a delicate situation, in which Russia "cannot prohibit" other states from joining NATO but, at the same time, cannot agree to an "expansion of NATO without Russian participation." But here too one expert could not avoid voicing a criticism which is hard to counter—why does Russia even on this important issue just have to follow in the Americans' wake, happy to compliment them without making its own timely initiatives?

The past, by no means single-stage, era has left East European peoples and what are fashionably termed their elites with the difficult legacy of enforced "communization" that is fundamentally demeaning to their national worth. But they have also inherited a huge infrastructure of diverse ties, intermeshed cultures, and mutual spiritual warmth. That has remained. Left to the whim of fate have been the nationalistic slogan "back to basics, and then..." or the other version—you can't make an omelet without breaking eggs. Well, there is no such thing as a well-ordered upheaval. But still it's sad... The new people, the new elite, the new commerce of Russia, looking past East Europe to the West and to America, are not utilizing the potential of the "Russian lobby," our homegrown special services, or the half-century-long experience of joint existence in the light of age-old historic roots.

This too was mentioned at the council meeting. As was the fact that the lessons of countries which had moved to the market economy ahead of us and had derived a cautionary experience (regarding "shock therapy")—which both the Russians and the IMF advisers selected by Moscow have lacked—have not been learned.

The Russian foreign minister termed relations with East and Central Europe a Russian foreign policy priority. One of the speakers noted that even priorities have their own numbering system. It is obvious that number one for Russia will be relations with our closest neighbors, number two will be relations with the West, number three will probably be relations with the East. Central and East Europe will therefore rank fourth or fifth. Yes, Russia now has different immediate neighbors. It is giving the main priority to them, not wishing to bid farewell to the CIS states in the same thoughtless way the USSR under Gorbachev bade farewell to the socialist camp.

But if the picture is widened geographically and the task historically, who can argue that the new democratic Russia will indeed be unable to be a great power without some new, lasting, and voluntarily friendly relations with those peoples to whom fate has bond us for so long.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman on COCOM Restrictions

LD0511200193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1323 GMT 5 Nov 93

[Text] Russia's relations with the Coordinating Committee on Export Control (COCOM) is a major issue in this country's joining the world economic system, Mikhail Demurin, a spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, said at a briefing Friday.

He said that Moscow was pleased with statements COCOM member nations had made that there were no political reason why restrictions on trade with Russia should not be lifted. "But we believe that once Russia has met all COCOM conditions its member states should have Russia left out of COCOM black lists," the Foreign Ministry official said.

The next logical step, he thinks, would be to think of closing down COCOM as a Cold War tool, Demurin said.

In his words, "we were pleased to know that the Western countries were engaged in active discussion of this subject. We welcome the idea of replacing COCOM with an organization that would supervise exports of "dual-purpose" goods and technologies. [quotation marks as received]

Thanks Canada for Aid

LD0511194193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1430 GMT 5 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Boris Krivoshey and Aleksandr Suprun]

[Text] Moscow November 5 TASS—The Russian Government has expressed deep gratitude for the Canadian Government and people for provided aid, said Mikhail Demurin, director of the Russian Foreign Ministry press and information department at a briefing held here on Friday.

The humanitarian aid worth 4.8 million dollars was delivered by transport planes of the Canadian Air Force which performed 22 flights to the cities of Tver, Ivanovo, Yoshkar-Ola, Ryazan and Syvtyvkar.

As a result of the humanitarian mission, 480 maternity and children's hospitals of 17 regions and 4 republics of the Russian Federation were provided with necessary medications and medical facilities, the Russian diplomat said.

Political Issues

Yeltsin Signs Text of Draft Constitution

LD0811144093 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1400 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin today signed the text of Russia's draft constitution, which is being put to a nationwide referendum on 12 December, after several amendments had been made. In the concluding stage, the editing of the text was carried out by a group of prominent philologists and legal editors that was set up on the instructions of the president. The draft constitution will be given to the mass media on 9 November for publication. The orginal of the draft constitution signed by the president is being sent to the Central Electoral Commission where it will be kept until the results of the nationwide referendum are known.

Mayak Details Constitution

LD0911065693 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0430 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] Russia's draft new constitution will be handed to the mass media for publication today. According to the draft, Russia will be a federal republic with a strong presidency and equal subjects of the Federation. The president is elected for a four-year term, but cannot remain in office for longer than two terms. A special article allows the current president to remain in office until the end of his term—1996. The draft does not envisage the post of vice president. Parliament consists of two chambers—the Federation Council and the State Duma. The draft guarantees the right to private ownership of land and free enterprise. Citizens can move freely in and out of Russia. Censorship is not allowed.

Filatov on New Constitution

BR0811155193 Rome L'UNITA in Italian 7 Nov 93 p 11

[Interview with Sergey Filatov, head of President Yeltsin's administration, by Sergio Sergi in Moscow on 6 November: "'No More Conflicts With Deputies; Executive Will Be Very Strong'"]

[Text] Moscow—"Here is the new constitution." Sergey Aleksandrovich Filatov, 57, head of the presidential administration, showed me the typewritten sheets contained in a red file. It was Saturday morning in the Kremlin, the eve of the holiday. Outside on Red Square, a long line of people stood outside Lenin's mausoleum, and even though the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution falls on a Sunday, the official holiday is still being celebrated this morning. So tomorrow, Monday, will be a holiday, too. Red October has been blacklisted, Vladimir Ilich's tomb will soon be removed, and the Soviets have been closed down by decree, together with the White House bombarded on 4 October, but a holiday is a holiday. Perhaps for the last time. It is Yeltsin who signed the decree for a referendum on the draft constitution—the very document, still lacking a definite form, that lies on the desk of the president's most influential aide, the man who supervises the complex work of the Kremlin apparatus—a powerful man, in other words.

The text of the constitution, in three parts (the first comprising the 137 principal articles, the other two the transitional provisions that will lapse in two years) will be released to the main newspapers and press agencies Tuesday to be published the following day, at the last minute. It is like a race against time. That date will leave exactly one month before the Russians go to the polls, 12 December, the same day as the Federal Assembly elections and elections in some major cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg. Filatov confirmed the numerous substantial changes to the draft constitution originally drawn up in July. "There have been some 70 amendments," he said, "but we have resolved all the controversial issues." From what he told us, it seems quite clear that, according to this draft, Russia will become a presidential state. In a sharp turn toward centrism, the Federal Treaty, a key agreement between the center and the major outlying areas, has been relegated to the position of a mere appendix and is only effective if it does not conflict with the constitution. The concept of the ethnic republics' "sovereignty" has disappeared, and the new parliament will remain in office for only two years in this first legislative term, with a view to "political and economic stabilization." The president will appoint the prime minister, and it will be up to the president to dissolve both the government and parliament in the event of an insoluble dispute between these two authorities.

[Sergi] Sergey Aleksandrovich, what kind of republic emerges from the new constitution?

[Filatov] It cannot be called either presidential or parliamentary. Interference between the legislative and the executive authorities has been eliminated. There will no longer be a duality of power. The State Duma and the Federation Council will deal with laws and the most important appointments. In other words, we will have a republic with a very strong executive power.

[Sergi] Could this not give rise to a sharp conflict with the republics and the regions?

[Filatov] If we are talking about the sovereignty of the states, we must admit that the nation that we are building is not a federation but a confederation, but having agreed that Russia is a federation, the word "sovereignty" must disappear because it embodies an element of ambiguity. We learned this when the USSR was dissolved. That was when it all started.

[Sergi] Why will the first legislative term last only two years and not four? Do you fear the election of a parliament hostile to the present leadership?

[Filatov] It is not easy to make forecasts about parliament's composition. When the reforms were begun we knew how inevitable power changes were at times of transition, both in the government and in parliament.

We must take it for granted that we will have further periods of political and economic crisis. For this very reason we decided that this period must be short—two years, in fact. We preferred to specify this period rather than to leave it indeterminate. From the first days of their election, deputies must be aware of this limited time available to them. In these two years they will have to perform a huge amount of work.

[Sergi] You are a representative of the "Russia's Choice" bloc, the favorite grouping. Are you in favor of a coalition government?

[Filatov] Actually we already have a coalition government. Not all the ministers think the same way, and they are not all the same. Different structures operate behind each of them. It would be a bad thing for there to be a homogeneous government. There will have to be a coalition, and I think that it should comprise Gaydar, Shakhray's party, and Yavlinskiy's, and also Sobchak's and Popov's movement, but it is important to reach an agreement before the election.

[Sergi] Deputy Prime Minister Shakhray has gone on vacation to avoid having the cost of his election campaign burden the government structures. Is that an example to be followed?

[Filatov] What would happen to the government if all the ministers who are parliamentary candidates were to go on vacation? I must admit, however, that Shakhray's move did cause some embarrassment. What can I say? If Shakhray has decided to go on vacation, then let him go by all means.

[Sergi] Tomorrow is 7 November. Will it be a holiday or a regular Sunday?

[Filatov] I heard an appeal over the radio urging people to regard it as an ordinary day of rest. I support that appeal.

Kazannik Comments

PM0911112393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Nov 93 First Edition p 5

[Article by Russian Federation General Prosecutor Aleksey Kazannik: "Draft Russian Constitution Could Be Fatal for Prosecutor's Office"]

[Text] As Russian general prosecutor, whose function, at least through the middle of December this year, consists in implementing supreme and independent oversight of the observance of the regime of legality in the country, I wholeheartedly support the president's desire to present voters as soon as possible with the draft of the new Constitution and later, if it is approved at a nationwide referendum, to implement it immediately. The new Constitution will also make more specific the tasks of the prosecutor's office organs but on the minimum condition that they continue to exist at all in the renewed country.

I deeply respect the opinions voiced by various participants in the Constitutional Conference and I highly assess the work done by the conference's working commission headed by Sergey Filatov, which has prepared what is at present the last version of the draft constitution. As one of millions of ordinary voters, on 12 December I shall vote for this draft at the referendum, but at the same time unless changes are made to it within the next few days, before its publication, in that section which directly concerns the organs of the prosecutor's office, then after counting the results of the referendum all that may be left for me will be to gather together the workers of the general prosecutor's office, send telegrams to our local staffers thanking them all for their service, and say good bye, explaining that the prosecutor's office as such no longer exists in Russia.

Article 129 of the draft constitution in its final wording retains for the prosecutor's office only the function of pressing state charges in court, as it were cutting off all other functions. This function is without any doubt extremely important and necessary but as of today it far from exhausts all the tasks and avenues in the activity of the prosecutor's office and for all its importance is not paramount among these tasks.

Today I see overall oversight of the observance of the regime of legality as being among the main tasks of the prosecutor's office organs from the General Prosecutor's Office to its local organs. And however difficult it is to maintain it in a state where laws are constantly changing and where what is under way is essentially only the frequently painful establishment of genuine legality, the prosecutor's office has until recently coped with that task. I shall not say it has coped brilliantly but nonetheless it has coped more successfully than anyone else. With a view to saving time I shall not now cite figures or give examples o the defense of citizens' violated rights and freedoms by the prosecutor's office organs but believe me, they are convincing enough.

The idea of predominantly court oversight of the observance of legality, the expansion of court methods of defending citizens' rights, and the transfer of the center of gravity of law enforcement work to the courts accords with the overall doctrine of the rule-of-law democratic state and I welcome it wholeheartedly, but first, I do not see here any obstacles to the prosecutor's office continuing, for its part, and improving its activity in overseeing the observance of laws and maintaining the regime of legality and not limiting its activity merely to helping the courts. Second, when the court system, like all other systems in our country, is now experiencing serious difficulties, including organizational and cadres difficulties, oversight by the prosecutor's office in that field, including oversight which does not demand in each case statements from the victims of law violation, is prompter and as a whole more effective than more unwieldy court control.

In the long term I do not have anything against the creation of an independent investigation committee with its own vertical structure which would assume the independent investigation of the majority of criminal cases although I would suppose that it would be expedient to keep the investigation of the most complex and important cases for the prosecutor's office organs. Actually, in my view it would be premature today to discuss this division of competence and it is totally inappropriate to be in a hurry to reach a decision for such a complex question. What I do not doubt is that as of today in terms of the historical circumstances which have taken shape a full and objective investigation of, for instance, complex and in every aspect important cases such as cases involving mass riots during the October events in Moscow is only within the powers of the prosecutor's office organs, which have the necessary experience and cadres and technical experience and I simply cannot see any other contenders for this in many ways thankless work.

When at the height of these events Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin telephoned me in Omsk and asked me to head the General Prosecutor's Office and I agreed, aware of the full measure of my responsibility to the Russian people, it was not specified in any way that I was being invited to chair a liquidation commission. Nonetheless, since that is how it has turned out, I am prepared to serve the Fatherland in that capacity too, if I am convinced that this reorganization of the prosecutor's office organs will serve the creation in Russia of a rule-of-law democratic state. But, on the one hand, I am not yet convinced of this, we must give the matter a lot of thought and not act rashly. On the other hand even a liquidation commission always works for the necessary time, without this panic-stricken haste, ensuring continuity between state organs, especially those performing such crucial and vitally essential functions.

It is difficult for me even to imagine what will happen in the country groaning today under the onslaught of crime if the functions which are today performed for better or worse by the prosecutor's office organs are halted even for a very short while. But that is exactly what will happen if the recommendations of the Constitutional Conference working commission and the president's constitutional arbitration commission are fulfilled. Seeking the reasons for such a strange decision, I still cannot understand whether it is the result of the "academic" frivolity, divorced from living practice, of those scientists who made up the above-mentioned arbitration commission, whether it is the result of the struggle for power, for influence and possession of the power structures, a struggle in which I am not yet that versed but in which the prosecutor's office or its prerogatives and its cadres potential are indeed the main "prize," or whether even, and I do not rule this out, what is manifested here is the result of lobbying by some mafia structures and other politics-mongering forces interested in destabilizing the situation in the country and weakening the effectiveness of law enforcement work.

Whereas in the summer I constantly took part in the work of the Constitutional Conference as an ordinary doctor of juridical sciences from the provinces representing the president's interests, since my appointment as general prosecutor I have lost my former seat at the Constitutional Conference and no one has invited me there in some other capacity. I am probably very much to blame for the fact that I did not promptly abandon my provincial intellectual habits and did not impose myself as an uninvited guest, since in this case it was probably essential to insist on it. But the fact is that I did not take part, I was not recruited to a single session of the Constitutional Conference working commission or the constitutional arbitration commission even when they passed their verdict on the future fate of the Russian prosecutor's office.

Now only a few days are left until the publication of the draft constitution which is being submitted for referendum—a few days during which it is still possible to correct my blunder and the existing situation. So I assume responsibility in this emergency and venture to ask the mass media for aid in order to draw the broad public's attention to this issue.

I do not insist that the constitution should enshrine once and for all any tough formulations which would preserve the prosecutor's office organs in the form in which they exist today. The prosecutor's office is undoubtedly in need of reform to the same extent that our entire state system is in need of reform, and perhaps even more so. But I shall object categorically to the reform of the prosecutor's office in isolation from other law enforcement organs. This must be done in a system, rationally redistributing functions and forces over a brief transitional period which is nonetheless sufficient primarily to ensure continuity.

At the same time it seems to me absolutely essential to enshrine in the Constitution the principle of vertical subordination and the procedure for appointing prosecutors which as far as I know has not been done in the last wording of the draft. As a result in some national republics there are already plans for the appointment of prosecutors by the republics' supreme soviets and other republican representative organs. These prosecutors will not so much supervise the execution of federal laws and the president's edicts as defend the local "sovereignties bandwagon," which threatens to involve a repetition of the "war of laws" and the destruction of the Russian state's unity and territorial integrity.

I would formulate article 129 of the draft constitution approximately as follows: "The Russian Federation prosecutor's office comprises a single centralized system with the subordination of lower-ranking prosecutors to higher-ranking prosecutors and to the general prosecutor. The general prosecutor is appointed by the Federation Council upon representation from the president. The prosecutors of the republics within the Russian Federation are appointed by the general prosecutor by agreement with the republics' representative organs. All other prosecutors are appointed by the Russian Federation general prosecutor. The powers, structure, and forms of activity of the prosecutor's office are determined by federal law."

This norm, which leaves questions of determining the tasks and functions of the prosecutor's office to the future Federal Assembly, would not block opportunities for the subsequent swift and at the same time considered reform of prosecutor's office organs in systemic connection with the other law enforcement organs. It would be necessary and sufficient in the Constitution. On the other hand what is proposed in the latest version of the draft could mean the death of the Russian prosecutor's office. And I would be very reluctant to be the willing or unwilling accomplice to this murder.

"I got that off my chest."

Yeltsin Edict on Transport Ticket Purchase

LD0811215793 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 2000 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] According to the press service of the Russian president, Boris Yeltsin signed an edict today on additional measures to implement his decree on the freedom of trade. The document says that the purpose of introducing additional measures is the concern about strengthening the protection of citizens' rights. To do this, a number of amendments are being made to the decree on the freedom of trade of 29 January 1992; these are designed to regulate the procedure for obtaining tickets for all types of transport by the population. The ministries of railways and internal affairs are instructed to take additional measures to remove shortcomings in organizing the sale of tickets to passengers and in curtailing abuse during their sale.

On International Loan Treaties

LD0811215693 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 2000 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] Today President Yeltsin signed an edict on the procedure for making decisions with regard to concluding Russia's international treaties on granting and obtaining state loans and credits. In particular, the document determines that international treaties on loans and credits be submitted for ratification by Russia's Federal Assembly in cases when their implementation requires changes in the limits of the state's foreign borrowings and credits to foreign countries, which are approved annually. In this connection, the government is required to draw up a proposal on the procedure for establishing such limits and submit it to the Federal Assembly before 1 January 1994. Moreover, the Russian Cabinet has been instructed to prepare a number of other proposals on this issue.

On Cultural Heritage Register

LD0811223593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1725 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow, 8 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—It was reported at the press service of the Russian Federation president today that on 6 November Boris Yeltsin signed an edict "On the Inclusion of Individual Objects in the State Register of Especially Valuable Objects of the Cultural Heritage of the Peoples of the Russian Federation." Here is the text of the edict:

For the purpose of ensuring that the historical and cultural heritage of the peoples of the Russian Federation be kept intact, I decree:

1. that the following objects, recommended by the state council of experts, under the Russian Federation president, for especially valuable objects of the cultural heritage of the peoples of the Russian Federation should be included in the state register of especially valuable objects of the historical and cultural heritage of the peoples of the Russian Federation:

The State Academic Mariynskiy Theatre (St. Petersburg);

The state historical, architectural, and ethnographic museum reserve of "Kizhi" (The church of the Saviour in Kizhi, its cemetery clergy house, and adjacent buildings, Republic of Karelia);

The State Film Fund of the Russian Federation (Moscow Oblast);

The state memorial and nature reserve of the "L. N. Tolstoy House Museum of 'Yasnaya Polyana'" (Tula Oblast);

The "Badge of Honor" decorative painting factory in Zhostovo (Zhostovo works, Moscow Oblast);

The Russian state historical archive (St. Petersburg);

The Russian archive of ancient documents (Moscow).

2. The Council of Ministers - the Government of the Russian Federation is charged with taking the necessary measures to provide for the operation of the objects indicated in point 1 of this edict in accordance with the decisions adopted earlier on especially valuable objects of the cultural heritage of the peoples of the Russian Federation.

Zorkin Denies He Falsified Minutes of Court Session

PM0911114593 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Nov 93 p 2

[Interview with Valeriy Zorkin, former chairman of the Russian Constitutional Court, by Boris Slavin; place and date not given: "Valeriy Zorkin: 'We Now Have an Autocratic Regime'"]

[Text] As is well known, Valeriy Zorkin, former chairman of the Constitutional Court, has been accused by his colleague N. Vitruk of falsifying the minutes of the Constitutional Court session on 21 September 1993 when the president's edict was examined. Boris Slavin, editor of the political science department, now talks with Valeriy Zorkin.

[Slavin] Valeriy Dmitriyevich, I have just been driving along the Moscow streets: There was no one around but the militia, and this on 7 November. You get the feeling that we are living in a police state. Is the charge against you of falsifying the minutes of the Constitutional Court session on 21 September 1993 not linked to that?

[Zorkin] If there has been any falsification going on, then it was done by Vitruk himself, clearly on the orders of the new political commissars. All this is being directed from on high, just like the problem of my dismissal. We have an authoritarian regime here now, to put it mildly. This is simply an autocratic regime, as we would say here. In these conditions, now that the Constitutional Court has been banned, people with a civic conscience would do well to keep their head down and say nothing.

[Slavin] Nevertheless, Valeriy Dmitriyevich, why is Vitruk making such an accusation against you six weeks after the event?

[Zorkin] First, there is the interest of the new leadership of the Constitutional Court itself. On Wednesday the president stated that he wants the Constitutional Court to remain in its full membership. As he said, the conscientious workers will be re-elected. People have begun trying to prove that they are conscientious. Vitruk began by assembling some judges to revoke the Constitutional Court's decision of 21 September (I do not think that will be the last attempt). When that failed he raised the question of falsification of the minutes. Despite the fact that the Constitutional Court session was held in public in full view of everyone and there is a corresponding tape recording which matches these minutes. I hope that it has been kept because if people wanted they could recreate the whole course of the discussion and check it against the existing minutes. The final decision was adopted openly. However, I saw the verbatim account of those minutes only yesterday.

The second aspect is the figure of Zorkin himself. They want to grind me into the dust. After all, we are living in a state where some people have nightmares about the bloody deeds that they have committed. Hence the desire to pin the blame on someone else. And to find a scapegoat. On 5 October Filatov told me bluntly that I was the main ideological inspirer and legal supporter of the coup. If the chairman of the Constitutional Court had not adopted the decision on the unconstitutionality of the president's edict No. 1400 it would all have been different, there would have been no bloodshed outside the White House, and so forth. I want to stress that the Constitutional Court chairman in that instance and in all other instances merely summarizes the viewpoint of the judges. He cannot adopt an independent decision. I do not know, perhaps there are other considerations, this has to be borne in mind. After all, the "Lefortovo case" is in progress and Filatov openly threatened me with criminal liability.

October Revolution's Relevance Pondered

PM0811160193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Nov 93 p 1

[Editorial: "October 1917 Is Part of History. It Is Senseless To Dispute This Fact"]

[Text] November 7... Until quite recently that was unquestionably a "red letter day" on the calendar. The streets were ablaze with red, there were reports on labor achievements, parades, and demonstrations. Now society's attitude toward this date is far more complex. Society is split and the division is caused among other things by that "red letter day" itself. Some are ready to fight for the old ideals, others are ready to fight against them. But the majority is uncertain and confused: Just what does 7 November mean now? Is it a holiday or not? Is it a memorable date or not?

We really need certainty on all things right now. We need certainty on this matter, too. Probably the best thing would be not to take to the streets, hold rally after rally, wave flag after flag, and display hatred after hatred. But instead think calmly and clearly: Who are we, where do we come from, and where are we going?

It is no secret that many people harbor a nostalgia for those holidays which seemed, among other things, to be days when the people were united. It is not true that in those days it was all just convention and falsehood: That it was just the slogans of the Central Committee that were heard through the microphone and ostentatious exclamations of "Hurrah!" No, there was much that was sincere and truly festive about it.

The changes that have taken place in the country have been too great, and the unanimous rejoicing over the October Revolution anniversaries that we used to have is hardly likely to return. On the other hand, it is hardly possible to expunge this date from people's memories so easily. Ultimately, October means not just the storming of the Winter Palace. It is not just the civil war which followed that event. It also means millions of lives, a vast number of great deeds and events, a great number of memorable symbols, feelings, and milestones, which are bound to remain with us. Let us recall, for example, the memorable parade on Red Square in 1941 from which the fighters went straight to the front line to defend the capital against the fascists. A parade which became a symbol of the people's spirit and steadfastness. After all, that was on the anniversary of October.

In today's debates about October 1917 you sometimes hear people say: If that great upheaval had not happened in Russia's history, we would be leading different lives today. There is one question here: Who is this we? If the revolution had not taken place when it did we would not be as we are today. Which way Russia would have gone, how its fate would have turned out at the perplexing crossroads of the 20th century, and would it have survived at all given some of the alternative paths of development? These are all questions to which there are not and there never will be answers.

There are simpler, more down to earth, and more personal questions that could be asked. Would our fathers have met our mothers at life's crossroads? Would our grandfathers have met our grandmothers had the events of 1917 not happened? Who knows?

"We are all the children of October"—a truly philosophical meaning suddenly appears in that old propaganda formula today. In fact even the biographies of our political and intellectual leaders for some reason make no mention of aristocratic roots. Nor does one hear any mention of the fact that the thrusting "pillars" of the country's business are descendants of the bourgeoisie. And those publicists who very casually claim that the revolution was carried out "by the lumpens alone" are not exactly the sons of courtiers either. "We all emerged from the people, children of a laboring family." There is nothing you can do about that: That is how things have developed in Russia.

Of course, you can blame the bolsheviks for everything. You can claim that the revolution was made by the lumpens, but a revolution cannot be "made" because those who are always to "blame" for revolutions are not only the revolutionaries themselves and those who follow them but also the authorities who lack the wisdom and flexibility to prevent social cataclysms and the perpetually silent majority whose silence sanctions historical acts of violence...

Revolutions like the one we always called, with justification, the Great October Revolution are not the result of a conspiracy by some group or other. They grow out of contradictions of colossal force and scale. They grow out of history itself. They are the drama and destiny of the people.

Every nation has had its "revolutionary epoch." One in the 17th century, another in the 18th. France, for example, was shaken by revolution throughout the 19th century. In Russia's case it was the 20th century...

Have the revolutions ended in Russia? As long as some are ready to fight to the death for the "ideas of October" and others are equally ready to fight to the death to eradicate them, the question will hang over us like a sword of Damocles... Would it not be better to set a different and common aim? To work together to try and understand what we can learn from everything that has happened to the country in past decades—from the storming of the Winter Palace to the storming of the White House. Does November 7 do nothing but divide society? Is it really impossible to find in it something which can unite society too, if you want to?

October 1917 is part of history. It is senseless to dispute that fact. The past cannot be rewritten, you cannot fight the past, but you cannot bring the past back either. You have to treat the past as it is done in civilized societies—calmly, wisely, with respect, understanding, and a desire to learn the lessons contained therein.

Recently there was a press report that, in addition to the problem of Lenin's mausoleum and the problems of the endless renaming of streets which seem to have confused even native Muscovites, someone is thinking of creating another problem: The idea is being fostered of replacing the red stars on the Kremlin with the old eagles... Of course, those eagles are part of history, too, but the stars on the Kremlin towers—are they not history, too? There has been nothing ideological about this since time immemorial. They are simply a good and conventional symbol.

Strictly speaking, what good will these changes bring to our difficult lives? Is this really the most important thing, the most urgent thing for a Russia already torn apart by contradictions and crisis? A plus times a minus remains a minus, just as a minus times a plus also remains a minus. Will we understand that this is not a mathematical truth but an historical one?

Perhaps the Kremlin stars will remain in place then? Perhaps they will be allowed to shine?

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76 Arrested for Attempting To Hold Illegal Rallies

LD0811173093 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1200 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] Law enforcement bodies arrested 76 people during atempts to hold unsanctioned rallies in Moscow on 7 November, according to a report by the public relations centers of the Russian Security Ministry. There were also 54 reports on instances of administrative offenses drawn up.

Barannikov Aide To Be Security Ministry Information Chief

MK0911092093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 9 Nov 93 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Barannikov's Man Appointed Chief of Security Ministry's Main Administration"]

[Text] Lieutenant Colonel Lyskov, who up to now has been Viktor Barannikov's assistant, has been appointed chief of the Russian Security Ministry's information and analytical administration.

Lyskov arrived at the Security Ministry together with Viktor Barannikov from the Internal Affairs Ministry, where he also was his assistant. He has never previously worked at the information and analytical administration. When Lyskov's appointment to the administration was discussed among top chiefs, Nikolay Golushko was asked why this particular person was chosen. The minister replied that during the events of 3 and 4 October Lyskov did not go to the White House even after his former patron's personal invitation. So it turns out that even the minimum loyalty is enough for a bureaucrat to be appointed chief of a key administration that supplies the presidential staff with information—although it is fairly possible that Lyskov refused simply because he calculated the rebels' chances well enough.

The appointment of Barannikov's man has drawn a mixed reaction among Security Ministry personnel. MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS experts believe that this may prompt high-class analysts to leave the Security Ministry.

Columnist Justifies Ouster of Antireform Parliament

PM0911104393 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 6 Nov 93 p 1

[Otto Latsis article under the "Politics" rubric: "Former Supreme Soviet Tried To Stop Market Policy, According to Otto Latsis"]

[Text] The president has always been in favor of taking decisive, fundamental measures. However, given the prevailing order, he was simply unable to realize them and put them into effect through his edicts. The whole market policy—the policy of market reforms—was stopped in recent months by the former Supreme Soviet. While, back in 1992, the policy did somehow, admittedly against opposition, make progress, of late everything was arranged in order to make it go into reverse. We were literally on the verge of that happening.

If the former Supreme Soviet's firm intention to implement a pie-in-the-sky budget in the fourth quarter had not been smashed we should now be living in roughly the same conditions as Ukraine.

The Supreme Soviet made compromise impossible. It simply brought us to the point of the destruction of state finances and the collapse of the whole economy because the economy is not regulated administratively. It is regulated by cost levers, and to take the cost levers and put them out of commission is tantamount to destroying the whole system of regulation.

They thought that regulation is when the State Planning Committee [Gosplan] and ministries issue orders and people heed them. You could, of course, restore the Gosplan, but no one would listen to it now.

The resistance put up in the last months of the Supreme Soviet's existence reached the point where the destruction of everything achieved at such great effort was at stake. Whereas last year there was some compromise and reforms made some, albeit poor, progress, and the financial system was, while operating poorly, still a going concern, the complete destruction of what had been achieved was now at stake, and that could not be allowed.

Election Issues

More on Yeltsin's 6 Nov Meeting With Media Chiefs

PM0911094993 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Nov 93 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Russian President's Meeting With Mass Media Leaders"]

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin met with mass media leaders 6 November. The conversation touched on preparations for the parliamentary elections and on the difficulties which the editorial offices of various mass media encounter today. Participants in the meeting spoke with concern about the extremely complex financial situation faced by many publications, the absence of conditions for a civilized news market, the huge difficulties which publishers and journalists encounter in distributing the press and organizing subscriptions to it, and the truly critical situation as regards the printing base. Measures which might improve the situation were discussed.

Russian President B. Yeltsin declared that he wants to see a constructive press which could contribute to the development of democratic reforms in Russia. He noted that society also needs an opposition press. But the opposition press should also operate strictly within the framework of the law. "There should be neither presidential nor antipresidential publications," B. Yeltsin stressed.

Various aspects of Russian political and social life were also touched on in the course of the meeting. Thus, speaking of the need for journalists to show greater responsibility for the printed word, the Russian Federation president very sharply condemned articles which have recently appeared in several publications, containing sundry conjectures about the defense minister. "Pavel Grachev is a strong minister. He worked, does work, and will continue to work," Boris Yeltsin stressed. "There is absolutely nothing behind all these rumors and conjectures." He did not rule out the possibility that the articles in questions could have been "bought" with "funds invested" by certain forces.

One other important political statement was also delivered at the meeting. "I am against fresh presidential elections in June 1994," he said. "I am in favor of the president's mandate running its full course through 1996."

Boris Yeltsin declared that he considers one of his tasks to be to "identify and nurture" [nayti i vospitat] a new candidate for the post of Russian president in time for the next elections. He also said that he intends to "promote the people's recognition" of the new candidate.

Boris Yeltsin also warned that "it will be difficult for any candidate to get elected at the next elections." "Anyone who now says he wants to be president is wrong if he thinks that this will be easy," he said.

Gaydar Supports Yeltsin Decision

LD0811160793 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1457 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] First Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaydar has given support to Boris Yeltsin's decision not to hold early elections for the country's presidency next summer. He described it as sensible, speaking in an interview with INTERFAX on Monday [8 November]. Gaydar does not rule out that the President's rating may somewhat decline because of reneging on his earlier promise. However, Yeltsin is right even if for pragmatic reasons, he said.

Although he does not rule out standing for Russia's presidency in the 1996 elections, Gaydar said this would not come on his agenda until 1995.

Kozyrev Interviewed on Decision

LD0811225893

[Editorial Report] Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian at 2100 GMT on 8 November carries in its "Beau Monde" entertainment program a 15-minute interview with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, conducted by journalist Matvey Ganopolskiy.

The first question is about Kozyrev's independence. Asked whether he can make any independent decisions, Kozyrev replies that although he can and does make independent decisions, questions of strategy are decided by Boris Yeltsin because he is the man elected by the people and it is therefore for him to make such decisions.

Ganopolskiy then asks Kozyrev about Yeltsin's recent declaration that he would not have to be re-elected in the December vote. He says: "The president said that possibly he will not have to be re-elected. This is good, is it not? He will stay on until the end of his term."

Kozyrev responds: "Thank God for that. You know, I think that I was one of the first to speak in favor of this, at the Russia's Choice congress. I remember that to my surprise the audience reacted with applause to my idea. My idea, if you wish, has to do with building a state. It is neither personal nor political, but simply constructive. I think that if we want to build a normal state and replace all these extraordinary measures, chaos, and dictatorship by some order—everyone want a strong hand, and some order—this will represent order. Once the nation has elected the person through honest, competitive elections, he must be given a chance to finish his work."

Kozyrev goes on to recall that Russia does not have a history of stable governments, whether before or after the revolution.

Ganopolskiy then asks Kozyrev whether he can give any assurances, based on his personal knowledge of the president, that in due course Yeltsin will not be persuaded to stay on for another 10-15 years, for example. Kozyrev replies that because we are now moving from chaos to order it is the president's duty to stay on for the term for which he was elected.

Kozyrev is then asked to explain the hostility of the former Supreme Soviet toward him. He says that his views and political positions have always been based on reality, while the former Supreme Soviet was trying to rebuild the Soviet Union, a completely unrealistic pursuit, in his view.

He is then asked to explain his feelings about Eduard Shevardnadze and the situation he presently finds himself in, when his former boss is asking him for troops. Kozyrev replies that he does not really have any "complicated feelings" toward Eduard Shevardnadze. He continues: "I think that I have a certain respect for Shevardnadze. We also have and always had problems in our relations, but somewhat outside politics. However, when it comes to the political situation, here things are somewhat clearer, but I don't want to simplify anything. The point is that Russia has historical, geopolitical, national, and state interests. It is a complicated expression but it defines the point clearly." He goes on: "We cannot, after being there [Georgia] for several centuries and deciding everything for them, drop everything all of a sudden and leave. However, a new style is what we are trying to establish there. This is why we do not get involved in the civil war. This is the difference compared with Afghanistan. We are not trying to support either the red or the white government in Tbilisi. However, we are trying to protect the road, the road of life for Tbilisi, because people will be dying from hunger all across Georgia, and for Armenia, and for Azerbaijan. We are trying to do this at the request of these three independent states, and no one except Russia will do this."

Kozyrev is then asked to describe his ideal for Russia. He says that his wish is for the Russian people to learn to accept and understand basic rules of western civilization such as human rights and democracy. Kozyrev says: "I think that this will be a country whose quality of life, first of all political and economic life, will not be inferior to the United States, France, or Germany, because we have a very rich country." In his view the new Russia will be not only democratic and rich, but also culturally unique, because "Russian culture cannot be pushed aside."

Kozyrev ends his interview by urging everyone to come to Russia, vote for the new parliament, open businesses and live happily, otherwise "even in 100 years there will still be nothing."

Yeltsin Urged To Stay in Office for Full Term

P[illegible]0811201593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 9 Nov 93 p 1

["Letter to chief editor" signed by V. Mazilin, A. Mukhanov, and A. Korniyenko carried under headline: "Boris Yeltsin's Powers Expire 25 April 1998 [as published]. We Are Categorically Against Early Presidential Elections"]

[Text] On 12 June 1991 we for the first time in our lives elected in a direct secret ballot on a multicandidate basis (from six candidates) the first Russian president, B.N. Yeltsin, for a term of five years.

At the referendum of 25 April 1993 the majority of voters effectively elected B. Yeltsin as Russian president for a second time, expressing confidence in him and approving his and the government's socioeconomic policy.

Sixty-six percent of those who took part in the referendum of 25 April 1993 voted for early elections of Russian people's deputies. This was why N. Travkin surrendered his deputies' mandate, but the remaining people's deputies continued to sit in the Supreme Soviet without the confidence of the people. So that there was nothing illegal in the president's edict of 21 September on stage-by-stage constitutional reform in the Russian Federation.

Obviously not wanting to provoke accusations of dictatorship, B. Yeltsin proposed early presidential elections also, but we believe that there can be no question of any early presidential elections. Who elects a president three times in three years?! President B. Yeltsin's powers expire 25 April 1998 [as published]. So let him fulfill his duties to the people.

We are grateful to President B. Yeltsin for his courageous, decisive measures to crush the attempted state coup of 3-4 October, which was organized by the ringleaders of the Supreme Soviet with the aid of red-brown bandits and gunmen. We call on Russians to unite around our first president!

God help Russia!

[Signed] V. Mazilin, A. Mukhanov, A. Korniyenko (1,600 signatures in all)

Further on 'Unexpected' Statement

PM0811185593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Nov 93 First Edition p 1

[Sergey Chugayev article: "Yeltsin's Abandonment of Early Elections: Thinking Aloud or a Firm Decision?"]

[Text] B. Yeltsin's 6 November statement of intent to act as president through 1996 was unexpected not only to the majority of observers but also, as could be seen, to many very close associates of the Russian head of state.

In any case, just an hour before this statement was made, S. Filatov, leader of the president's administration, was maintaining that for moral and ethical reasons Yeltsin would not abandon the idea of holding early elections 12 June next year. Later, as is known, the country's leading figures, including both Filatov and V. Chernomyrdin, approved of this decision by the president.

Such obvious lack of coordination in the actions of top officials makes it possible to conclude that there is an ongoing acute struggle within Yeltsin's entourage for influence over him. The president's Saturday statement gives grounds for believing that supporters of a hard line are gaining the upper hand in this struggle.

The reasoning behind the intention made public by the president sounds quite logical. Indeed, the offer to hold early presidential elections next June was made as a compromise offer when, during the memorable last third of September, there was still hope of a peaceful way out of the constitutional impasse in which the country found itself owing to the insoluble contradictions between the executive and the legislature, but parliament rejected that offer, and so, if you argue logically, it lapsed back on 3 October, during the storming of City Hall and "Ostankino."

At the same time, it seems that supporters of such arguments fail to take a very important moral and political aspect of the problem into account. The president's intention to hold early elections in June, which remained in force until Saturday, meant in the eyes of Russians that Yeltsin had assumed a considerable proportion of the responsibility for the October events and was ready courageously to grant the people the right for the third time to judge how correct his decisions and actions had been.

Meanwhile, we are somehow losing sight of the fact that Yeltsin has to all intents and purposes already posed the question of confidence in himself. I mean his decision to hold a referendum on the draft of the new Russian Constitution 12 December. In this connection the question arises: How well have the president's analysts calculated the consequences of this decision? What will happen if the referendum does not take place or the draft constitution is rejected and the president is thereby denied a confidence vote? For in that case all power in the country must pass to the State Duma, which will have to adopt the new constitution. The president will be left with just two ways out—either to hold early elections or not to surrender power to the Duma.

The most expedient thing seems to be to grant to the future parliament the right to decide when the presidential elections are to be held and what the new constitution is to be like. This is what Yeltsin had declared earlier. For some reasons, however, the president deemed it necessary to let himself have the last word. This tactic seems highly dangerous. It runs counter both to the interests of the majority of the parties which have decided to participate in the elections and to the very spirit of the election campaign, since it sharply depreciates the role of the future parliament right from the start. It makes voters either refuse to participate in the elections or vote against the draft constitution. In this way the president himself today is laying down preconditions for another very acute internal political crisis in Russia, which could result in national-communists acceding to power in the country.

Of course, the president's Saturday statement is still not a final decision. Rather, it is the ploy of launching "trial balloons," which is well known to us from the recent past and has repeatedly been successful. Those who have decided to use this proven tool once again seem to totally disregard the new political realities which have taken shape in the country since 4 October.

From that day, pending completion of the elections to the new parliament, Yeltsin's responsibility increased sharply. Before October Russia's Supreme Soviet had acted as a lightning conductor for the president. All decisions were perceived through the prism of the confrontation with the legislature, with the result that the president was forgiven many mistakes. Today, however, the president has ended up one-on-one with the people of Russia, with the voters. Whereas previously the Russians supported him in the struggle against the CPSU and the soviets, today a huge section of society scrupulously examines and analyzes any action by the supreme power because, as is the case in any civilian society, they are in loyal opposition to this power. Are those who recommended the president to launch this "trial balloon" aware that they are launching it not at the former Supreme Soviet but directly at a civilian society? Unlike parliament, it does not play at political games but makes a choice.

Effects on Parliament Noted

MK0911091093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 76, 9 Nov 93 (signed to press 8 Nov) p 1

[Dmitriy Ostalskiy report in the "President" column: "Boris Yeltsin Stays On and Promises To Defend the Press"]

[Excerpt] Boris Yeltsin has stated that he has decided to stay on until the end of his tenure—in other words, until 1996—and therefore not hold presidential elections on next 12 June. He was speaking during a lunch with a group of chief editors of leading Russian publications on 6 November at approximately 1400. Signs are that the president's decision came as quite a surprise also for many members of his own team, because literally two hours earlier presidential administration chief Sergey Filatov had denied such a possibility while Yeltsin's press secretary Vyacheslav Kostikov asked the president to clarify whether this statement could be made public or whether it should after all be considered as an idea expressed in a private conversation. Boris Yeltsin said confidently that the statement could be promulgated.

Meanwhile, few doubted that after the October events the decision to hold early presidential elections would be revised. The majority of observers tended to believe that the newly elected parliament itself would rule—"accompanied by applause"—to give the president "an opportunity to complete his term." What was surprising was only that the president made the decision on his own and, moreover, on the eve of elections, when such actions by Yeltsin can cause a certain damage to political forces close to him. Nonetheless, the critical reaction from the opposition proved to be—at least so far—not as strong as could have been expected—and it virtually drowned in a fairly powerful chorus of support on the part of the president's associates.

The present situation, however, practically deprives the opposition (both open and covert) of any serious political prospects for the near term. As is known, the term of life meted out to parliament is two years (at the very best). Consequently its powers will cease half a year before new presidential elections. Therefore there is no way even a body consolidated on the basis of "separation of powers" can lay claim to a legitimacy sufficient for a successful struggle with the presidential branch. In other words, one cannot expect a change of course with a normal development of the political process. And although Yeltsin's second victory next summer would make the changes wanted by the opposition even an even more remote prospect, it still had the hope that the people would "come to reason" in six months. Now participation in the December elections for the opposition forces will remain merely a matter of prestige and work for the future. The probability, even if purely theoretical, that the parliament will again become oppositional to the president is obviously overshadowed by the knowledge that such a parliament will be immediately dissolved, and that will be the case over the entire two and a half years.

It is hardly worthwhile trying to assess Yeltsin's statement "from a moral point of view" because the case in favor of the presidential position is just as strong as the case against it. Even so, in this event the president showed greater honesty than had he done the same but after the elections. [passage omitted]

Gaydar Urges Support for New Candidate

LD0911105393 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1000 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Excerpt] Now I am going to read an appeal by Yegor Gaydar, leader of the Russia's Choice electoral bloc, which we received by fax. I am quoting:

Dear Muscovites: Shortly after an appeal by the Russia's Choice bloc, you collected the necessary number of signatures to nominate Yuriy Luzhkov for the Federation Council. A few days ago, however, the Moscow mayor said that he was not going to run for parliament. In this situation, the Russia's Choice bloc made an emergency decision to nominate Yuriy Dmitriyevich Chernichenko as candidate from Moscow for the elections to the Federation Council.

In order to register Chernichenko's candidacy, we must collect more than 35,000 signatures in Moscow within three to four days. This task is extremely difficult. However, democratic Moscow has had to overcome even grater obstacles. We are appealing to everyone who has supported the Russia's Choice bloc, and who has given their signature in support of a referendum on the private ownership of land, to support your candidate. [passage omitted]

Parties Buy, Forge Signatures of Supporters

PM0811164193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Report by Sergey Chugayev: "Collection of Signatures for Candidate Members of the Federal Assembly Ends. Stakes Raised"]

[Text] According to data obtained from the Central Electoral Commission, as of midday on 5 November, the "Cedar" movement and "Women of Russia" were still the only two officially registered election blocs (having gathered the requisite 100,000 voters' signatures). The remaining main contenders for participation in the election campaign are evidently compiling evidence of support.

As far as one can judge from our correspondents' reports, despite the fact that in most regions of Russia the collection of signatures is generally taking place in normal conditions, a number of members of election blocs are displaying amazing ingenuity in an attempt to achieve the 100,000 mark at all costs. So, as is the case in market economy conditions, the stakes were markedly raised on the eve of the completion of the drive to collect signatures. Only yesterday the cost of a voter's signature in support of a contender was 100-150 rubles [R]; now, our correspondent V. Nevelskiy reports, one party in St. Petersburg is offering R600 for a signature.

As we can see, money is still not always the most important thing in our society. Our correspondent in Ulyanovsk Oblast, V. Razboynikov, reports: A local service station was only filling up the cars of drivers who had added their names to the signature form. He also told the story of A. Akhmedov, a lecturer at the Ulyanovsk Pedagogical Institute, who had told students in a history class to collect several dozen signatures each. It was hinted that the best collectors' efforts would be taken into account in the examinations. The lecturer was eventually reprimanded by the department head for "unethical conduct in class."

There are also reports of obviously criminal episodes during the signature collection process. M. Ovcharov, correspondent in Yaroslavl Oblast, reports that three people in Rybinsk were caught forging signature forms in support of the federal lists of candidates from the Russian Christian Democratic Party [RCDP]. Three RCDP members, including a member of the party's political council, were enagged in making forged documents, having somehow obtained the identity card data of many inhabitants of Rybinsk. Some 70 counterfeit signature forms, bearing the names of 700 people, were confiscated from the Rybinsk Christian Democrats, but some of the forgeries had already been sent to Moscow. The city prosecutor's office has launched an investigation.

Political rivals are not averse to blatant thieving. In Kemerovo, our correspondent V. Kostyukovskiy reports, persons unknown stole 33 signature forms bearing 400 signatures in support of P. Solodovnikov, chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia oblast organization.

Central Electoral Commission Checks Lists of Candidates

LD0811152393 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1144 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] The Central Electoral Commission's Chairman Nikolay Ryabov announced with reference to a presidential ruling that after putting the final touches to the draft constitution, copies of the document will be sent to "ROSSISKAYA GAZETA", "ROSSIYSKIE VESTI", and ITAR-TASS today.

He reported at a working session of the commission today that it will take 2 days to check the list of candidates submitted by parties and blocs and to complete formalities on the third day. On the fourth day, possible arguments will be resolved, and on the fifth day, the commission will make its decisions public. According to Ryabov, of the 24 expected decisions, 21 deal with registration or non-registration of the candidates nominated by the parties and blocs, which has collected 100,000 signatures; 3 decisions will concern statements addressed to the commission by 3 associations.

The association "August" declares that it has failed to raise the required number of signatures and charges all parties and blocs but "Russia's Choice" with breaching the rules of the signature-raising campaign.

The bloc "Homeland" and the movement "Alternative" explain their failure to hand in their lists because of delayed air flights to Moscow and ask the commission to give them more time to deliver the lists to the commission.

When Ryabov instructed commission members how to check the lists, he reminded them that signatures must come from no less than 7 Federation territories with no less than 15,000 signatures from each of them. For this reason, Ryabov stressed, regardless of the number of signatures submitted by various parties and blocs, calculations will be made, on the scheduled figure of 100,000 signatures.

Details on Lists

LD0811222393 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2000 GMT 8 Nov 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The Central Electoral Commission has started checking the lists of signatures. Our correspondent Oleg Safiulin is on the line.

[Safiulin] The Central Electoral Commission continues checking the lists of signatures that have been submitted to it. On 11 November, 24 resolutions will be passed; 21 of these will concern the registration of the lists of candidates or the refusal to register them. Three resolutions will be published after examining the applications from the Fatherland bloc and the Alternative [alternativa] movement, which had not been able to bring the documents to Moscow in time because of delayed flights; and the statement of the August bloc concerning the falsification of signatures will also be taken into account. Meanwhile, Nikolay Ryabov gave a reminder that the signatures have to be collected in the territories of no less than seven subjects of the federation, and not more than 15,000 signatures in each.

Thus, the bloc of the Agrarian Party would have 112 fewer candidates, the Civic Union 86 fewer candidates, the Constitutional Democratic Party 67 fewer candidates, and the Liberal Democratic Party would shed the smallest number of candidates—four people. As to the authenticity of the signatures, we were told at the press center of the Electoral Commission that five days would be quite enough for checking them.

The nomination of candidates for the Federation Council and the State Duma continues. Reports have been submitted from 78 regions, and 375 persons have been nominated as candidates to the Federation Council; 13 of them have been registered. Also, 844 persons have been nominated as candidates to the State Duma, 12 of whom have been registered.

3 Million Sign Election Candidate Lists

LD0811221993 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 2126 GMT 8 Nov 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] According to the Central Electoral Commission, 21 electoral associations have put forward a total of 2,490 candidates for the Federal Assembly and another 844 candidates for the State Duma.

Some 3 million Russian citizens have put their signatures under candidates' lists of various parties and movements.

At this stage, the Agrarian Party of Russia is the undisputed champion with 500,000 signatures. Russia's Choice bloc and the Russian Unity and Accord Party have collected 200,000 signatures. The Communist Party comes third with 187,000, the Liberal Democratic Party's Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc with 166,000 signatures, and the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms with 135,000.

Sergey Baburin's party, the Russian All-People's Union, from which 20,000 lists with signatures had been stolen, managed to collect the necessary 80,000-odd signatures from Russian citizens in just 24 hours.

Borovoy Claims Most Blocs Falsified Election Lists

LD0911094693 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0600 GMT 9 Nov 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Excerpts] The Central Electoral Commission is continuing its examination of lists of electors' signatures submitted by the parties, blocs, and movements before midnight on 6 November. [passage omitted]

Konstantin Borovoy, leader of the Economic Freedom Party, has said that he is sure that the majority of the movements falsified their lists. He said in an interview with the POSTFACTUM agency that he expected the Central Electoral Commission to announce on Tuesday that some blocs had falsified 30 to 40 percent of signatures.

Stankevich Interviewed on Electoral Funding

LD0811183693 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1325 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Interview with Sergey Stankevich, economic adviser to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, by Aleksey Ogureyev from the "Money and Politics" program; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Ogureyev] Sergey Borisovich, we would like to hear from you how financial contributions to candidates' funds are being regulated. Also, in principle, where can a candidate legally obtain money, in your view?

[Stankevich] Traditionally the state provides the major part of resources to be spent during an electoral campaign. There are also additional resources obtained by parties and candidates.

As for state funds, everything is more or less clear here—the sum is known, it has already been allocated, and it is being made available to electoral commissions of different levels. This is mainly the monies necessary for the day-to-day operation of commissions themselves in the course of the electoral campaign. It is intended for organizational expenses. Only a small part of the resources allocated by the state may be used for anything extra.

There are electoral funds—both of individual candidates and of parties, in the case of those candidates who have linked their political activity with a party. That is where complications begin, because as yet, there is no comprehensive system of state regulation in this area.

We must not allow the buying of seats in the parliament, in the same way that they are bought at some stock and currency exchange or other; also, parliamentary elections, a serious matter, should not provide a field for self-assertion of some rich people just because it tickles their fancy. That is why I would like to reiterate that under no circumstances should this sphere be left without strict legislative limitations. They must follow immediately.

In the foreseeable future, at least, I would prefer that a considerable share of electoral campaigning resources, at least two thirds, be provided by the state. First, this would give equal chances to candidates, especially in view of the increasing financial inequality among the population. Second, this would protect us, for example, from excesses in this delicate sphere.

[Ogureyev] It has been reported recently that the U.S. Government, I believe, has allocated about $10 million for the Russian electoral campaign. Will this money be spent, and how will it be spent?

[Stankevich] There is no doubt that such help has been offered, but there is a considerable distance between an offer and its implementation. I am not prepared to discuss a specific sum of money that may eventually arrive.

Should it arrive, it will be spent first and foremost on equipment, of course, because computer technology and a lot of other equipment are of course needed to count votes and accumulate all electoral information. Besides, training is needed for staff. There are other organizational expenses. It is practically impossible for these funds to be spent on publicity campaigns in favor of certain parties or candidates.

Ostankino's Election Coverage Plans Outlined

PM0811165193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "On an Equal Footing"]

[Text] As part of its coverage of the election campaign, "Ostankino" has set up a special working group and is drafting a document to decide a whole range of issues connected with the elections. Valentin Lazutkin, first deputy chairman of the largest federal television and radio company, announced this at a press conference.

By agreement with the Central Electoral Commission [CEC] it has been decided to allot two hours of airtime to televised debates as of 20 November. Valentin Lazutkin thinks that the speakers will have to be decided by drawing lots. The frequency of news reports being carried on air depends on a given bloc's political activeness. Each event is assigned the same duration and the same kind of commentary.

This does not apply to paid political publicity, which is being introduced for the first time during the present election campaign. By agreement with CEC Chairman Nikolay Ryabov, time will be allocated for this publicity on the basis of the financial potential of the electoral associations themselves.

Personnel Chief on Servicemen's Participation in Elections

PM0911101393 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Nov 93 p 1

[Interview with Lieutenant General Konstantin Bogdanov, chief of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Main Directorate for Work With Personnel, by Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Andreyev and Captain Second Rank Leonid Mrochko; place and date not given: "The Army and Elections: How Will We Vote?"]

[Excerpts] We have known for a long time that servicemen will also participate in the 12 December elections. However, there are a lot of unanswered questions regarding the organization of elections at military units. Today Lieutenant General Konstantin Bogdanov, chief of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Main Directorate for Work with Personnel, speaks about the procedure for the participation of Russian Armed Forces servicemen in the upcoming elections. [passage omitted]

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Konstantin Valentinovich, the elections and voting for the draft Constitution presuppose electioneering and propaganda events...

[Bogdanov] I see what you mean. In accordance with the Russian Federation Law "On Defense," any political agitation, including electioneering, is forbidden on the territory of Russian Federation military units, large formations, and Armed Forces establishments. Representatives of political parties and movements should be warned against attempts to organize this kind of event on the territory of military units in defiance of the law. They should also be aware that, on the basis of the Russian Federation Law "On the Status of Servicemen," servicemen have the right to participate in their spare time in mass events which do not pursue political aims.

Servicemen have the possibility to familiarize themselves with the political programs of electoral blocs and parties on television and radio and in the press. Every serviceman's conscience will suggest to him for whom to vote 12 December. In order to avoid idle speculation, I would also state that no instructions have been issued to the troops telling them for whom to vote.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] People are expressing the opinion that it is inexpedient for servicemen to participate in the upcoming elections and voting, because they should be protected from political activity. What is the stance of the Ministry of Defense on this?

[Bogdanov] It is true that such opinions exist. As far as the stance of the Ministry of Defense is concerned, it has already been expressed during this interview. We are guided by the law "On the Status of Servicemen," which guarantees that every serviceman, as a citizen, has the right to elect and be elected to organs of state power. At the same time, we suggest that servicemen should not put themselves forward as candidates in the upcoming elections.

This is dictated by the fact that both chambers of parliament will work on a permanent basis. In accordance with the Russian Federation Law "On Military Service Obligation and Military Service," in the event of a serviceman being elected as a people's deputy and transferring to permanent work in the representative organs of power, his military service is suspended for his term as deputy.

My opinion is as follows: If a serviceman decides to become a statesman or a politician, in other words he is prepared to change his chosen profession, then it is better for him to leave the ranks of the Armed Forces. The profession there is to defend the motherland, and the place of a man in uniform who performs his military duty is in combat formation.

Rumored Reduction of Deputies' Term of Office Denied

PM0911095393 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 6 Nov 93 p 1

[Unattributed, untitled report from the "Focus of Attention" column]

[Text] Aleksandr Kotenkov, chief of the Russian President's State-Legal Administration, has categorically denied the statement made by Valentin Kuptsov, first deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Communist Party Central Executive Committee, that a presidential edict reducing Federal Assembly deputies' term of office from four to two years has already been signed. "Such a norm is enshrined in the draft constitution, but there is no such edict," Kotenkov told INTERFAX.

Military Issues

Atomic Energy Minister Visits Nuclear Test Site

LD0911093193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0729 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow November 9 ITAR-TASS—Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Victor Mikhaylov today flew to the state nuclear testing site "Novaya Zemlya islands".

He was accompanied by representatives of the Russian Defence Ministry's general staff, the public relations department of the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation told ITAR-TASS:

The minister is due to inspect the technical state and conditions of functioning of the testing site during the period of the moratorium on nuclear testing.

Yeltsin Edict on Defense Industry Issues

LD0811193593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1710 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow, 8 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—On 6 November 1993 Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin signed an edict "On stabilization of the economic situation of enterprises and organizations in the defense industry and on measures to provide for the state defense order." We are conveying the text of the edict which was circulated today by the press service of the head of the Russian state:

On the stabilization of the economic situation of enterprises and organizations in the defense industry and on measures to provide for the state defense order:

For the purpose of stabilizing the economic situation of enterprises and organizations in the defense industry, boosting the efficiency of conversion measures, and providing for state requirements in the sphere of defense and security, I decree:

1. That an interdepartmental working commission for the examination of conversion programs in order to grant special purpose credits should revise the conversion programs of enterprises and organizations before 1 December 1993, basing itself on their economic performance.

The Council of Ministers—the Government of the Russian Federation—and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation must ensure continuous financing, up until completion, of conversion programs of enterprises and organizations, approved in the established order.

2. That state customers of the Russian Federation be authorized to make advance payments on state contracts (agreements) to providers of work related to the development and manufacture of production (goods, products and services) if this work involves a long production cycle (of six months or over), if it is necessary for them to buy raw and other materials or parts in order to accomplish the state defense order. In production supply contracts (agreements), costs of raw and other materials and parts must be included in the price of the final product, based on the level of prices at the moment of the advance payment.

Advance payments to contractors for the state defense order must be made within the limit of 20 percent of the annual volume of budget allocations for the purchase of armaments, military equipment, and products of scientific and technical research in the military field.

3. That, that during the execution of a state defense order, a level of rentability is established in prices for manufactured output (goods, labor, and services), one which is fixed according to types of output and which enables a stable financial base to be set up for the production, scientific-technical, and social development of enterprises supplying the output of a state defense order.

The Council of Ministers—the Government of the Russian Federation—is to determine the scale of the fixed level of rentability for types of output, and also the procedure for increasing it during the production of new and unique highly effective output.

4. That from 1 January 1994, enterprises and organizations of the Russian Federation executing a state defense order be permitted, when establishing negotiated prices for output intended for defense purposes, to relate to the cost of the aforementioned output (goods, labor, and services) expenditure on wages on the following scale:

For employees of enterprises and organizations engaged in work on executing a state defense order—no higher than eight times the scale of the minimum monthly wage in the Russian Federation;

For employees of enterprises and organizations of the Russian Federation Ministry for Atomic Energy who are directly engaged in the development, production, and dismantling of nuclear weapons—no higher than nine times the minimum monthly wage.

5. That the state tax service of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, together with the Ministry of Economics of the Russian Federation, the State Committee of the Russian Federation for the Defense Sectors of Industry, and the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation should, before 1 December 1993, following the established procedure, submit to the Council of Ministers—the Government of the Russian Federation—proposals on introducing additions into the existing legislation relating to the procedure for calculating the tax on the profits of enterprises and organizations carrying out the state defense order, taking into account the fact that, in calculating the taxable profits, the outlays on wages which can be included in their fixed amount in a section relating to production costs, are to be determined in amounts envisaged in point 4 of this Decree.

6. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is charged with providing an armament program for the period up to the year 2000, according to the established procedure, in the fourth quarter of 1993.

7. The State Committee of the Russian Federation for the Defense Sectors of Industry and the Ministry of Atomic Energy, in coordination with the State Committee for the Management of State Property, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Finances, the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Justice, are to prepare and submit to the Council of Ministers—the Government of the Russian Federation—by 20 November proposals determining the specific features of the activity of state enterprises and organizations in the defense sector which are not subject to privatization, taking into consideration the creation of conditions to enable them to function stably in a market economy.

Details of Staff Exercise Reported

PM0811200193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Nov 93 p 1

[Nikolay Poroskov and Dorofey Getmanenko report: "Coordination Among Staffs of All Levels Has Been Tested in Russian Army. Our Correspondents Visited Armed Forces Central Command Post"]

[Text] In the recently adopted "Basic Provisions of Russian Federation Military Doctrine" one of the key points appears as follows: The Russian Federation does not treat any state as its enemy. At the same time our state reserves the right to use military force—for individual and collective self-defense. For this it is necessary to maintain the defense potential at a level adequate to the existing and potential military threats, to qualitatively improve the Armed Forces and other troops, and to ensure their combat and mobilization readiness. The need to prepare the Armed Forces to perform both defensive and offensive operations under conditions of the massive use of contemporary and future weapons is also noted.

In order to meet the demands made of it, the army must improve its skill. Exercises are the highest and most effective form of enhancing combat readiness. One of them—an operational-strategic command and staff exercise to improve command and control of the Russian Armed Forces—has just been held under the leadership of Army General Pavel Grachev, minister of defense.

If people anywhere know about the army at the present moment, they are to be found in the Russian Ministry of Defense, specifically at the Central Command Post [CCP], which is on the second floor of the building on the Arbat. Information filtered, verified, and amplified in advance comes in to here, to the duty general, from the branches of the Armed Forces, the categories of troops, the districts, and the fleets. It is information on the level of combat readiness, on exercises being conducted, on the redeployment of troops, and on violations of the air border; it is data from the missile attack early warning system and much, much more. The duty general informs the leadership of the Ministry of Defense so that it can reach a decision. Maybe a fateful decision.

When large-scale measures are being conducted, the workplaces in the CCP's main hall are occupied by the Defense Ministry leadership. This was the case at the concluding stage of the aforementioned exercise. The role of the CCP can best be seen precisely from this example.

The need for the exercise resulted from the fact that it was necessary to check coordination among staffs at all levels within the recently established new structure of the Russian Army and Navy, in a significantly changed international situation. It was preceded by three regional exercises under the leadership of deputy defense ministers. The present command and staff exercise crowned the large-scale program.

At the first stage the Armed Forces were hypothetically switched from a peacetime to a wartime footing, and a defensive operation was conducted in the latter case. The hypothetical enemy was halted before he could achieve his goal. He dug in at the positions held and brought up reserves from deep within his own territory, while in the sea and ocean zones he held the initiative for a while longer, but events showed the steadiness of our strategic defense.

After reporting the situation, Colonel General Viktor Barynkin, chief of the General Staff Main Operations Directorate, concluded: The war has gone through a critical phase, the situation is shaping up in Russia's favor, and it is proposed to stabilize the fronts (these were the district staffs for the duration of the exercise) and to make a counterstrike—which subsequently was done.

The developing situation is reflected in detail on two huge screens in the CCP hall. The very titles indicate their purpose: "Possible nature of enemy actions" and "Projected use of Russian Federation Armed Forces." A separate chart—electronic and in color—reflects the air situation with specific targets. More detailed information, including information of a reference nature, can at any moment be called up onto monitors at the workplaces of the minister of defense, his first deputy, and the chief of the General Staff.

During the exercise an information group and the Center for Operational-Strategic Planning, which are also here, in the hall, worked intensively. The latter, proceeding from an analysis of the situation which had taken shape, drew up proposals by which the minister of defense was guided in making decisions.

Although what was happening was only an exercise, it was impossible not to feel the tension hanging in the air in that hall, which can rightly be called the nerve center of the Armed Forces. The leader of the exercise, Army General Pavel Grachev, considers one of its chief results the fact that it will make it possible in the immediate future to elaborate new approaches to the conduct of combat operations.

The minister of defense also said that, in accordance with Russia's recently adopted military doctrine, closer coordination with the other "power" ministries and the leadership of the military industry is contemplated. This means that the CCP's functions will expand still further.

Reports from the commanders in chief of the branches of the Armed Forces were heard at the end of the measures. Summing up the results, the defense minister pointed out that the purpose of the exercise had been achieved—questions which might be posed during a "special period" were rehearsed, and the army demonstrated its ability to resolve complex tasks of the country's defense.

1 Trillion Ruble Debt to Defense Industry

LD0811230693 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 2126 GMT 8 Nov 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] According to official data from the Russian Defense Ministry, the government's debt to the military industrial complex is estimated at over 1 trillion rubles, and continues to increase. Every month, 40 million [as heard] workers of the defense industry complex fail to receive their salaries.

Accomodation Problem for Naval Personnel Viewed

LD0811232193 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 2126 GMT 8 Nov 93

[By correspondent Nikolay Ivanov, including recorded remarks by Ye. Karabanov, deputy head of Main Engineering Directorate of Russian Navy; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Ivanov] According to the Russian Defense Ministry, 61,700 apartments will be built this year for families of servicemen. By 1995, 87,000 families will have new accommodation, but the problem of building and distributing accommodation is still quite acute, especially for the navy personnel. The withdrawal of Russian units from the Baltic countries, the continuing service at the bases that remain at the Baltic Fleet's disposal, the redeployment of the Caspian flotilla—all this calls for an increase in the amount of accommodation, and makes the leadership of the Navy seek new ways to solve the problem.

[Karabanov] We have some 25,000 officers and warrant officers in the Navy who have no apartments. We have now decided not to build accommodation at the main submarine bases of the Pacific and Northern fleets, but to build it in central Russia instead—it is cheaper this way. Unfortunately, the funding is unsatisfactory. At present, we have received only 40 percent of what we expected at the beginning of the year. The Navy is looking for other funds, outside the budget, and we are getting some from the sale of ships for scrap and from sales of technical equipment.

Paper Reviews New Military Doctrine

PM0911114793 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 9 Nov 93 p 2

[Igor Chernyak "Military Review": "Serving Russia in Hard Times"]

[Text] **Two-Faced Doctrine**

Only specialists noticed that the report of the latest session of the Russian Security Council contained the phrase—"the basic provisions of military doctrine were adopted." The Russian defense minister gave a vague answer when asked by a foreign correspondent whether these basic provisions are a military doctrine. Military analysts drew a fairly unexpected conclusion in this connection: A Russian military doctrine does not exist in complete form. There are a range of key provisions which can indeed be described as doctrinal. The most general of them were made public "for the people." The others "are not to be divulged." Why?

There is some conjecture at the Defense Ministry on this score. Some people believe that, along with the "basic provisions," whose essence was announced, there are also some that are being kept secret. They think that the "underwater" section of the doctrine conceals questions of Russia's nuclear policy toward nuclear and nonnuclear states and the forms and pace of nuclear disarmament and rearming [perevooruzheniye]. It articulates Russia's strategy on nearby countries where Russian troops are deployed. The requisite numerical strength of the Russian Army is not substantiated as it is in the Law on Defense, but it does say in extremely specific, rigid terms how, when, and to what "extent" Russian troops can be used to restore order in their own country.

Obviously had the full text of the doctrine appeared in the press, it might have been the subject of acute public debate in Russia and caused a considerable political splash worldwide. A number of Defense Ministry personnel believe that the Russian authorities have no interest in this in the current situation or even on the eve of the elections. And that is why the content of the strategic military document, which every Russian citizen is entitled to know, is being kept secret from the people. So, are the people who formulated the doctrine keeping things from us? This is a unique case. It is also worthy of note that Grachev hinted that the "basic provisions" are not dogma and will be adjusted, but does that not mean that the strategy of Russian military policy will change with every change of government or president?

Lastly, the defense minister told journalists that the current military doctrine is a historic document since this is the first time that it has been adopted. That is not quite true. Russia has already had a military doctrine and, unlike the present one, it was not concealed from anyone and was formulated in a simple clear-cut manner: "Anyone who comes to us with sword in hand will die by the sword."

President Recalls His Youth

Russian Defense Ministry sources have reported that B. Yeltsin is shortly expected to sign an edict on military councils in the Russian Armed Forces. A fundamental element in the edict being drafted will be a provision regarding the inclusion of civilians representing the authorities in military councils within districts and categories of troops as well as on the Russian Defense Ministry Collegium. The same thing happened in the former USSR—at one time, for instance, Boris Yeltsin, first secretary of Sverdlovsk CPSU Oblast Party Committee, was a member of the Ural Military District military council. However, this practice was terminated after the CPSU was barred from power.

Sources claim that at the moment Moscow Mayor Yu. Luzhkov is being considered among the candidates for the Ground Forces Military Council and V. Komchatov, the president's representative in Moscow, is being considered for a similar post in Moscow Military District.

Officially the inclusion of high-ranking civilian officials on the military councils is attributed to the fact that their task is to assist the Armed Forces in carrying out the draft and coordinating measures pertaining to the army's socially useful activity—bringing in the harvest, building civil installations, etc. However, observers think that the innovation has at least one another purpose—namely an attempt by the authorities to supervise the military.

Shall We Remember Afghanistan?

Despite the fact that the press centers of the Moscow Military District and Russian Armed Forces Ground Forces denied the report that Pavel Grachev ordered the White House to be bombarded 4 October with rockets, sources at the Russian Armed Forces General Staff and the Ground Forces Air Force Directorate say that this order was nonetheless issued. However, they say that it came not from the defense minister but from a high-ranking military boss involved in directing the assault on the parliament building.

According to the sources, on receiving this order, Colonel General Vitaliy Pavlov, commander of Ground Forces Aviation, who won a Hero of the Soviet Union star for Afghanistan, took a combat helicopter on a reconnaissance of the White House, but on seeing how many civilians there were massed near the parliament building, Pavlov refused to give the command for helicopter pilots based near Moscow to take off and use rockets, for which he almost lost his job and his shoulder boards.

"The scale of the devastation that would have occurred in the vicinity of the White House had helicopters used rockets is impossible to imagine," a high-ranking General Staff staffer said commenting on Pavlov's decision. Recalling Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, who contemplated bombing the Kremlin in August 1991 in order to win victory over the State Committee for the State of Emergency, he also remarked that "thank God, the 'bomber marshal' does not have that many followers among military bosses."

Where Is the Million To Be Found?

Major General Yu. Novikov, deputy chief of the General Staff's Main Organization and Mobilization Directorate, said that draft commissions began their work in Russia 1 October. The draft contingent will start being dispatched to the troops somewhere around 10 November, he said. Novikov expects 218,000 people to be drafted this fall. The Airborne Troops and the Strategic Missile Forces will be staffed first.

The Army and Navy staffing situation is still one of the most serious problems facing the Russian Defense Ministry. Speaking at the All-Russia Conference 9 August, Army General K. Kobets said that two drafts are to be discharged from the Armed Forces and other troops in the fall, a total of around 0.5 million men (over 280,000 in the Armed Forces alone) and in view of that the

Russian Army will have a shortfall of NCO's and enlisted men of over a million.

The military managed to persuade the president and the government that the situation is verging on the catastrophic. The result was B. Yeltsin's edict drafting students from technical colleges and vocational and technical colleges into the Army. Observers think protests can be expected in the near future from directors of secondary and secondary special educational establishments, Committees of Soldiers Mothers, etc.

The Main Organization and Mobilization Directorate denies all the charges leveled at it. In the opinion of Major General Valeriy Astanin, the actions taken by the drafting commissions are not in contravention of the new Law on Education, which presupposes that citizens of the Russian Federation receive education to at least ninth-grade level. According to him, the president's edict envisages that final-year students at technical colleges and vocational and technical colleges should pass all their examinations by 25 October. What is more, the general said that the Russian Education Ministry has already studied the question of third-year students at technical colleges and vocational and technical colleges receiving certificates attesting that they have obtained a secondary education. Astanin described the steps being taken as "enforced and temporary" because the other option—increasing the number of people serving on contract—presupposes allocating the Army considerable funds, which are not available at the moment.

Moscow Is at the Bottom of It

Colonel General Yevgeniy Maslin, head of a central Russian Defense Ministry directorate, in charge of nuclear questions, was urgently sent to the Pentagon 15 October on a top-secret mission. It has been learned that the purpose of his trip was to "strike fear" into the Americans over the state of the nuclear missiles based in Ukraine and incite the United States to put more vigorous pressure on Kiev to hand the nuclear warheads over to Moscow more rapidly. According to military department sources, Maslin's visit cost the Defense Ministry $150,000, but brought Russia no practical result. Moreover, people in Kiev, according to competent organs, rapidly guessed "who was at the bottom of this" and tried as best they could to reassure Secretary of State W. Christopher. Some people in the Defense Ministry wondered in this connection whether it was worth crossing the Atlantic to tell the Americans something that they are well aware of without the Russians?

Economic Issues

Gaydar on Government View of Agrarian Policy

PM0911100993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Report by Valeriy Konovalov: "Farmers Think the State Does Not Need Them, but Deputy Prime Minister Gaydar Dispels Their Doubts"]

[Text] At an expanded session of the AKKOR [Association of Russian Peasant (Private) Farms and Agricultural Cooperatives] presidium the farmers presented to Yegor Gaydar a whole package of demands and proposals to the government. The deputy prime minister responded by expounding his own principled views of agrarian policy.

The farmers' appeal to the government does not appear to be an ultimatum, unlike some recent kolkhoz organizations' documents. The gist of the AKKOR proposals is that the promised preferential measures should not be abolished where private farmers are concerned, all debts to peasants must be paid, and interfarm structures, peasant banks, and insurance companies must be supported.

If this does not happen and current economic trends continue, the development of private farming in Russian will be in serious jeopardy, the session participants believe. More than 30 percent of private farms could be ruined in the very near future given the existing financial conditions.

"The state needs the farmers," Gaydar said. "They are a very important component of our economic policy. The state's resources are not limitless, but the farmers will get priority." According to Gaydar, the government made a serious mistake to make unwarranted promises. A striking example of this is grain purchases for state resources. The peasants supplied the grain, but there turned out to be no way of paying them.

The vice premier announced that the practise of preferential credits would end, irrespective of the recipient, that is, the state will not longer make up the difference between commercial and preferential interest rates. But support for the countryside and above all for private farmers will be provided by other methods. In particular, export and import transactions will be made much easier, import restrictions will be relaxed, and duties will lowered. All obligatory state deliveries will be abolished from next year. The state will purchase essential products, but, in so doing, will provide peasants with an economic stake.

Zaveryukha Defends Yeltsin Land Edict

PM0811160993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Nov 93 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed, untitled report]

[Text] The problems of increasing the efficiency of Russian agriculture cannot be solved unless land acquires a genuine owner, Aleksandr Zaveryukha has stated.

The transformation of collective and state farms into joint-stock companies, limited liability partnerships, and agricultural cooperatives and the other measures being taken in Russia during agrarian reform have not, the government vice premier in charge of questions concerning the agrarian sector believes, led to the "appearance of an owner of Russian arable land." In Zaveryukha's opinion the president's Edict "On Regulating Land Relations and Developing Agrarian Reform in Russia" removes "these insuperable barriers." The edict is not an attempt "to finish off collective farms," he noted. On the contrary, the edict is based on "an owner's inalienable right to dispose of the land belonging to him." As regards the outbreak of land speculation being predicted by what the vice premier calls certain "specialists who are far removed from the land," such speculation is already "widespread" in Russia.

Edict on Agricultural Production Co-ops Due Soon

PM0811150993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Nov 93 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed, untitled report]

[Text] Valeriy Alakoz, first deputy chairman of the Committee for Land Resources and Land Management, has declared that one of the main aims of President Boris Yeltsin's edict "On Regulating Land Relations and Developing Agrarian Reform" is the protection of landowners' rights.

He announced that at present there are around 40 million landowners in Russia. According to V. Alakoz, the edict also affords citizens a guarantee of greater access to the acquisition of land, as well as the chance to transfer it to more efficient economic managers. Aleksandr Kalinin, in charge of the government's agro-industrial complex department, expressed the view that the edict will make it possible to change the entire complex of agrarian relations within the country. He expressed the hope that agricultural production cooperatives will be revived and will become widespread. A. Kalinin also announced that a draft edict on the development of agricultural production cooperatives will soon be submitted to the president. In his words, amendments to the process of privatization in the sphere of agro-industrial service enterprises can also be expected.

Ministry Able To Collect Taxes From Regions

PM0811152393 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 3 Nov 93 p iii

[Unattributed report: "Aleksandr Pochinok: No Reason for Regions To Quarrel with Center"; from the "Delo" section]

[Text] Rumors that some regions are refusing to pay taxes to the federal budget are strongly exaggerated. The Ministry of Finance has adequate potential to influence the federation components which withhold payment of taxes to the federal budget. For example, the center has the right to suspend payments from federal programs or the allocation of credits, and also to use other methods of financial influence. This is well understood at local level. Talk of the regions' "wealth" and their ability to live without the center's support is an illusion. All attempts at confrontation with the center lead to the regions suffering first and foremost. This is understood increasingly clearly in the republics within Russia and in the krays and oblasts. Of course, the center is also aware of the danger of using any economic sanctions in our unstable times. Relations between the center and the regions should be built on a different basis.

Actions Outlined Against Regions Withholding Taxes

PM0911103393 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Nov 93 First Edition p 4

[Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 1774: "On Measures to Observe Russian Federation Legislation on Budget Organization"]

[Text] Taking note of the extraordinary financial situation in the Russian Federation and the need to finance urgent federal spending out of the Russian Federation republic budget for 1993, and in accordance with Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 1598 "On Legal Regulation in the Period of Phased Constitutional Reform in the Russian Federation" of 7 October 1993, I decree that:

1. In the event of a failure by executive organs in republics within the Russian Federation, krays, oblasts, the autonomous oblast, autonomous okrugs, or the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg to observe Russian Federation legislation when remitting to the Russian Federation republic budget the sums raised from the federal taxes levied on their territories, the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government shall be granted the right in the period from 1 November 1993 through 31 January 1994 to take the following measures:

a) to suspend funding from the Russian Federation republic budget for enterprises, institutions, and organizations located on the corresponding territories until such time as the obligations envisaged under Russian Federation legislation for the remittance to the Russian Federation republic budget of the sums raised from federal taxes have been carried out in full;

b) to end the provision to national-state and administrative-territorial formations of the quotas needed to implement their foreign economic activity until such time as the the obligations envisaged under Russian Federation for the remittance to the Russian Federation republic budget of the sums raised from federal taxes levied in the corresponding territories have been carried out in full;

c) to suspend delivery to the corresponding national-state and administrative-territorial formations of products centrally supplied from Russian Federation state resources, including imports;

d) to regulate the size of centralized state lending taking account of the size of the remittance shortfall to the Russian Federation republic budget.

2. In the period from 1 November 1993 through 31 January 1994 the Central Bank of the Russian Federation shall, on the basis of a submission from the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government on the violations indicated in Paragraph 1 of this edict, compulsorily deduct the sums to be remitted to the Russian Federation republic budget in 1993 from the current accounts of the republic budgets of republics within the Russian Federation, kray, oblast, and okrug budgets, and the city budgets of Moscow and St. Petersburg.

3. The Russian Federation presidential edict "On Measures to Observe Russian Federation Legislation on Budget Organization" shall be submitted for examination by the Russian Federal Assembly.

4. This edict comes into force from the moment it is signed.

[Signed] President B. Yeltsin of the Russian Federation
[Dated] Moscow, the Kremlin
27 October 1993
No. 1774

Shokhin: Division of Taxes Threatens Federalism

LD0611130893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1137 GMT 6 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow November 6 TASS—Harmonious economic relations with regions and in regions themselves are "a guarantee of the consolidation of Russia's statehood, as well as protection against centrifugal trends and the emergence of administrative entities like medieval principalities," Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin believes.

He pointed out in an interview with TRUD that political passions over the problem of sovereignisation are the result of the fact that economic federalism, which is very important for Russia, has not been developed well enough. The extremely irrational division of tax revenues to the budget is the most acute problem in this sphere, shokhin said.

On the whole, between January and August budgets of regions, integrated in the Russian Federation, were drawn with incomes exceeding the expenditures to a total sum of 1.5 trillion roubles, while budgets of 43 regions were drawn with deficit. In some of them the expenditures exceeding the incomes are becoming a permanent factor. Thus, the budgets of the republic of Dagestan, the Altay Territory, the Kemerovo, Kamchatka, Pskov, Tomsk and Omsk Regions were drawn with deficit over the past four months. The situation, worsened by the irrational character of the system of distribution of taxes, forces some regions to withhold tax revenues, intended for the federal budget, and use them for their own needs. Practically all the taxes, collected in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Chechnya, which were subjects to distribution, were actually transferred to the local budgets.

Shokhin is positive that special taxes and tax rates, needed for the exercise of authority, should exist for each level, both federal and regional one. In his opinion, this is one of the aspects of economic federalism. Another aspect consists in Russia's common economic space. This means that individual republics, territories and regions should not be granted the "ex-territorial" economic status through declaring themselves to be free economic zones, for example, or securing privileges, which are out of reach for other regions, with the help of political lobbying in the upper corridors of power. Of course, Shokhin continued, in some cases privileges may and should be granted, but they should be a kind of state incentives, of support for new projects.

In the opinion of Shokhin, economic federalism also includes support for those regions, which really need it. These are, in the first place, the regions, where a large number of workers are becoming redundant as a result of closing down enterprises and even whole industries.

Government Wants Central Bank's Status Written

LD0511195293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1323 GMT 5 Nov 93

[Text] The Russian Finance Ministry in a press release on Friday has called for a range of fiscal policy issues to be written down in the country's new constitution.

Among other things, this provides for the Central Bank of Russia's [CBR] independence from both the government and the State Duma. The CBR's main task is to maintain the stability of the national currency and price levels.

The ministry also calls for a constitutional provision under which the government may not receive CBR credits but must try to cover whatever budget deficit arises by borrowing from non-financial agencies and the public. For its part, the CBR is not authorized to grant credits to non-financial agencies or provide special purpose loans or credits to various sectors of the economy. No decision on a budget deficit can be taken unless ways of how to raise funds or cut spending are indicated.

The ministry also suggests that the State Duma be vested with powers to approve or reject government-proposed spending but not be entrusted with decision making on spending itself.

Restriction on Foreign Banks' Activity Urged

MK0611124093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No.75, 6 Nov 93 (Signed to press 5 Nov 93) p 1

[Unattributed report: "Boris Fedorov, Yegor Gaydar Call For Restrictions on Foreign Banks' Licensing"]

[Text] Russian Finance Minister Boris Fedorov said yesterday that in the next two to three years restrictions on licensing foreign banks' activity in Russia must be kept both in terms of the number of licenses granted and the requirements for the banks' capital. In Mr. Fedorov's view, "a certain degree of protectionism" with regard to Russian banks is essential, especially given that they risk losing their most competent employees. "The government does not approve of the emerging trend on the part of the Russian Central Bank toward expanding the licensing of foreign banks without due and comprehensive consideration of all aspects of the economic situation in Russia. We find it strange that the Russian Central Bank seeks to get rid of small Russian banks as soon as possible and at the same time excessively to promote foreign ones," the minister's statement says. Boris Fedorov said that the overly speedy access to Russia granted to foreign banks may "effectively prove discriminatory" to Russian financial companies. Yegor Gaydar, too, expressed his surprise at the Central Bank's policy of "granting more and more general licenses" to foreign banks. In his words, competition is essential in the banking system, but it should not lead to "a rapid downturn in the domestic banking sector."

Bank Chief Criticizes Government, Agencies

PM0911094193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Nov 93 First Edition p 3

[Vladimir Kucherenko report: "Financial Measures Alone Are Not Enough"]

[Text] Viktor Gerashchenko, head of the Central Bank, has broken his long silence and shared with the public his impressions of the expanded session of the Council of Ministers attended by representatives of the country's regions. At the same time the country's chief banker stated his support for changing the landmarks in the policy of economic reforms.

In Gerashchenko's words, the Russian Federation president has been forced to recognize that the reform process is inadequately managed and that the people's living standards remain "below the threshold of the government's attention." He once again denied charges that the Central Bank of Russia is violating the agreements reached with the Finance Ministry in May, under which limits on centralized credits were stipulated. And the fact that these limits were exceeded in the third quarter he explains by two factors. First, following IMF methods, the Finance Ministry did not take account of the peculiarities of the Russian economy, in which many processes objectively bear a seasonal character. Even the IMF has recognized this, and a modified version of the "Fedorov-Central Bank" agreement is now being prepared which will be the basis on which negotiations with the IMF on granting Russia the second part of the $3-billion loan will be resumed. And second, the Finance Ministry proved unable to cover the budget deficit with the aid of state treasury promissory notes, and was therefore forced to darn the holes in the budget with the aid of Central Bank credits.

At the same time Gerashchenko asks: Why is there no reduction in the rate of inflation, despite the fulfillment of the IMF recommendations? And he replies: because in our conditions, inflation bears a nonmonetarist character, since one of its major causes is the calamitous state of production. Hence it is impossible to fight it solely through a tough policy of financial stabilization—a strong state program of support for vital industries is needed. The chief banker effectively questioned the earlier reform policy. He criticized, for example, the State Committee for the Management of State Property, which since last year's mutual offsetting of debts has failed to implement a rescue package for industry or save potential bankrupts. And this in turn has provoked the current problem of mutual debts and budget imbalance. In particular, he believes, the Finance Ministry likes to blame the Central Bank for the 150 billion rubles [R] "left hanging" in 1992 from the last mutual offsetting of debts, which no one can no recover. In Gerashchenko's words, this is the fruit of government inaction.

The Central Bank views the problem of slow payments in the same light. Gerashchenko calls the Finance Ministry attempt to introduce promissory notes hasty, since the major problem of payments is not so much the absence of a promissory note mechanism as the poverty of enterprises, whose working capital has been eroded by inflation. Hence an absurd situation could arise whereby two insolvent plants start to exchange Finance Ministry-issued pieces of paper. The head of the Central Bank of Russia remarks that haste over the introduction of promissory notes will lead to a wave of forgeries, like the false letters of advice or "Rossiya" checks. The chairman of the Central Bank believes that it was quite wrong not to index the working capital of industry in January 1992, and then not to find time to do so later, selectively. Payments are also being held up by the cash crisis in the economy—enterprises simply have nothing with which to pay deliverers.

Gerashchenko hints gently that the majority of regional representatives and government members share his view on reforms, and Fedorov remains somewhat isolated. He does not consider the anti-Central Bank campaign in the press anything serious, nor does he believe that the Finance Ministry will manage to win the government over to its side. In passing he also remarked that Fedorov himself is not without sin, since Finance Ministry money is being kept in the accounts of "certain commercial banks," and not in the Central Bank, as it should be.

Touching on the question of commercial banks, Gerashchenko noted that 70 percent of the country's transactions pass through Moscow credit and finance institutions; if bankers and their clients would operate according to the current rules, transactions would proceed efficiently enough. He believes that there is a need to allow foreign banks into the Russian market—within reasonable limits, of course. In the opinion of the head of the Central Bank, this would force their Russian colleagues to lower their "extortionate rates." It was also said that the Central Bank is receiving many reports that commercial banks are buying up the old 1961-1992 bank notes. To which Gerashchenko stated that the exchange of the old denominations was completed by the Savings Bank on 1 September, and now old bank notes are exchanged by cash centers only in exceptional cases. But only for physical persons in possession of a document confirming that they were unable to exchange them by the officially appointed deadline.

Economist Views Role of Monetarism in Russia

PM0811150493 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 3 Nov 93 p 1

[Interview with Vladilen Martynov, director of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations by unidentified ITAR-TASS reporter; place and date not given: "Things Are More Difficult for Russia Today Than for Germany After the War"; from the "Delo" section]

[Excerpt] [ITAR-TASS] How do you assess the prospects of Russia's emerging on the world market and being included in world economic relations?

[Martynov] No country can successfully develop in isolation, outside the international division of labor. But the road to economic openness will obviously be rather long and difficult for us. The majority of Russia's directors and entrepreneurs still have no concept of external competition and are not ready for it, so we shall be forced to implement a protectionist policy in some sectors.

True, Russia's position is made easier by the fact that, after all, it possesses large reserves of energy and raw material resources. Were it not for this, we would be encountering even worse problems than Ukraine. Hence the government's course of stimulating exports seems to me to be correct. Boris Yeltsin's remark at the G-7 meeting in Tokyo that new credits are not so important for us as equal opportunities for our export goods compared with Western countries' comparable goods is also correct.

[ITAR-TASS] But credits are also required?

[Martynov] Of course. Only it is important to use them correctly, and not repeat the mistake made in the eighties, when we basically spent them on food, instead of spending them on the development of sectors which would by now be bringing in returns. We will be paying for this mistake for a long time to come. It is good also that the West is agreeing to restructure (defer) our debts.

Above all today we are interested in investments, in the influx of private capital. For this, however, we need, first, political stability, and, second, a favorable legislative environment. I do not agree with those of our economists who say that equal conditions should be created for all, including foreign, investors. If you really want to attract serious, and not speculative, capital from abroad, you should grant it privileges. It must be understood: No capitalist will come to us without receiving guarantees of higher profits than in his homeland or, say, in Australia.

The recent political changes in our country, including the abolition of the Supreme Soviet, are on the whole assessed positively in the West. Especially in entrepreneurial circles. There are, however, also negative factors. For example, I find it absolutely impossible to understand who in the Russian Government is responsible for foreign investments today. Structures for this have been created in virtually every ministry, but on a national scale the policy is unclear.

[ITAR-TASS] And how will the recent changes affect the economy in general? In particular, what will the return of Yegor Gaydar and the reinforcement of the "liberal monetarist" wing in the leadership do for us?

[Martynov] In a sense it has now become easier for the government to purse a policy of financial stabilization: It is possible, at least, to calculate the real budget expenditure in the fourth quarter. But the atmosphere of disorder and the contradictory demands of the regions and various political groups in the conditions of the election campaign, of course, curb the leadership's possibilities.

As for Gaydar... It seems to me he is not quite the same economist and politician who headed the Cabinet of Ministers two years ago. Gaydar is a clever man; he is constantly learning, from his own mistakes too. In general, when he and his young team began to lead the state, they saw themselves as kamikaze pilots, and did not expect to stay at the helm for more than three months. They saw their task in taking the first step—and after all, that is what they did. Although, I repeat, not without mistakes, because at that time they approached many problems purely from a theoretical point of view.

Life, however, is more complex than any theories. You say: "monetarist wing." But after all, as one idle economist has calculated, there are no less than 87 versions of monetarism in the modern world, and the level of state regulation of the economy can differ greatly. It is impossible to calculate the "dosage" just on the basis of general theoretical premises divorced from a specific situation in a given, specific country.

Of course, in our country today there can be no question of a return to regulation according to the old Gosplan [State Planning Committee] model. But support for the money supply, the stabilization of the ruble, structural overhaul, and the development of foreign economic relations are unthinkable without an active state role. Incidentally, all countries which have entered on the road of radical reforms are in a similar situation. The fact that the situation in Russia today is more difficult than anywhere else, because we have to reform the economy in conditions of a forced reduction in people's standard of living, is another question. In postwar Germany or Japan the standard of living was so low that even the toughest policy was accompanied by a gradual improvement in life. And this created a basis for social concord. [passage omitted]

Chubays Views Upward Trends in Privatization

PM0911101993 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 6 Nov 93 p 1

[Article by Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Chubays under the "Privatization" rubric: "'Middle Class' Is Strengthening and Growing, According to Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Chubays"]

[Text] Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov recently stated that many enterprises in the city are being privatized for a song. I would describe that statement as very new and interesting. True, what was interesting in it has long become out of date while what was new is not interesting. I could have seriously discussed such a position a year or—at the very latest—six months ago.

Last week saw a a dramatic rise in the voucher rate. And the rate of the privatization check is, of course, a direct function of the confidence in the privatization program felt by the market or, in a broader sense, the Russian population. Whenever a dangerous attack was launched on the course of privatization by the Supreme Soviet, the voucher rate stood still or even declined. True, the most recent attacks in August were no longer able to shake it, and it has risen consistently.

And since September its growth rates have begun to exceed the inflation rate. Last week they went up particularly quickly. I think that what lies behind this now is the final conviction on the part of the market that no one will now be able to start, stop, or slow down privatization in Russia. And that means that the "middle class," which forms the basis of any civilized society, will strengthen and grow.

Fedorov Cited on Moscow's Economic Policy

PM0811163993 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 6 Nov 93 p 1

["Excerpt" from statement by Deputy Prime Minister Boris Fedorov under the "Finances" rubric: "Reforms Will Founder If Inflation Is Not Licked, States Deputy Prime Minister Boris Fedorov"]

[Text] I am glad that the struggle against inflation still remains one of the main goals in the statement on economic policy in 1993-1994 adopted by the Council of Ministers. In my view, the lowering of inflation to 15 percent in January with a subsequent reduction to 2-5 percent by the end of 1994 is a perfectly feasible task.

However, such processes do not happen automatically. A deliberate anti-inflationary policy is necessary, and the government does intend to pursue this. Special attention is paid to the budget deficit. In the fourth quarter this figure could be 5.5 trillion rubles [R]. The revocation of a number of decisions made by the Council of Ministers aimed at increasing the expenditure side of the budget will make it possible to save an extra R1.7 trillion in the current quarter.

Next year we set ourselves the goal of reducing the budget deficit to 5 percent of GDP. What is more, at least 30 percent of that sum is to be covered by issuing securities. For comparison purposes, the budget deficit on the results of 1993 will clearly be 10 percent of GDP.

I would describe the government decision to consolidate in the budget all the subsidies aimed at supporting agriculture and the northern territories as a very important measure within the framework of the stabilization policy. That will make it possible finally to abandon the pernicious system of uncontrolled issuing of credit. Moreover, we will not now be using the budget to compensate for the difference in the rates of interest on Central Bank credit.

In my view, the government statement on economic policy should be regarded by the Central Bank leadership as calling, as early as the first quarter of 1994, for a substantial part of the credit to be redistributed not through the issuing of credit, as now happens, but by means of auctions and collateral loans (secured on bonds) and other real market methods.

Government Differences on Economy Analyzed

MK0511180093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Nov 93 p 1

[Ivan Zasurskiy report under the "Viewpoint" rubric: "Will the President Fire the Central Bank Chief? Viktor Gerashchenko as an Indicator of Self-Determination"]

[Text] An anti-Gerashchenko campaign has drawn excessive attention to the conflict between the Central Bank chief and the Finance Ministry. Meanwhile, the conflict in itself is "working" in nature, not decisive, one that fits into the pattern of the standoff between the old professionals and the young reformers and reflects not only disagreements on a number of matters concerning the strategy and tactics of reform, which exist not between Viktor Gerashchenko and Boris Fedorov alone, but also tensions within the government that overshadow the dispute between the Central Bank chief and the Finance Ministry.

If previously Viktor Gerashchenko was the only "exposed" leader who disagreed with the exclusive priority of financial stabilization, now we are witnessing the proximity of the banker's views to what amounts to electoral statements by Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets, Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin, and other members of the Council of Ministers. If previously the conflict, which has historical roots, was seen in the light of the standoff between the reform-minded president and the parliament that was putting breaks on reform, now the stance of Boris Yeltsin, too, is not clear.

So, according to SEGODNYA, an edict on dismissing Viktor Gerashchenko has been sitting on the president's table for a number of days. But the "president's table" is an extremely loose concept, and the fact that edicts sitting on it have been signed will be hardly of any importance until they "slip" from the table and travel to some other place. The fact that the edict is "sitting" is important in itself, however, because formerly instructions signed by the president used to take off from the table at the presidential entourage's prompting, but had to be rescinded later.

Curiously, the president's stance on Viktor Gerashchenko may be determined not only by weekly revelations in the press concerning the Central Bank head, but also this bureaucrat's viewpoint and its compatibility with those held by nonradical government leaders. For instance, with that of Viktor Chernomyrdin, whose presentation at a Council of Ministers meeting did not contain a single trace of the severe confrontation with the Central Bank, which has been professed by Boris Fedorov. On the contrary, government policy according to Viktor Chernomyrdin was being worked out "together with the Russian Central Bank."

On the whole, at a time when efforts to step up reform encounter an unsurmountable barrier—the interests of Russia's pauperized population—what objectives should the president opt for? Since an assessment-based approach is impossible here (as is always the case when short-term interests are at odds with long-term ones), immediate needs seem more convincing than the blueprint of future happiness after the financial stabilization and voucher privatization of the entire country—hence the president's current stand also has the right to exist. The thing is that the president is sitting on two chairs—one of stepped-up reform and the other of operational management—which renders both directions in the cabinet's activity inconsistent and is sometimes even fraught with serious complications for the country's economy.

Given this, the contradiction between a stable ruble policy and the interests of Russian industry appears particularly characteristic. As soon as the Russian money's exchange rate against the dollar becomes stable, the scissors of ruble inflation come into play. They force prices to soar; Russian products are gradually getting more expensive than foreign-made ones, and domestic prices begin to overtake world prices.

The president's address at the Council of Ministers meeting is noteworthy above all because it was mixed in nature. Traditional calls for boosting reform momentum and achieving a stable, convertible ruble were combined this time with a rebuke for losing control over the economy and the radicals' penchant for emergency rule. I would like to believe that this marks the beginning of working out a new, "balancing" presidential stance with regard to reform and the economy. If this is so, then Boris Yeltsin's future after 12 December could find a rational justification.

Viktor Gerashchenko from the team of professionals is an indicator of the independence of action and decision-making not only by the president, but also Yegor Gaydar, who once invited him to take on the job of Central Bank chief. Yegor Gaydar is not so simple-minded, either—according to people who have had a chance to deal with him, he is capable of singling out the basics and reviewing his decisions; furthermore, he is guided not by slogans that make newspaper headlines after Council of Ministers meetings, but by somewhat more serious considerations, including political ones. Russia's future will largely depend on these leaders' self- determination on the eve of elections with regard to long-term objectives and the right tactics.

Government Proposes 'Financial Constitution'

MK0611115093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 75, 6 Nov 93 (signed to press 5 Nov) p 1

[Report by Mikhail Leontyev under the general headline: "The President Reckons With Regional Demands. Boris Fedorov Proposes 'Financial Constitution'" under the "Staraya Ploshchad" rubric: "Constitutional Limitation of Budget Deficit Should Raise Politicians' Responsibility"]

[Text] The Finance Ministry has circulated a press release proposing to "include in the Russian Federation Constitution the following provisions which can conditionally be called a "financial constitution." Without this we shall never achieve financial stabilization or sheer order in the economy.

"1. The Central Bank of the Russian Federation is independent of both the government and the State Duma; its main task is the maintenance of a stable national currency and price level.

"2. The government may not receive credits from the Central Bank and is obligated to cover the budget deficit exclusively through loans from nonfinancial institutions and the population.

"3. The Central Bank may not credit nonfinancial establishments or provide target or sectoral credits.

"4. Any decisions on spending in excess of the established budget may be made only after a corresponding source has been identified or other expenditures have been reduced.

"5. The State Duma may approve or reject budget spending plans proposed by the government, but it has no right to initiate spending decisions.

"The Russian Federation Finance Ministry appeals to all parties and movements and candidates to the State Duma to support these provisions, which have been proven in practice in dozens of countries and to include them into their election programs."

There is such an odious thing called the "democracy of interest groups." Put simply, sectoral, regional, and other lobbies unite to get through their amendments to the budget, which turns parliament into a perennial source of budget deficit. The most civilized countries suffer from coalition pressure groups, and what this means to us has been shown by the now defunct Supreme Soviet which approved an unprecedented budget deficit of 50 percent of GNP.

The measure proposed by the Finance Ministry is the most effective method against lobby coalitions. A rigid budget deficit limit is established and any additional claims on the budget must be backed up by specific sources. If the military or the agricultural producers want to get more funds, they must show at whose expense it will come: the pensioners, the industrialists, or themselves. This is a "financial constitution" and it is quite obvious why this order should be constitutionalized.

It is all the more appropriate that this initiative has been timed to coincide with the elections. The inflationary groupings from communists to "civil unionists" will now raise a lot of noise; as a result, it will be possible to discern clearly a responsible political movement from demagogues and economic saboteurs. This is possibly the sole thing for the sake of which it is now worth to adopt the constitution and hold the referendum.

The proposal to strip the Duma of spending initiative may appear somewhat dubious: If the conditions of the proceeding four points are adopted, there will be no particular need for that.

Incidentally, based on the first point of the Finance Ministry's proposals, one can conclude that the ministry regards the question about the incumbent Central Bank chairman as a foregone conclusion. It would be hard to imagine that after such a fierce struggle over placing the bank under government jurisdiction that Boris Fedorov would speak in favor of freedom and independence for Viktor Gerashchenko, who is deeply convinced that a budget deficit is vitally needed to salvage the "industrial potential" and "to preserve traditional markets."

Regional Affairs

Yeltsin Aide Says Ural Republic Plan Invalid

PM0811163393 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Nikolay Medvedev, chief of the Work with Territories Administration of the President's Administration, by Vladimir Yanchenkov; place and date not given: "Dangerous 'Power Games'"]

[Text] As is well known, the Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet has decided to declare a Ural Republic on the oblast's territory. The first edicts have been issued by Rossel, the republic's acting governor. Nikolay Medvedev, chief of the Work with Territories Administration of the President's Administration, commented on these events in a conversation with ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA's correspondent.

[Yanchenkov] So then, the Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet has made the Ural Republic a reality. How legitimate is this decision from a legal standpoint?

[Medvedev] Sverdlovsk Oblast leaders have exploited the generally sensible and correct idea of free economic development and an equal tax burden between Federation components. These factors undoubtedly need to be made equal in economic, sociopolitical, and legal terms. But Sverdlovsk Oblast has chosen a flawed method and way of implementing this idea.

What is a republic? It is a state. And Chapter Two, Article 14 of the so-called Ural Republic Constitution states: "The Ural Republic is a rule-of-law, democratic, social, and secular state with a republican form of rule." But, forgive me, who gave the oblast soviet the right to decide matters on this scale?

From the legal standpoint the oblast soviet's decision is unambiguously groundless. It does not square with either the old, existing Constitution, or with the new planned constitution. Moreover, the position of Sverdlovsk Oblast leaders and the oblast soviet's decision can be seen as a direct failure to carry out the well-known presidential edict No. 1400 on phased constitutional reform and subsequent presidential edicts.

Under the existing Constitution, oblast soviets do not have the right to decide questions of national-state makeup. Under the law on the referendum they are not entitled to submit such matters to oblast referendums either. An oblast, according to the law, can only have a charter [ustav], not a constitution.

[Yanchenkov] What is the way out of this situation?

[Medvedev] In solving any highly important problems, particularly those regarding national-state makeup, it is necessary to calculate and weigh up all possible consequences and to look ahead. After all, what is happening? Today Russia is a federation, if things continue in this way will it be a confederation tomorrow? If we are now making it our main strategic aim to preserve the united Russian state at least within the bounds currently defined by the Constitution, then all problems need to be solved on the basis of this strategic goal.

There is only one way out of the situation now. All the component republics within the Russian Federation should retreat from their declarations of sovereignty, and such backtracking has already occurred at the latest conference of Russian Federation component leaders. Only a subject of international law—and only the Russian state is that—can be sovereign.

Admittedly, the leaders of certain republics disagreed with this approach. In particular, Shaymiyev (Tatarstan) and Stepanov (Karelia). And they cited the norms of international law and the Helsinki Declarations.

But such references are groundless. The Helsinki Declarations, as is well known, apply to peoples and ethnic groups which are identical to states. But there are currently 128 ethnic groups in the Russian Federation! So from what angle should a people be identified with statehood?

This is a clear case of confusion, we need above all to clarify the terms—specifically, terms such as a nation's right to self-determination and to a realistic, scientific revelation of the links between people, ethnic group, politics, and state.

The Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet's decision was made on a wave of emotion and personal ambition. And the degree of responsibility which should be incumbent on people—in this case the deputies who made the wrong decision in the spirit of classic soviet, Bolshevik traditions—has not been calculated.

What will provincial separatism lead to? Sverdlovsk Oblast—put it this way—undoubtedly has some definite economic priorities; it is entitled to claim some privileges. But the Russian regions are by no means uniform in this respect. For instance, there is Yakutia (gold) and Komi, Tatarstan, and Tyumen (oil). But there is also Kalmykia—with its alkaline steppe and sands... So just what is the Sverdlovsk option proposing? That all the natural riches concentrated in a specific region should belong solely to that region's population and nobody else? But that is a Bolshevik approach, whereby we hunkered down in our own economic area within the Soviet Union and did not want to integrate ourselves with the world economy!

[Yanchenkov] Nonetheless, what is to be done about the Ural Republic? After all, its proclamation is a fait accompli. And what is to be done about the demands from the regions—Cossack regions, for instance—for republic status? After all, the president's edicts on the rehabilitation of repressed peoples and on state support for the Cossacks apply to them...

[Medvedev] In our approach to this issue—be it with regard to the Cossacks or any other region—we need to take into account the fact that a form of presidency has been established in the country now, although Federation components have been given power and the right to act and resolve all matters autonomously. But they can only act within the framework of the recent presidential edicts which I mentioned earlier.

All the talk about the status of certain regions is based on one main question—the attitude to power. Power as an end in itself or as a strong means of achieving our main strategic goals?

A principled approach to power structures should be based on Russian laws. Relying on regional separatism at a time when the position in the country is beginning to stabilize, when real power has finally been established, and when all the systems for running the country are working would result in chaos and push society into another disaster.

As for the Ural Republic, look for yourselves. Here is a document which arrived recently from the collective at the Sverdlovsk Main Administration of the Central Bank of Russia. Read it—people are outraged by the ill-considered, hasty action taken by the oblast leaders and are proposing that they postpone looking at the question of setting up the Ural Republic. And there have been a huge number of letters like this! Where is the unanimity on the part of the population, which the creators of this upstart republic have been proclaiming?

I do not know how the president will act, but our administration has drawn up certain recommendations for him. We believe that the Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet's decision has no legal force. Criminal proceedings should be instituted against the people who made it at this time—when the tragic events of early October in Moscow are still fresh in the memory. The head of the oblast administration should, naturally, be dismissed by presidential edict, and as for the oblast soviet...

[Yanchenkov] Clearly, it would do better to dissolve itself?

[Medvedev] Yes, its powers should be suspended.

We need to end all these "power games." Power is not a toy. I repeat—power is a means to successfully advance reform and to realize the main aims which we have set for the sake of ensuring Russia's prosperity and enhancing the well-being of its citizens.

Voting Intentions of Petersburg Electorate Viewed

PM0811144193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 5 Nov 93 p 2

[Article by Yuriy Kukanov under the rubric "Russian Before the Elections": "What They Think About the Duma in Peter's City"]

[Excerpt] St. Petersburg—[passage omitted] Some 3,745,600 inhabitants of the Palmyra of the North [fanciful name of St. Petersburg] have the right to vote on 12 December. According to various estimates 23-37 percent of them will probably boycott the elections. The remaining 63-77 percent of Petersburgers with varying degrees of probability intend taking part in the voting. The ordinary voters, unfamiliar with the upheavals of the party struggle, will not find it easy to choose among the rival political blocs. Especially since the contenders for the Duma seats themselves are still arguing among themselves at a distance, as it were. For example, Vitaliy Savitskiy, cochairman of the Russian Christian Democratic Union, has repudiated a report on the Union's membership of the Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc, stating that the well-trained political eye may discern behind these political structures the figures of Mikhail

Gorbachev, former general secretary of the CPSU, and fellow zealot Nikolay Ryzhkov.

It was with surprise that the leaders of the Union of Labor Collectives of St. Petersburg city and oblast learned of their membership of the "Fatherland" electoral bloc. Sergey Morozov, the union's chairman, has announced that their organization will completely boycott the Duma elections.

Now for the scandal involving the republicans. The regional organization of the Republican Party of the Russian Federation [RPRF] does not understand how Yuriy Nesterov, former Russian people's deputy from St. Petersburg, got onto the Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin list. The St. Petersburg republicans condemn the RPRF leadership which concluded an alliance with the "Yavlinskiy bloc" on terms which differ sharply from those approved at their fourth party congress. It seems that the desire of the Republican Party's leaders to win places in the Duma at any cost threatens to end in a split in the party's ranks. In any event, the regional party organization intends to raise the question of the dismissal of the political council at the next congress.

However, the party battles for deputies' seats are of least concern to the voters. They will vote for their own well being, according to the specialists from the Center for the Study and Forecasting of Social Processes. According to the findings of a poll that they conducted in mid-October, the number of citizens who have managed to maintain or even improve their material situation since the reforms began considerably exceeds the number of those dissatisfied with the present economic course. Hence the sociologists' forecast: The united opposition of national communists which is opposed to the reforms can expect to win at most 15-20 percent of the votes in St. Petersburg whereas the association of just three blocs of democratic organizations ("Russia's Choice," the Movement for Democratic Reforms, and the Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc) has five times as much support with around 75 percent. According to the sociologists' figures, "Russia's Choice" headed by Yegor Gaydar is the frontrunner in the election race in the city on the Neva today. Of those who said that they would definitely vote, 24 percent said that they would vote for him, 19 percent favored the "Yavlinskiy bloc," 11 percent sided with the movement for democratic reforms headed by Anatoliy Sobchak and Gavriil Popov, and 8 percent said that they intended to vote for the communists. The sociologists asked Petersburgers whom they would prefer to see as president if elections were held at the same time as the Duma elections. Some 42 percent said Yeltsin, 28 percent Yavlinskiy, 11 percent Gaydar, 9 percent Rutskoy, and 5 percent Zhirinovskiy.

One-Third of Muscovites May Not Vote 12 Dec

MK0511160093 Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian No 16/18, 5-11 Nov 93 (signed to press 4 Nov) p 5

[Unattributed report under the "Rating Vs. Vilchek Service" rubric: "All Is, Alas, Ahead Yet"]

[Text] **Muscovites' Political Likes and Dislikes. "Ostankino" Sociological Center Data**

A survey of Muscovites' political moods that we conducted between 25 and 31 October attests first and foremost to the fact that the voters stand to win or lose their future, as they have to make up their minds on such short notice: A mere week ago, most of the forces and figures on the political arena were either not there or rather blurred.

Here are the answers of 2,020 Muscovites to our questions in percentages.

Do you follow the election campaign?
I do closely, with great interest—27
I do with no special interest—39
I do not—34

Are you going to vote?
Yes— 60
No—14
Undecided—26

If you follow the election campaign, which of its participants (which party, bloc) looks more convincing, more attractive, do you think?
"Russia's Choice" (Ye. Gaydar, S. Kovalev)—20
"Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc"—10
Party of Russian Unity and Accord (S. Shakhray)—5
Democratic Party of Russia (N. Travkin)—3

Another 8 "voices" became divided in almost equal shares between the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms, Civic Union, "August" (included in the poll was also the Economic Freedom Party), the Socialists, the Liberal Democratic Party, and the Communists in league with National-Patriots. (The latter were not in our list, and were included by respondents).

The following figures, though, seem the most significant.

Thirty-two percent found it hard to answer for whom they would vote. They are easy to understand: the Radicals are incomprehensible to them but they promise paradise (or at least the dressing room of paradise) tomorrow. The appealing Liberals dangle unpopular measures.

Twenty-two percent were not stumped for an answer, but declined to do so. In an abrupt, often aggressive form. They as a rule said they were not going to vote. Most of them belong to the 44 percent of capital residents who earn less than 50,000 rubles a month per family member.

In short, all those in the race still have sufficient success margins. The less conspicuous parties will really have to band together: The average voter can only keep in his field of vision not more than 5 to 7 party banners and 15 to 20 names personifying the various political trends. As regards parties now in the lead, the proposed merger with S. Shakhray, for example, is very perilous, I think. The thing is that a considerable part of voters who are prepared to back the democrats would not like, as they vote for them, to vote also, as it were, for having no early presidential elections. A merger of democratic parties into one bloc would put this part of electors in a difficult position, thus motivating them to take no part in the elections.

Gorbachev Ordered To Apologize to Luzhkov

PM0911110393 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 6 Nov 93 p 1

[Report by Andrey Varchenya of Moscow City Hall Press Center: "People's Court Rules That Gorbachev Should Apologize to Luzhkov"]

[Text] After more than six months of red tape, Moscow's Oktyabrskiy Rayon People's Court has delivered its ruling in the action brought against former USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev in defense of the honor and dignity of Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov.

During a television broadcast in May this year, Gorbachev accused the Moscow government of "constructing 10-12 three-story country residences on the outskirts of Moscow." Luzhkov considered that this statement by the former president impugned the honor and dignity of the city administration and went to court. Gorbachev did not once turn up at court.

In his absence the court has ruled that Gorbachev must within one month apologize on television to the government of the capital and repudiate the information he gave.

Moscow Visitors Must Register With Officials

PM0811143593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Nov 93 First Edition p 5

[Reader's letter followed by unattributed report on reply from Yu. Sharagorov, deputy chief of Moscow Passport Administration, under the rubric "Questions to the Newspaper": "On Registration in the Capital"—first paragraph is reader's letter]

[Text] Will relatives coming to stay in Moscow from other Russian cities and Commonwealth countries have to be registered? (A. Zavoruyev and others)

A guest coming to Moscow for a stay of more than 72 hours is obliged to register with the internal affairs organs, Yu. Sharagorov, deputy chief of Moscow Passport Administration, explained. The registration must take place within 24 hours, not counting the day of arrival, weekends, and holidays. On the basis of the law "On State Charges," a fee equivalent to 1 percent of the minimum wage will be levied for registration and a residence permit. At the present time this is equivalent to 77 rubles [R] and 40 kopeks. Those found guilty of violating the registration procedure may be fined a sum equivalent to 10 times the minimum wage, that is, R774. Registration is to be carried out at the local internal affairs organs at the place of residence.

Moscow Sets Rules for Visitors Without Visas

LD0911100193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0930 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow November 9 ITAR-TASS—The mayor of Moscow, Yuriy Luzhkov, has signed an order to introduce a special procedure to be fulfilled by permanent residents of countries outside the Russian Federation when they come to Moscow, unless they come with regular visas. From November 15, such citizens must register at their temporary residence in Moscow and pay local authorities one-tenth of Russia's minimum monthly wage (about 80 roubles or 66 U.S. cents) per day. This rule applies to those who are not citizens of the Russian Federation and arrive in Moscow for more than one day on business, for holidays, commercial and other kinds of activity, as well as guests of Muscovites and for medical treatment.

Tuva President Comments on New Constitution

OW0911084693 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel and Orbita Networks in Russian 1945 GMT 27 Oct 93

[Report by A. Serin; from the "Utro" program]

[Text] We will now meet the president of the Republic of Tyva, which is what the Tuva Republic is now called. This is what we expected it to be called. The fact is that the 24th session of the republic's Supreme Soviet was concluded in Kyzyl the other day and it discussed issues of the republic's constitution. Our correspondent Anatoliy Serin reports from the capital of the Republic of Tuva.

[Begin recording] [Serin] The republic's constitution was adopted in the conference hall of the Tuva Republic. By a majority of votes the deputies adopted a document very important for the Tuva Republic. We have with us Sherig-Ool (Izozhikovich) Oorzhak, chairman of the Constitutional Commission and president of the Republic of Tuva. [Oorzhak is identified by caption with the initial "M"] Sherig-Ool, what are the characteristics of the constitution of the Republic of Tuva?

[Oorzhak] The first characteristic lies in the fact that the constitution clearly defines human rights. Man is given [words indistinct]. Private property is an inalienable part of a person's rights. A person's right to have his own property and to privately own land is considered an inherent and natural right.

The second point, and this is something new, is that a whole package of questions concerning the mutual relations and rules governing the republic's membership in our federal state, the Russian Federation, is specified in the constitution. We consider this to be very important. This is the first time that we have constitutionally acknowledged ourselves to be a part of the Russian Federation.

[Serin] Tell us, how different is the Republic of Tuva's constitution from the draft Russian constitution?

[Oorzhak] That draft is also a very strong one. I would say that our draft is also an original one. But since this is an ethnic republic, we have taken into consideration the ethnic characteristics of our republic, our history, and the rich history of our Tuvin statehood. We recently celebrated the 230th anniversary of [word indistinct]. After all, we know how Tuvin statehood was created. Therefore the constitution is enriched by our historic experience. Another point is that our constitution has been developed on the basis of the current Russian constitution and the draft Russian Federation constitution. We have also taken the experience of foreign countries into consideration. Therefore we have no strong conceptual questions on which we disagree with Russia. [end recording]

Transbaykal Election Campaign Begins Quietly

PM0811164993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Report by Vyacheslav Smirnov: "Preparations for Elections in Transbaykal Taking Place Without Split Into Them and Us"]

[Text] Chita—The air did not stir in Chita officials' offices when Valeriy Lomako, first deputy head of the oblast administration, sent a cable to President Yeltsin asking for the oblast soviet to be disbanded since it is holding up reforms. The deputies themselves did not want to resign voluntarily, saying that they would carry out the president's edict and directives and fully support the decision on early elections and the radical reform of organs of representative power.

However in October Oblast Administration Head Boris Ivanov visited Moscow, where he resolved pressing issues for the people of Chita in government offices. Grain is still being harvested throughout the oblast, but both money and fuel are in short supply. For the umpteenth year the oblast is experiencing a very acute shortage of electricity and heat.

The administration head persuaded ministers of the need to provide Chita Oblast with urgent support. The people of Chita were allocated considerable federal budget aid, which, needless to say, helped stabilize sociopolitical and economic life.

The people of the Transbaykal greeted with approval Boris Ivanov's decree suspending the activity of village, settlement, rayon, and city soviets of people's deputies. The opinion was almost unanimous that it was high time this happened.

So the Transbaykal has entered into the election campaign without upheavals. Local political parties and public organizations and movements stepped up their activity. At the end of October a routine session of the permanent "roundtable" was held. They discussed the question of what kind of representative power the oblast should have. And considered several options starting with the name and finishing with the structure and the number of future deputies. Failing to reach agreement, they all voted in favor of sending all the proposals to the president's administration. They may come in handy for people formulating normative documents.

Federal Assembly candidate deputies began to be nominated in a calm atmosphere. They include local businessmen, entrepreneurs, and new wave politicians, backed by democratic parties and movements. Administration Head Boris Ivanov stated his willingness to take part in the elections to the State Duma. The regional branch of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, which supports him, thinks that he has every chance of receiving voters' vote of confidence.

Deputies have actively joined in the preparations for the elections, along with the administration, without splitting into them and us. Electoral commissions have been formed, borders of districts have been defined and made public, an oblast election staff has been set up, explanatory work is under way among the population, and signatures are being collected.

However, the calm flow of electoral life may prove to be deceptive. There was recently a drastic increase in the price of bread. You now have to pay 350 rubles for a loaf. Rising prices, interruptions in the flow of the heating supply, and constant electricity outages, as happened last year, may also affect voters' activity.

Explosion Destroys Railway Tunnel in Chechnya

LD0811170593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1144 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] The head of the transport department of the Interior Ministry of the Russian republic of Chechnya, Makhsud Musayev, said a tunnel, not a bridge as reported before, was totally destroyed by an explosion on Sunday on the Zhalka-Gudermes section of the North Caucasian Railway. He told Interfax one powerful explosive device had already been removed from that part of the railway shortly before Sunday's explosion. He surmised that a new device had been planted there afterwards.

Musayev said three explosions had occurred on that stretch of the railway in the past three months. He said a provisional track was now used for trains running between Groznyy and Moscow.

Musayev said the Chechen authorities were investigating the incident.

Chechen Official Denies Reports of Unrest

LD0911093693 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0600 GMT 9 Nov 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] A representative of the Chechen Republic's Ministry of Information and Press has denied a report by several mass media sources about the start of riots in

Groznyy. The statement says that a curfew is being maintained in the capital of Chechnya. Beginning at 2100 hours, Ploshchad Svobody—in which the presidential palace and Chechnya's government and parliament building are situated—were blocked by subunits of the National Guard and by armored equipment.

Defense Ministry, Omsk Arms Producers Confer

PM0811161593 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Nov 93 p 1

[Report by Valentin Rudenko: "Leaders of Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Omsk Enterprises Touch Base"]

[Text] A group of generals and officers from the Russian Ministry of Defense, headed by Andrey Kokoshin, Russian Federation first deputy minister of defense, has visited one of the major domestic aerospace firms—the "Polet" [Flight] production association—as well as the Omsk "Transportation Machine-Building Plant" production association, which manufactures T-80U tanks.

Measures to maintain the scientific and technical potential of defense firms and the prospects of cooperation in the interests of the implementation of the long-term arms program elaborated by the Ministry of Defense were discussed.

The Russian Federation first deputy defense minister also met with the teaching staff and students of the Omsk Higher Tank Engineering Institute.

There will be a detailed report about the results of the trip in the next edition of the newspaper.

International Affairs

Officials React to Yeltsin's Decision on Elections

MK0911090093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Nov 93 p 2

[Unattributed report under the "In Brief" column]

[Text] Kiev—A POSTFACTUM news agency reporter asked some Ukrainian state and public figures to comment on the news that Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin intends to hold no early presidential elections. The Ukrainian president's press service advises that Leonid Kravchuk had not voiced his official view in this regard. Vyacheslav Chornovil, leader of Ukraine's People's Rukh, stated: "Even if this decision is prompted by objective reasons, it hits at Mr. Yeltsin's prestige and offers the opposition and his adversaries a chance to launch yet another series of attacks on him which may hasten their vindication." Aleksandr Moroz, chairman of Ukraine's Socialist Party: "This is a logical step which will lead to a dictatorship with a tame parliament."

Kiev Informs Russian Ambassador About Sect

AU0811200193 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 5 Nov 93 p 1

[Unattributed report: "It Has Been Brought to the Knowledge" of the Russian Ambassador]

[Text] On Wednesday [3 November], Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation in Ukraine Leonid Smolyakov was invited to Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was brought to the attention of the diplomat that there are many Russian citizens—members of the so-called "Great White Brotherhood"—among the participants in the unlawful actions in Kiev. Their arrival in Ukraine involves a violation of passport regulations. L. Smolyakov's attention was also drawn to the lack of objectivity in the elucidation of the events around the "Great White Brotherhood" in some of the Russian mass media. The Russian Federation ambassador to Ukraine was handed a memorandum on the illegal activity of members of the "Great White Brotherhood" in Kiev. A request was also expressed that the appropriate Russian authorities do not allow the sect members to travel to Kiev.

Zlenko Meets With Austria's Mock in Vienna

LD0811223893 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1910 GMT 8 Nov 93

[by ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Chupakhin]

[Text] Vienna, 8 Nov—The possibilities of developing economic ties between Austria and the Ukraine, as well as problems of the Ukraine's integration into common European structures, were the focus of attention in talks held here today between the two countries' foreign ministers, Alois Mock and Anatoliy Zlenko, who is in the Austrian capital on an official visit.

At a meeting with journalists the Ukrainian minister expressed the hope for "parallel actions" on the part of the member-states of the Council of Europe in relation to the efforts of the Ukraine and Russia to become a part of this organization. For his part, A. Mock stressed that Austria supports the Ukraine's desire to associate itself with the Central European Initiative. However, he pointed out, there is still no consensus on this question within this working community, which includes a number of European states.

Considerable attention during the course of the talks was focused on problems of nuclear safety. In this connection A. Zlenko noted the fact that the recent decision by the Ukrainian parliament to continue the operation of the Chernobyl nuclear plant was rejected. The basis for this was the findings of a commission of experts. The minister also recalled an agreement recently signed between the Ukraine and the United States on monitoring the safety of Ukrainian nuclear power plants, and expressed the hope that this step serves as an example to other states.

Call To Withdraw Troops From Georgia

LD0811173393 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1230 GMT 8 Nov 93UNIAR 1230 GMT 8 Nov

[Text] Simferopol, 8 Nov—The Crimean branch of the Ukrainian Republican Party has issued a statement on the latest developments in Georgia. The document says: "At Moscow's order, a group of Black Sea Fleet ships carrying marines and armored equipment was dispatched on 3 November from the territory of Ukraine to the Georgian coast. According to informed sources, an assault party of Black Sea Fleet servicemen was landed in the town of Poti, where they joined the fighting in support of one of the conflicting sides. The Supreme Council of Ukraine did not approve any decisions to send to Georgia Ukrainian citizens who make up more than half the conscripted sailors and over 90 percent of officers and non-commissioned officers in the Black Sea Fleet. Taking this into consideration, the Council of the Crimean branch of the Ukrainian Republican Party declares its resolute protest against the use of Ukrainian citizens in Georgia's internal conflict. The Council regards the participation of Black Sea Fleet ships in the combat action in Georgia as an overt attempt to involve Ukraine in Russia's foreign policy. The Crimean branch of the Ukrainian Republican Party demands that the president and the Supreme Council of Ukraine immediately withdraw all Black Sea Fleet servicemen of Ukrainian nationality from the war zone in Georgia."

Ukrainian Colonel Named UN Commander in Sarajevo

LD0611210593 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 6 Nov 93

[Text] The UN Secretary General has appointed Colonel (?Senchenko) of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, commander of the United Nations troops headquarters in

Sarajevo. As is known, a Ukrainian battalion has been involved in UN troop operations in the former Yugoslavia since July last year. Its personnel are performing their duties in one of the most difficult regions, Sarajevo.

Plyushch Proposes Israel Join Black Sea Cooperation

AU0811111393 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian 4 Nov 93 p 1

[UKRINFORM report: "Ukrainian Parliamentarians in Israel"]

[Text] The visit to Israel by the Ukrainian parliamentarian delegation headed by I.S. Plyushch is continuing. The Ukrainian parliamentarians were received by Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin. The chairman of the Supreme Council and the head of the Israeli Government briefly described the political and socioeconomic situation in their countries and exchanged opinions on ways to build democratic societies in conditions that have taken shape in Ukraine and in Israel.

Y. Rabin asked about the course of privatization in our country. I.S. Plyushch told about the national, religious, and cultural life of Jewish citizens in Ukraine and raised the question of concluding a trade and economic agreement between our states. I.S. Plyushch highly appraised the fact of concluding the Israeli-Palestinian agreement and remarked that qualitatively new elements of compromise and stabilization have now emerged in the situation in the Near East.

The delegation also visited the Israeli parliament and held negotiations with its chairman Shevach Weiss. I.S. Plyushch made a speech before members of the Knesset. He stated: "We regard the building of relations between Ukraine and Israel as a priority trend in our external policy. Of course, this is not only based upon the presence in Israel of a large group of former Ukrainian citizens. Among the objective reasons for our interest in Israel is the geographical proximity of the Black Sea and Mediterranean regions and potential possibilities for the development of a large-scale economic, scientific-technological, and cultural cooperation."

I.S. Plyushch proposed the idea of Israel joining the zone of cooperation between the Black Sea countries, first as an associate member, for the consideration of the parliamentarians.

Experts Cooperating With Mideast Nations

AU0511142793 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 3 Nov 93 p 5

[Unattributed report: "A Breakthrough to the Near East"]

[Text] A real "assault force" of Ukrainian statesmen is presently "deployed" in the Near Eastern Region. For example, according to the Press Center of Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, yesterday a meeting took place in Cairo between I.A. Wahid [name as transliterated], Egyptian minister of industry and natural resources, and Ukrainian governmental experts headed by V. Kazanov, deputy minister for machine building, military-industrial complex, and conversion. In particular, they spoke about cooperation in building a concentration combine in the town of Abu Tartur [name as published].

Prior to that, the Ukrainian delegation visited Kuwait where prospects of cooperation in the spheres of the economy, industry, oil extraction and processing, trade, and investments were discussed.

Commentary Criticizes Stance on Nuclear Weapons

AU0911090093 Kiev UKRAYINSKA HAZETA in Ukrainian No. 18 (36) 4-17 Nov 93 p 8

[Commentary by UKRAYINSKA HAZETA correspondent Oleksandr Sychov: "Christopher's Mission to Kiev Has Turned Out To Be a Failure. Ukraine Is Only Ready To Get Rid of Nuclear Weapons for $3 Billion"]

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher arrived in Kiev in order to finally obtain Ukraine's consent to get rid of those nuclear weapons that are still available on its territory. However, the almost one-year long activity by the Washington diplomacy in Kiev has turned out to be a failure. Moreover, the Ukrainian position has obviously changed for the worse.

Quite recently, it was still avowed in Kiev that the obligations on nuclear disarmament would be approved by the parliament at any moment. The issues of financial compensation and special security guarantees were only put forward by those parliamentary politicians who advocated extreme nationalist views and who did not seem to reflect the opinion of the majority.

This time, open bargaining was practiced with Secretary of State Christopher. He was given to understand that success in the issue of nuclear weapons in Ukraine will cost Washington at least $2.8 billion or maybe even $5 billion, as Chairman of the Parliament Ivan Plyushch stated. "The faster the problem of guarantees and financial assistance is resolved, the sooner Ukraine is going to fulfill its obligations," said Minister of Foreign Affairs Anatoliy Zlenko.

An agreement was signed in Kiev, in accordance with which Washington will grant Kiev the previously promised $175 million for dismantling the warheads and additional $155 million for rebuilding the economy.

The only thing that Christopher heard from President Leonid Kravchuk in response to that good-will gesture was this: "Let the parliament decide." Today, the majority of members of the Ukrainian Council are, in fact, against the state's nuclear-free status. It was promised to Christopher that the parliament will, probably, ratify START-1 by the end of the year, but with considerable amendments.

Ukraine insists that the attitude toward it be like that toward a nuclear power and that it be involved in the negotiating process on nuclear weapons on an equal basis with five recognized nuclear powers. The deputies are ready, in return for a specified sum of compensation and for the return by Russia of the nuclear fuel for atomic electric power plants, to allow the destruction of just 130 old intercontinental ballistic missiles SS-19 whose service life is expiring. As regards 46 up-to-date SS-24 missiles and also 40 strategic bombers equipped with nuclear weapons, it is envisaged to "temporarily" keep them in Ukraine's arsenal. According to chairman of the Council's External Political Committee, Dmytro Pavlychko, this may continue for "seven, 10, or 20 years."

The reasoning of the adherents of a "temporarily" nuclear Ukraine is quite obvious. Some people see in nuclear weapons a possibility to satisfy great-power ambitions, while others would only like to sell the weapons at a higher price without any concern for the consequences.

As early as in 1995, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty may not be extended, and up to a dozen new nuclear powers may emerge in the world and threaten one another with force. Nuclear tests will be continued. The implementation of START-1 and START-2 will also be foiled. The weapons situated on the territory of Ukraine are included in the general reduction limits. If Ukrainian SS-24 and bombers are even temporarily taken out of the process, Russia, in order to keep up the schedule, will have to destroy its own more up- to-date systems. Moscow will hardly agree to that.

Kiev risks getting itself into a political isolation. A possibility of such development of events was hinted at by the outraged U.S. Secretary of State before he left for the next destination of his trip—Belarus. "The maintenance of nuclear weapons will weaken rather than strengthen your security," he said. "This will complicate and may even undermine the process of integration in the world community of democratic nations which is the only genuine guarantee of Ukraine's security."

National Affairs

Crimean Tatar Leader Murdered in Simferopol

WS0811155393 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 1500 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] Yuriy Usmanov, leader of the Crimean Tatars' national movement, has been murdered in Simferopol. His mutilated body was found near a trolley-bus station on Raketna Street Sunday [7 November] morning. As his bag was opened and searched, investigating officials said that the murder could have been motivated by robbery. However, one should not rule out the involvement of extremists angered by his consistent seeking of compromises with local authorities in resolving problems of the Crimean Tatars. Mustafa Dzamilev, chairman of the medzhlis, expressed condolences in connection with Usmanov's death. Despite serious diagreement between us, he said, the death of Yuriy Usmanov is a great loss for the national movement to which he devoted his entire life. The medzhlis will issue a special declaration regarding this incident.

Radetskyy Signs Armed Forces Reduction Decree

PM0811131593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Nov 93 First Edition p 1

[UNIAN report]

[Text] Ukrainian Defense Minister Vitaliy Radetskyy has signed an order decreeing that by 1 January 1994 Ukraine's Armed Forces will be reduced by 150,000 to a figure of 380,000.

By the end of 1995 they will be reduced to 250,000. It is planned that four of the eight combined-arms divisions presently deployed will be left.

Kiev Says Cuts To Be 'Measured'

PM0911110793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Report by Viktor Litovkin: "The Ukrainian Army Will Be Cut, But in a Measured Way, Without Going Over the Top"]

[Text] The IZVESTIYA editorial office received a fax from the Ukrainian Defense Ministry Press Center. It denies the information from the Kiev UNIAN agency which we published on 3 November.

The Press Service communication says that Defense Minister Vitaliy Radetskiy did not sign an order on cutting the Armed Forces by 150,000 people as of 1 January 1994 and reducing their numerical strength to 380,000. The numerical strength of the Armed Forces is set by the Ukrainian Supreme Council, the fax stresses, at 450,000. It will be achieved through measured cuts, which have nothing to do with emergency measures.

The Press Center communication does not say how many troops and what kind of troops are stationed in Ukraine at the moment, although it is known that the total in the three districts, when the Ukrainian Army was formed, was 700,000, and further tens of thousands of officers responded to an appeal from the country's leaders and returned home from Russia and other republics of the former Union, wishing to serve on the banks of the Dnieper.

Previous legislative acts on military matters adopted by the Ukrainian parliament presuppose a figure of 400,000-420,000 for the numerical strength of the Armed Forces by 1995. In accordance with international agreements, forces on the territory of Ukraine must not number more than 200,000-250,000. This is the Army Ukraine must have by 2000. This is the information the Ukrainian Defense Ministry presented to the CIS Joint Armed Forces Main Staff.

Kuchma Criticizes Supreme Council

AU0811111593 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 4 Nov 93 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Kuchma Is Trying To Justify Himself?"]

[Text] Leonid Kuchma gave his first post-resignation interview to Dnipropetrovsk newspaper NASHE MISTO [Our City]. When he agreed to "swap" the seat of director of a large "secret" plant for the seat of premier, Leonid Danylovych [Kuchma] apparently was not aware of two things: "First, that there is nothing sacred in the upper echelons of power.... Second, like everybody else, I believed that Ukraine is so rich that it provided for the entire [Soviet] Union. It turned out that it is, in fact, rich. However, was it really a provider?"

In short, Leonid Kuchma decided not to be involved in these "games." Even though he is surprised at the development of this whole business with the resignation of the government that he headed: Everybody, except for Kuchma, retained their posts. It appears that it was not the "helpless" government that was in somebody's way, but the premier? Asked why the Cabinet of Ministers failed to implement economic reforms last year, Leonid Danylovych replied that "nothing serious can be done with the Supreme Council in its present composition."

Border Troops Chief Bannykh Views Problems

AU0811123393 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian 4 Nov 93 p 8

[Article by Lieutenant General Viktor Bannykh, first deputy chairman of the State Committee for Questions of Defense of the State Border and chief of staff of Ukraine's Border Troops: "Cossacks Are Expected at the Border"]

[Text] **There is no need to stress that priorities of Ukraine's national security include reliable defense of the state border. One of the first laws of our independent state was the law "On Ukraine's State Border," which reads as follows: "Ukraine's state border is inviolable. Any of its violations will be decisively repulsed."**

Lieutenant General Viktor Bannykh, first deputy chairman of the State Committee for Questions of Defense of the State Border and chief of staff of Ukraine's Border Troops, tells about assistance given to border guards by public organizations and especially by the local population.

In accordance with the law, the defense of the state border is carried out with the active participation of Ukrainian citizens. State and public organizations assist Border Troops in enlisting the services of Ukrainian citizens, on a voluntary basis, for guarding the state border.

Consequently, the defense of our state's border is the task for all the people. All the more so since in recent years, attempts at violating the Ukrainian border have sharply increased and the activity of organized criminal groups has markedly intensified.

It would suffice to say that while during the last year the Border Troops detained an average of almost 100 transgressors a month, this index has increased 10-fold since April 1993. Ninety percent of the detained are citizens of southeastern Asia, Middle and Near East, Africa, and Romania.

Never before have we had to deal with such an influx of offenders. That is why we urgently need the help of volunteers. There are quite a number of them. I can name resident of the village of Shehynya in Lvov Oblast Andriy Taras who resisted the temptation to accept a bribe and reported the lawbreakers to the border post. Schoolchildren Andriy Halko and Semen Trendiy helped to detain two "illegals." Unfortunately, there are examples to the opposite. In exchange for the "greenbacks," some of our fellow citizens hide trespassers in their homes and then take them to the border on their own or public transport, promoting, by their unlawful actions, the illegal movement of foreign citizens across Ukraine's state order.

Such cases have led border guards and local authorities to look for new forms of enlisting the services of the population for protecting public order at the state order.

In my opinion, we should not forget the good traditions. In the past, thousands of members of voluntary people's patrol were active in Ukraine's border regions and there existed a well organized system of their work. Unfortunately, however, this form of attracting the local population to the defense of the state border no longer works.

That is why there emerged the need to issue legislative acts that would authorize the creation of nonprofessional associations to participate in the defense of the state border. At present, a legislative bill is under discussion in Supreme Council commissions. The bill provides for the rights of citizens' associations regarding the protection of public order at the border and obligations of state organs with regard to the activity of these associations.

I reiterate that such a law is long overdue. Work collectives, individual Ukrainian citizens, and especially residents of border regions frequently turned to us and expressed a desire to take part in the struggle against violations of law in the border region. Several times, the State Committee for Border Defense received such proposals from the Ukrainian Cossackdom. During meetings, their leadership emphasized the need to renew the participation of the Cossackdom in the defense of Ukrainian borders.

In this connection, it was agreed that in those populated areas at the border where there are cossack communities their participation in the patrol and other services will become possible.

I would like to dwell in more detail on forms of activity of cossack detachments. They will cooperate with subunits of Border Troops and with local organs of internal affairs as required by the state of the operational situation and specific characteristics of the tasks. Commanders of Border Troops units and formations will render every assistance to Ukrainian Cossacks in forming voluntary people's patrols. They will appoint officers and warrant officers to instruct them and will organize scheduled training of the personnel. Much attention must be given to physical and moral and psychological training, to the mastering of the tactics of actions, ways and means of self-defense, and also to the knowledge of juridical norms of Ukrainian legislation. It goes without saying that any deviations on the part of the Cossacks from the established rules of conduct in fulfilling their official tasks are unacceptable.

The Cossacks will only be able to take part in the service after corresponding juridical and special training and after they receive a certificate authorizing them to guard the state border.

State organs, public organizations, including Cossacks, and the entire population, by helping the border troops and other law- enforcement organs in the border region, are fulfilling a great and noble task. It is only by joint efforts that we will be able to establish order at Ukraine's state border.

Party Vows Continued Struggle Against Regime

AU0811111793 Kiev UKRAYINSKI OBRIYI in Ukrainian No. 17 (26) Oct 93 p 4

[Statement by the Press Center of the Ukrainian Nationalist Assembly: "We Pursue the Right Cause. We Will Win!"—published in Russian]

[Text] On 16 October, under this unofficial, not recorded anywhere, but quite expressive motto, an oblast session of UNA [Ukrainian Nationalist Assembly] was held in Rivne. It was attended by about 200 UNA-UNSO [Ukrainian National Self-Defense] activists from every Ukrainian oblast. The participants in the session pointed out that, despite the fierce pressure on the part of the authorities, attempts to ban UNA-UNSO, and provocations on the part of "competent organs," the organization, acting under extreme conditions, continues to expand its ranks and intensify its activity. At present, members of the organization must comply with higher demands and be ready to perform boring routine work. It is precisely in this—in the ability to conduct work that is often hardly rewarding—that true heroism is manifested. That we can hardly count upon gratitude is attested to by the facts: The organization has lost six of its best riflemen who perished during the peacekeeping mission in Georgia, about ten persons are under criminal investigation, and 20 persons are presently serving administrative punishment. Among those arrested are the following leaders of a number of oblast and rayon UNA organizations: Serhiy Chaplyhin, Mykola Nepochesnyy, Mykola Karpyuk, and Oles Babiy. Besides, Ukraine's Security Service and militia are conducting complete surveillance of the organization's leadership; the telephones are tapped and provocations involving the planting of weapons and munitions cannot be ruled out.

UNA Deputy Chairman Dmytro Korchynskyy pointed out in his speech that the organization has reached a new level. It has become a phenomenon in Ukraine's political life. Everybody knows about UNA- UNSO and it is, therefore, unnecessary to distastefully advertise our activity using empty phrases such as "democratic swines." People need to be loved and the more the better—this is the main motto of today. People must know that UNA and UNSO are associated with order, stability, and prosperity. It is necessary to treat one's enemies with sympathy and compassion.

Even if we had totally changed our phraseology, begun to talk of democracy, given up the struggle and started selling matches, our eyes would, all the same, have betrayed something that makes the traitors and profiteers who have risen to power instinctively hate us and be afraid of us. In us they see their own end. We cannot be reformed. UNA-UNSO is not simply an organization—it is a state of mind and a phenomenon.

After the session, a rally was held and a UNSO detachment's torchlight procession marched toward the site of construction of the new Cathedral of St. Mary the Protectress where a service was held.

Communist Supporters Urge USSR Restoration

LD0811093393 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 2223 GMT 7 Nov 93

[Text] Sevastopol, 7 Nov—Communist supporters held a 3,000-strong sanctioned rally and a march through city streets organized by the Bloc of Patriotic Leftwing Forces of Sevastopol. At the rally, speakers called for the restoration of the USSR and against the institution of presidency in Ukraine and the Crimea.

The rally resolution denounced the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation and the involvement of Black Sea Fleet marines in the Georgian civil war. It called on the leadership of Ukraine to sign the treaty on economic union and prevent "total elimination of the gains of October." The rally and the march were held under red banners and flags of the former USSR republics, the Russian Federation and the Republican Movement of Crimea. The demonstrators sang songs of the Soviet era.

Party Leaders on Electoral System, Strategy

WS0911093093 Kiev UKRAYINA MOLODA in Ukrainian 22 Oct 93 p 3

[Interview with Ukrainian Socialist Party Chairman Oleksandr Moroz, Ukrainian Democratic Party Chairman Volodymyr Yavorivskyy, and Volodymyr Filenko, chairman of the Party of Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine, by unidentified UPressA reporter; place and date not given]

[Text] [Reporter] A discussion is under way on the electoral law. Which system do you find more suitable for Ukraine—a majority or proportional system?

[Moroz] In my opinion, we should have a mixed system. If we introduce a purely proportional system, political organizations will be on an unequal footing. If we suggest that our citizens vote for party lists, we may lead to a split of society. There is no constructive discussion among political forces in Ukraine; these forces are opposed to one another. This is why the existing majority system seems more just than any other. However, taking into account my opponents' wishes, I could accept a combination of the two systems. For example, 15 percent of the deputies could be elected by party lists, while other candidates could be nominated by staffs and elected in territorial electoral districts.

[Reporter] It seems that socialists are afraid of elections on the basis of party lists. Is your popularity that low?

[Moroz] I am interested in the proportional system. We have conducted a number of opinion polls demonstrating that in that case, the Socialist Party would automatically obtain numerous seats in the legislature.

[Reporter] Could a proportional system accelerate the process of gathering strength by political parties?

[Moroz] It could, to a certain extent. However, I am afraid that some political parties would use considerable funds from abroad during their election campaigns, which would place different parties on unequal footing.

[Reporter] Which system do you support?

[Yavorivskyy] Undoubtedly, only a country that can be called democratic, in which elections are held on the basis of a multiparty system. However, it is not that easy to move from totalitarianism directly to civilization. Our electoral committees have no experience of which to speak with regard to the proportional system, neither has our constituency. This is why I think that it would be most wise to update the majority system by legalizing the nomination of candidates by both staffs and parties, including public organizations. Aside from this, a number of deputies could be elected by party lists. This way, both parties and electors will gain experience.

[Reporter] What is your vision of a proportional system?

[Yavorivskyy] Each party will compile a list of candidates. Lists of candidates suggested by parties will be included on the ballots. Then, electors will have a choice of voting either for a separate party, in which case they will vote for the entire list, or cross out some names on the party list. This will give a picture of both the parties' and the candidates' popularity, which would be of interest for parties themselves.

[Reporter] We have 29 registered parties. Should some minimum threshold be introduced?

[Yavorivskyy] Absolutely. If a party does not win the necessary number of votes, it should not be represented in the legislature.

[Reporter] How high should this threshold be in Ukraine?

[Yavorivskyy] I think that a lot of parties will be unable to overcome even a very modest threshold of say, 3 percent.

[Reporter] If a deputy changes his views, will a party have the right to call him back?

[Yavorivskyy] This should be decided by the legislature. In my opinion, this variant would be quite fair.

[Reporter] Could you predict which variant will be chosen—majority, proportional, or mixed?

[Yavorivskyy] In my opinion, this will be a mixed system and there will only be discussions on quotas.

[Reporter] Mr. Filenko, is the government led by Leonid Kravchuk capable of improving the situation in Ukraine?

[Filenko] I am afraid not. The first steps of this government demonstrate that nothing will change for the better. In my opinion, the president has only one option—namely, to address the Supreme Council with an appeal to annul all decrees adopted by the previous government. Perhaps then, the situation could be improved.

[Reporter] However, there is almost no difference between the current government and the government that adopted these decrees....

[Filenko] It is not quite so. I believe that the government cannot be expected to work hard until the upcoming Supreme Council and presidential elections. These people will be involved in anything else but not overcoming the economic crisis.

[Reporter] Will the Party of Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine [PDVU] and the New Ukraine form blocs with other parties?

[Filenko] New Ukraine has not given a final answer to that question as of yet. With regard to the PDVU, I can positively say that the party will take part in electoral blocs. We will not propose party lists, because neither our party nor other political parties possess the necessary potential, thus far, to seriously influence the future parliament's composition. Heated debates are currently under way within the PDVU regarding our relations with New Ukraine; we cannot reach an accord on this issue. Some people, including myself, regard New Ukraine as an electoral bloc which could be an umbrella for the PDVU. However, there are other opinions as well. We will hold a number of conferences, and New Ukraine will convene a congress. On the basis of these, we will draft a common position. The PDVU will not form coalitions with either the Rukh or the Congress of National Democratic Forces. Most likely, we will reach a compromise with these parties regarding cooperation and common rules.

[Reporter] Will the PDVU nominate a presidential candidate?

[Filenko] I am not ready to speak on behalf of the PDVU, but New Ukraine is discussing this issue. Most probably, possible candidates will be proposed on a nonpartisan, individual basis. The issue of party support for individual candidates will be discussed at the level of regional organizations. There is no clear-cut leader who could count on New Ukraine's unanimous backing.

[Reporter] Who, in your opinion, could be possible candidates?

[Filenko] Such a list would include Hrynyov, Yemets, Kuchma, Yukhnovskyy, and a number of other people. Any of them could receive New Ukraine's support.

[Reporter] Who is the most probable candidate for president?

[Filenko] First of all, I would not disregard the chances of President Kravchuk. Ivan Plyushch is another serious candidate, no matter how strongly he is being criticized. There are a number of others—Chornovil, Hrynyov, Yemets.... However, I believe that new leaders will soon emerge, who will have both political and financial support. I would not limit the group of possible candidates to those mentioned earlier.

[Reporter] Are you going to propose your candidacy for president?

[Filenko] No. In my opinion, it makes no sense to participate in presidential elections without a serious team. Thus, I will not be a candidate in the coming elections, and time will tell whether this will happen in the future.

Committees Discuss Carpathian Economic Zone

WS0811142893 Uzhhorod NOVYNY ZAKARPATTYA in Ukrainian 21 Oct 93 p 1, 2

[Report by Ivan Chopovdya]

[Text] As has already been reported, last week in Kiev, a meeting of seven permanent Supreme Council committees was held. It was chaired by Vasyl Durdynets, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Council, and attended by officials of the Ministry of Economy and the Zakarpatska Oblast leadership—Dmytro Dorchynets, head of the oblast administration; Serhiy Ustych, first deputy chairman of the oblast administration; Volodymyr Burkal, director of the Oblast Council Secretariat; Ivan Ivanch, chief of the Department of External Relations in the oblast administration; Yanosh Savka, first deputy chairman of the Committee for Economy at the oblast administration. Participants in the meeting discussed the draft bill "On a Special (Free) Economic Zone in Zakarpatska Oblast." The draft, as our newspaper has already reported, has been prepared by the Oblast Council and the oblast administration and amended, in accordance with a Supreme Council Presidium resolution, by a working group of the Supreme Council and the Cabinet of Ministers.

Opening the meeting, Vasyl Durdynets emphasized that the draft bill is designed to facilitate the economic development of the Transcarpathian region, speed up the transformation to a market economy, establish export possibilities, strengthen social trends in the economy, and greatly contribute to Ukraine's economic potential. Following Durdynets's speech, the floor was taken by Serhiy Ustych, the head of the working group:

"Zakarpattya, as many other regions of our country, is trying to find different approaches to the issue of overcoming the economic crisis, as well as various economic patterns that would allow to rationally and effectively apply the existing resources and benefit the status of a free economic zone.

"Here are some principles of this. I will begin with the most important ones that would allow to optimally reconcile the state's and region's interests. What will the state receive in return for creating the free economic zone? First of all, special (free) economic zones, in my opinion, are a unique kind economic testing grounds for entrepreneurship, thanks to which the transformation to a real market can be done faster. Secondly, the project will be carried out not at the state's but the investors' expense. Following a certain transformation period, the free economic zone will become self-financed. Until the entire economic infrastructure of the zone is created, the state will be receiving hard currency revenues. So, Ukraine's economic capacity will be growing. Thirdly, completion of the project will enhance geopolitical interests of the state. In particular, establishing a free economic zone on the border with four Central Europe countries will allow for the thorough intensification of Ukraine's integration to international economic structures.

"All this testifies that introduction of the free economic zone in Zakarpattya is not only of regional but also of state importance. In this regard, completely curious and even absurd are statements by certain politicians and state officials that the 'Europe-Center' free economic zone project is a display of regional egoism and that the citizens of Zakarpattya want to live at other regions' expense. I will say even more. The draft prepared by the working group accumulates worldwide experience in establishing special economic zones.

"The documents have their own strange and, I would say, ancient history. In the first place, we had submitted the documents to the Council of Ministers, then we handed them out to the Cabinet of Ministers. I could speak long about their long-suffered history and the evident bias and subjectivity displayed during the consideration of the documents. Now, they are waiting at the Supreme Council...

"Additionally, members of the working group have visited a similar zone in China, which by the way, has also been visited by Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk. We have also studied activities of free economic zones in Russia. All this gives us serious foundations for claiming the superiority of regional special (free) economic zones over local ones, sometimes called 'point zones.' However, they do not contradict one another. The border town Chop, where grounds for operation of free customs zones have already been established, could serve as striking evidence of this. Particularly, I refer to the 'Chop-Inter-Port.'

"I regret one more thing. While we are continuing with the fruitless discussions on free economic zones, our Hungarian neighbors have already begun appropriate proceedings."

Serhiy Ivanovych answered in detail numerous questions from Ukrainian People's Deputies Mykhaylo Shvachko, Anatoliy Tkachuk, Albert Korneyev, Serhiy Semenets, Oleksandr Tarasenko, Oleksandr Piskun, Oleksandr Duntau, Mykhaylo Hryshko, and Serhiy Makarenko.

Sect Mass Suicide Threat Moved Ahead to 14 Nov

AU0811130393 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 5 Nov 93 p 1

[Report by Halyna Kryvenko]

[Text] On Tuesday [2 November], Ukraine's Ministry of Internal Affairs gathered a large audience of journalists and specialists in order to discuss what to do next with members of the "White Brotherhood" who are doomed to death through self-immolation or dry [without taking any water] fasting. When the militia raided one of the apartments on the eve of their rally in the square near the Sofia Cathedral, the condition of one child particularly appalled them. The child kept crying for two days: "I do not want to die...." Maryna Tsvyhun's husband told about her first meeting with Kryvonohov and that he gave her "sedative" tablets following which she changed completely and soon disappeared from home, about verses that she wrote and that could be set to music right away, and about what she is now. For her son's thirteenth birthday, she sent a telegram: "Vitaliy, I want to see you in the image of Jesus Christ. Maria." When there was a meeting with the son and he asked his mother to return home, she answered: "I can't, I am already largely in heaven." She even made affectionate statements to Ukraine. Now, with her help, Ukraine's intellectual potential is being ruined—the gifted and talented children whom the "White Brotherhood" is turning into "zombies"—thoughtless robots obedient to other peoples' will.

As Metropolitan Filaret, who was present at the meeting, said, there exist forces that are using the "White Brotherhood" for ruining our society. Let us think: Why has it spread where faith has been destroyed and hasn't spread where faith is strong...?

Children left for Kiev from Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Krasnoyarsk.... Even while still at home, they started fasting. As a rule, they embarked on their way without passports. Those who had passports concealed them after crossing the border. About 500 persons have been detained, 77 released—their parents came to collect them—288 children are in reception and distribution centers, 50 who have violated the law are in special reception centers, 4 persons are in emergency wards, more than 30 have been fasting for more than eight days, and six began to take food.... A question was asked whether a state of emergency has been in effect in Kiev. As stated by Colonel General of the Valentyn Nedryhaylo Militia, there is no sense in establishing such conditions against sick people who are victims. It is a different matter that Kiev should not become a yard with a through-passage for the illicit forces that are being expelled from Moscow. Generally speaking, the country must be freed from those who live here illegally (there are about 50,000 such persons in Kiev alone), waiting for a chance to cross the border to the West. The militia has been given great powers regarding the status of Kiev.

On Wednesday [3 November], Kiev healers, psychologists, socionist [sotsioniky], computer scientists, and specialists in other branches assembled. Groups are being formed for work with the "initiated" of the "White Brotherhood" in order to help them rid themselves of the coded programs that are ruining their psyche.

Last year, the Kiev Procurator's Office adopted a resolution on instituting a criminal case against Yu. Kryvonohov on charges in accordance with Article 290, Part I, Article 143, Part II, and Article 199, Part I of Ukraine's Criminal Code. The Interpol units of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and the interior ministries of the CIS countries have been instructed to look for him. In the framework of the criminal case, 386 witnesses have been interviewed; two buildings and one Toyota automobile have been confiscated; and 1 million copies of publications for indoctrinating the public have been confiscated.

In view of these realities, the "Brothers" have changed their tactics: The "end of the world" has been brought forward from 24 to 14 November. However, Ukraine's Ministry of Internal Affairs asked the press to give Yuriy Kryvonohov this message: Yura [diminutive for Yuriy], if you have a conscience, come to Kiev. You must repent—this may mitigate the punishment, and the main thing—you must stop torturing people. I, correspondent Halyna Kryvenko, subscribe to these words.

Belarus

Government Appeals to Citizens Over Calls for Disorder

LD0811215093 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0400 GMT 6 Nov 93

[Text] The Council of Ministers has issued an appeal to the citizens of the Republic of Belarus, which points out: Recently, at enterprises, organizations, and educational and other institutions of the republic, and also in the press, radio, and television, at the initiative of the Belarusian Popular Front, the Belarusian assembly of military men, heads of a number of trade unions, and opposition political forces, rumors, leaflets, and calls have been spread inciting the population to mass civil disorder and illegal actions. Open threats are being addressed to the government and there are calls to create combat volunteer forces and carry out armed actions and crude attacks against the Russian people.

The aims of the organizers of this [word indistinct] are clear. On the eve of the latest session of the Supreme Soviet which opens in a few days, and which will consider exceptionally important questions for the people, they aim to disrupt political stability in the republic, to try by any means to seize power. The government cannot remain indifferent to such actions, and calls on the citizens of Belarus to maintain restraint and reason, and not to yield to the provocative calls of political adventurists.

What the implementation of such machinations can lead to was clearly shown by the recent bloody events in Moscow. We must all learn the lessons of this. Special responsibility lies with the leaders of the mass media. Everything possible must be done to preserve civic peace, calm, and order in the republic. Only in an atmosphere of stability and respect for law can the present critical stage in our development be overcome, a worthy life ensured for people, and the state sovereignty of Belarus imbued with real content.

To travel down the path which the provocateurs are inciting the people to take would mean dooming to failure the economic reforms and democratic transformations in society and bringing the republic into chaos and lawlessness.

The government firmly stands for observing the constitutional order, and will protect it by all forces and means available to it. Organizers of and participants in provocative actions or any other illegal acts will receive the harshest and most decisive rebuff, the appeal says.

Presidium Recommends Ratification of Currency Union

LD0811195193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1751 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] The presidium of the Belarusian parliament has recommended to the legislature to ratify the agreement on forming a monetary union with Russia. Parliamentary Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich told a news conference that the presidium on Monday "for a long time discussed all the pros and cons" and decided combining the two monetary systems would be a positive step.

Asked by Interfax about the intentions of Belarus and Russia to form a customs union as well, Shushkevich said that would take some time to materialize. But Belarus badly needs it, he believes. He fears Russia may soon start pursuing a discriminatory customs policy against Belarus, since higher customs duties force Belarus to raise the prices of its goods exported to Russia.

"Moscow is in no hurry to enter a customs union with Belarus because economically this wouldn't be its interest," Shushkevich said.

Shushkevich on Russian Ties

LD0811191893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1743 GMT 8 Nov 93

[By BELINFORM correspondents Sergey Zayats and Larisa Lazar for TASS]

[Text] Minsk November 8 TASS—"We intend to build all relations with Russia on civilised principles," Belarusian Parliament Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich said.

Speaking at a news conference in Minsk on Monday, Shushkevich said the future of Belarusian-Russian ties is as important for Belarus as the adoption of a new constitution.

He stressed that Belarus favours the idea of establishing a common currency and customs system between the two countries. After three-hours heated debates the Belarusian Government voted on Monday to recommend the parliament to ratify an agreement on a common rouble zone with Russia.

Shushkevich also said that the upcoming parliamentary session will discuss the final version of Belarus's draft constitution which, he believes, "has good chances to be adopted." The draft constitution envisions the institution of presidency in the republic.

Shushkevich on Delay Approving Georgia's CIS Status

LD0511224993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2029 GMT 5 Nov 93

[Text] Belarus is the sole CIS republic, the head of which has not signed the document on Georgia's joining the Commonwealth of Independent States.

According to the provision now in force, Georgia cannot be an equal member of the Commonwealth without an official OK from all CIS countries.

In his exclusive interview with Interfax chairman of Belarus' Supreme Soviet Stanislav Shushkevich explained the delay on the document's signing by the absence of appropriate authorities. As he explained, in Belarus the parliament's leader is only the country's supreme official and according to the legislation in force in the republic, the presidium of the Supreme Soviet fulfills functions of the head of the state (according to Shushkevich, the presidium will manage to gather in its full composition not earlier than November 8).

Shushkevich made it clear that if the Supreme Soviet presidium fails to express its attitude to this problem, he will submit the issue on Georgia's participation in the CIS for consideration of the next session of the Belarusian Supreme Soviet to be opened on November 9 in Minsk.

Finance Minister Defends CIS Economic Union

WS0811150093 Minsk NARODNAYA GAZETA in Belarusian 27 Oct 93 p 2

[Article by Finance Minister Styapan Yanchuk: "Integration Is the Road to Progress and Independence"]

[Text] It has become an ordinary thing when political emotions erupt on the eve of a regular Supreme Soviet session: A range of political organizations using various methods begin launching crazy political campaigns against the government.

This fall, the leaders of some notorious organizations have not forgotten their old habits. On the eve of the 9 November session, they have launched massive mass media attacks against the government, attempting to suggest to Belarusian citizens the thought that the government is pursuing a ridiculous economic policy leading to the loss of sovereignty and Belarusian independence. Their statements—which claim that we betray national interests—lack thorough analysis and serious arguments.

The government's efforts for the renewal and development of Belarusian economic ties with Russia, for the unification of the Belarusian and Russian monetary systems, are attacked most vehemently. They claim that we want to economically subordinate Belarus to Russia.

Of course, they admit that Belarus can develop relations with other countries, but these will be "without any political coloring."

I do not understand: Are they really naive or are they just political schemers counting on ignorant people?

The government's policy rests on the following principle: Only the rapprochement of economic potentials of the two countries and their mutual efforts to alleviate the economic crisis can really guarantee national sovereignty. This position would hardly enjoy the support of the majority of the population if it had been based on emotions only. Workers of various branches of industry back the bolstering of economic integration with Russia and other countries of the "ruble zone."

Our researchers state that if economic ties among the erstwhile USSR states are completely ruined, Russia could produce 65 percent of its current output; Ukraine 15 percent; Kazakhstan 27 percent; while Belarus only 4 percent. Russian supplies account for 67 percent of production in Ukraine, 52 percent in Kazakhstan, and 84 percent in Belarus.

You can see that the issue of preserving and developing inter-republican economic ties is especially pressing for Belarus. People can experience the cost of close economic ties between the states on practice. Not long ago, the session of the Club of Managers of the Association of the Entrepreneurs and Stock Holders (representing the non-state structures) adopted a decision backing this concept.

Political emotions and the desire to overtake power are dominating factors among people opposed to economic integration.

What will happen if Belarus does not enter the ruble zone? As a rule, the leading role in any currency zone is occupied by a state which has the greatest economic potential. Currently, the Russian ruble is the basic currency for the majority of CIS states. The volume of trade and economic relations between Belarus and Russia is immense: Russia imports 57 percent of the Belarusian output while 67 percent of the goods imported to Belarus come from Russia (in Ukraine, the ratio is 23 and 20 percent, and in Kazakhstan—5 and 4 percent, respectively).

Any country should resolve the issues of a budget deficit before it introduces a national currency. The high level of the budget deficit complicates the material and financial imbalance of the economy and speeds up inflation. The foreign experience convinces us that the national currency system can be only created when the level of budget deficit ranges from 2 to 3 percent, in relation to gross national product. Currently, and according to the latest reports, in Belarus this figure exceeds admissible levels by two times. The national currency is also strengthened by the state of the payment balance, the level and rate of inflation, and the stability of the functioning of currency markets. They are extremely complicated issues which cannot be resolved in a short while. We are working on these issues and only after resolving them can we raise the issue of introducing our own currency.

To my regret, the opposition does not propose any constructive decisions.

I would like to remind everyone that there are some countries in the world which do not have their own currency and use the payment notes of other countries. Well, their economies are developing successfully.

An analysis of the current situation says that if Belarus leaves the CIS economic union and withdraws from the ruble zone, it would not be able to produce goods which could be competitive on the international market. Only this kind of production can allow Belarus to buy strategic raw materials.

Unification with Russia represents a way for joint economic restructuring. It is much easier both for Belarus and Russia to go along this road of reforms together.

The past few years, when the CIS states were making attempts to independently alleviate their predicaments, have taught us a lot. We must develop economic relations with all the countries of the world. However, it would have been unwise to break the economic liaisons with our neighbors.

Aiming at the creation of an economic union, we do not wish to restore the former USSR. The new economic union is based on principles which provide for the effectiveness of the output of each of the countries. Currently, it is impossible for any country to live at the cost of the others; economic relations should be mutually beneficial. The issue is: Either the population of Belarus works selflessly and in two or three years creates the necessary conditions for the development of national economic potential, or we are bound to many long years of useless existence.

Therefore, a critical analysis of socioeconomic processes in nearby countries shows that the principle strategic line in the economic development of the Republic should be directed at the integration of the economic potential of the erstwhile Soviet republics and the bolstering of the political and economic sovereignty of Belarus. To achieve these aims, it is necessary:

1. To implement the consequent structural changes in the economy;

2. To develop an open type of economy;

3. To provide a search for effective sources of raw materials, fuel and energy;

4. To seek out markets for Belarusian goods.

Given the process of an active transfer to the market relations, such a strategy will allow for the conservation of resources, the attraction of foreign investments, and the development of export potential.

Currently, there are no economically independent states in the world. The industrial giants, such as Japan and the United States, are economically interdependent; they would be paralyzed if their economic ties were broken. However, they preserve not only their economic independence, but are political opponents in many aspects. You can see that political divergencies do not negatively affect their economic cooperation.

I would like to hope that at the upcoming Supreme Soviet session our people's deputies will deviate from political confrontation and concentrate their efforts on the solution of pressing socioeconomic issues.

Kebich Dismissed From Chairmanship of Anti-Crisis Committee

WS0811134393 Minsk BELAPAN in Russian 1100 GMT 6 Nov 93

[Unattributed report: "Vyacheslav Kebich Loses Post of Chairman of the Anti-Crisis Committee"]

[Text] On 5 November at the Writers' House, a session of the Anti-Crisis Committee [AC], created in 1992 with the aim of confronting any outside threats to Belarusian statehood, was held. Thirty-two AC members out of 52 were present (26 AC votes are required for a quorum). AC Chairman Vyacheslav Kebich received a vote of no confidence (he was absent from this session). The entire audience supported his reelection. Among absent AC members, state officials prevailed. Nikolay Statkevich was authorized to temporarily fulfill the functions of AC chairman. The elections for the new AC chairman will be held no later than December 1993. The AC members stated that, currently, the Belarusian Government's policy poses the greatest danger to Belarusian sovereignty. In connection with this, the text of the AC program will likely be changed. The aim of this organization will be to confront Belarusian statehood regarding both outside and inside threats. The AC has adopted two resolutions—on the urgency of an independent economic policy, and on patriotic upbringing in society.

National Concord Party Chief Offered Vice Premier Post

LD0811182393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1511 GMT 8 Nov 93

[By BELINFORM correspondent Larisa Klyuchnikova]

[Text] Minsk, 8 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—Vyacheslav Kebich, head of the Government of Belarus, has offered Gennadiy Karpenko, chairman of the Party of National Concord [Partiya Narodnogo Soglasiya] the post of vice premier in charge of economic reform issues, a BELINFORM correspondent learned from the party's executive committee.

For a 10-day period Gennadiy Karpenko will be holding political consultations with the leaders of his party and other centrist sociopolitical forces, after which he will give the head of government his answer. Observers note that G. Karpenko's decision will largely depend on whether he gets the backing of other sociopolitical forces, whether he is given the right to form "his own team," whether it is likely the Council of Ministers would be partially restructured, and other factors.

Shushekvich Addresses Foreign Visitors, Diplomats

LD0511203893 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1815 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Report by special correspondent Mikhail Rutkowskiy]

[Text] [Rutkowskiy] The Christian Democrat (?international) delegation that was received by the Stanislav Shushkevich, the Supreme Soviet chairman of the Republic of Belarus, included Vice President (?Andrey Minin), Wilfried Martens, the president of the Union of European Christian Democrats, Vitaliy Savitskiy, cochairman of the Russian Christian Democratic Union, and others.

Stanislav Shushkevich told the guests about the process of democratization in our republic. In their turn, the guests informed the Supreme Soviet chairman about his high international prestige as leader of the democratic, independent Republic of Belarus.

Then, there in the Supreme Soviet, there was a meeting between Stanislav Shushkevich with the ambassadors of foreign countries in the Republic of Belarus. Greeting the foreign diplomats, Stanislav Shushkevich said in particular:

[Begin Shushkevich recording, in Russian] On the one hand, we are interested—if one can say it positively we are doomed—to close integration with the CIS countries. We simply have no other way out. Another way out is unthinkable. But on the other hand, without the development of relations with the Western European countries and the United States, without the development of relations with the Baltic and Eastern European countries, and without expanding relations with what we call the modernized east, we understand that we can in no way fit into world integration. Clearly the stress, the priorities will be defined by the outgoing and incoming flow of goods. We understand that this does not happen by itself; vigorous purposeful activity plays a major part here, but we are increasingly transferring the levers of management to the hands of nonmonopoly, nonstate structures. Therefore, there may also be those versions here that are not very easy to forecast.

We would be very grateful if we had talks about these matters with your participation. Many of you represent countries with long democratic traditions, and evidently some of our steps and acts—if you were to express how you see this process, how you understand this process, and how they would act in your countries—in order that our zealous colleagues will be unable to accuse you of interfering in our internal affairs, we would also be very, very grateful for such a vision.

We also understand that the question of our security is now moving to another surface, because the traditional ensuring of security in the bipolar world of which I spoke, and ensuring of security in the world which is now actually being established, the stress here is also changing, because in some ways our internal problems in general may threaten our security no less than external difficulties. I am hoping for your indulgence toward certain of our foreign policy initiatives which were declared, but we have not found in ourselves sufficient strength, ability, and tact to implement them. We admit it ourselves and as you know, we recently have been more [word indistinct].

The final thing: (?I rely on) a certain sympathy of yours over the fact that our contribution to the United Nations [words indistinct] representatives of many of your countries place us in a (?category that is so different from) [words indistinct] state, that in general it is difficult to imagine. If your personal attitudes are expressed, we will have to (?agree). [end recording]

[Rutkowskiy] There was a mutual broad exchange of views on major political and social problems that our society is going through at the present stage.

Russian Envoy Urges Direct Business Links

WS0911084693 Minsk NARODNAYA GAZETA in Belarusian 29 Oct 93 p 1

[Report by Stepan Starozhyl: "Oil Will Not Flow From Our Agreement"]

[Text] The CIS economic union will not provide Belarus with cheap oil because all of it is at the disposal of Russian plants and commercial structures. Thus one must conduct business with them instead of twiddling one's thumbs and waiting for the administration to distribute oil. This was declared by Russian Ambassador to Belarus Igor Saprykin during a visit to Vitebsk.

In this regard, the ambassador also said he was bewildered by the lack of joint Belarusian-Russian ventures.

More Ties With Russian Chemical Industry Urged

WS0911110393 Minsk BELORUSKIY RYNOK in Russian No 28 Oct 93 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Belarusian Chemistry Is More Dead Than Alive"]

[Text] Gone are the times when Belarus was called a republic of big chemistry. Now, only some antiquated businessman would take the risk of asking chemical enterprises for their production without having provided his own raw materials.

With the demise of the USSR, the Belarusian chemical industry, which was built according to civilized principles (the final product was geared to customers' needs), found itself cut off from raw material sources. As the old joke goes, it is now more dead than alive. This situation is also reflected in reports from Belarusian stock exchanges.

However, when you just skim through offers of Russian stock exchanges, you would immediately remember that Russian natural resources "contain the entire periodic table." Enterprises of the military-industrial complex that are undergoing conversion throw on the market even substances and components used for the production of both conventional and nuclear ammunition, missile fuel, atomic station elements, etc. Until recently, before the famous scandal, red mercury was regularly put up for sale and could be delivered to any part of the world.

However, this superficial diversity cannot conceal the obvious fact that the Russian chemical industry—left without markets of its neighboring countries —is also experiencing big problems.

What is the solution? Leading CIS and Western economists see it in the creation of multinational corporations uniting the entire chemical complex of the former Soviet Union on a shared property basis.

Economic Agreement Signed With France

LD0511202793 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1815 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] An agreement between the Governments of the Republic of Belarus and the French Republic on mutual assistance and protection of investments will serve as a fine stimulus for business people. The signing of this important document took place in Paris, where, at a consultative meeting with representatives of international financial and monetary organizations and donor-countries, there was a government delegation headed by the first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mikhail Myasnikovich. The agreement envisions complete and comprehensive protection and security for capital investments for both sides, and also free transfer of incomes and payments from one country to the other.

Mikhail Myasnikovich told journalists at a news conference in Minsk about everything that took place in Paris. He recalled that such agreements have already been signed in Belarus with Germany, Austria, and several other countries.

Cabinet of Ministers Approves Agreement With Germany

WS0811115493 Minsk BELAPAN in Russian 1600 GMT 6 Nov 93

[Unattributed report: "Belarusian-German Agreement Has Been Approved"]

[Text] BELAPAN has learned that the Belarusian Council of Ministers has adopted decree No. 748 approving the agreement on the development of large scale cooperation in the sphere of economy, industry, science, and technology between Belarus and Germany signed on 2 April 1993. The Council of Ministers has submitted this agreement for the consideration of the Belarusian Supreme Soviet.

Moldova

Snegur Told of Russian Community's Concerns

PM0811164393 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Nov 93 First Edition p 6

[Lyudmila Feliksova article: "What the Russian Community Wants"]

[Text] Chisinau—President Mircea Snegur of Moldova has received representatives of the Russian community. This is a remarkable fact because they have not been lavished with attention by the leaders of the republic, contacts with whom have become extremely rare. Meanwhile, the Russian population has amassed quite a few problems and questions. They are not new and they are well known, including to the president, and relate primarily to the problem of education. The Russian community believes that it is time to stop the hasty and unjustified closure and transfer of Russian schools and kindergartens. Vocational and technical education in Russian has been scrapped. The request to open a Slav university (the conditions for this do exist) has gone unheeded.

One of the most sensitive issues is the forthcoming language-proficiency certification [yazykovaya attestatsiya]. The whole range of problems connected with it must be free of excessive politicization, the representatives of the Russian community believe, and certification must be carried out from the viewpoint of the possibilities and economic consequences for Moldova.

The department for languages has been quite happy to assume... monitoring and prosecution functions and is demanding additional rights. But it is clearly not up to the job of methodological and organizational work.

It is less than two months till the certification date, but there is still no program for various categories of workers. Moreover, the department has prepared draft proposals on certification which conflict with the Labor Code. All these things are making well-trained and qualified specialists quit their jobs and leave the republic.

At the meeting the sides also discussed the possibility of obtaining dual citizenship.

M. Snegur did not shirk a single awkward question and gave very definite answers. The whole set of problems, in his words, will be examined by the republic's top leadership in the days ahead. The Moldovan president tends to take a positive view of dual citizenship, but he cited the fact that the treaty with Moldova has not been ratified by Russia and this is slowing matters down.

The Russian community, Mircea Snegur assured them, can always turn to the president's structures, and he even promised to visit the Russian cultural festival which is scheduled to take place in the second half of November right across Moldova, including in eastern and southern areas of the country.

Government's Current Economic Activity Viewed

AU0911103693 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2009 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] Chisinau, BASAPRESS, 8/11/1993—The Moldovan Government started to examine the State Budget for 1994. Chisinau authorities seem to intend to respect the Memorandum regarding the economic and financial policy in the close future. The planned budget deficit will be 200 billion rubles, which is only 3.5 percent of the gross internal product, stated Claudia Melnic, Minister of Finance. New taxes will be applied, including excises on import. Fiscal taxes will be reduced from 20.5 percent of the gross internal income in 1993 to 16.3 percent in 1994. According to the Russian newspaper KOMMERSANT, "the new incomes, designed to fortify the economy, will only hurt it." The Government intends to liberalize the prices gradually, abandoning preferential credits and subventions. Experts believe that the economic policy promoted by the current executive can provoke depressions, as it presses over the people. The aggravating contradictions in the society are up to reach the critical point, states Valeriu Zelinschi, chairman of the "Harmonia" Foundation in an open letter to Mircea Snegur. The crisis is much more deep than one thinks, stated participants at the round table "Crisis in Moldova and Ways to Solve it." This round table joined representatives of business, parties, political movements and independent experts. The Soviet mentality is a "timer-bomb," which still persists in governing circles and in the lower strata, stated Mihai Sobor, chairman of the Union of Entrepreneurs. While people get totally pauperized, misunderstandings between Trade Unions and Government increase. The Presidium of the Moldovan Federation of Independent Trade Unions threatened the executive to start large actions of protest unless its proposals on people's social protection are fulfilled. One can imagine that the state of uncertainty gives place to some firm decisions regarding the reform and improving the economy. These factors will, finally, influence the electoral campaign.

Gagauz Party Supports CIS Economic Agreement

AU0611204593 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2048 GMT 5 Nov 93

[Text] Chisinau, BASAPRESS 5/11/1993—Members and supporters of the Gagauz People's Party (GPP) consider that the opinion of the Comrat Government does not necessarily represent the opinion of the Gagauz people who do not want to live in isolation, states today's issue of the newspaper PACEA CIVICA (CIVIC PEACE). The GPP has its main purpose to peacefully solve the present political and economic problems of districts densely inhabited by Gagauz people, stated Konstantin Taushanji, leader of the party, economist, and dean at Comrat University. GPP was founded in 1994 [as received] at the initiative of intellectuals, workers, businessmen, and farmers. It relies on decisions of the congress of deputies from all levels which was held in Ceadar-Lunga and which rejected the statehood of the so-called Gagauz Republic and supported the special status of territories inhabited by Gagauz people as part of Moldova. The south population supports the future elections and wants to have its representatives in the Moldovan Parliament. GPP leaders support the signing of the Economic Agreement with CIS. They consider that this will favor the solution of many problems.

Candidates Register as Electoral Commission Members

AU0511150193 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2150 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Chisinau BASAPRESS, 4/11/1993—The Central Electoral Commission (CEC) ceased the registration of candidates wishing to become its members as representatives of social and political parties and movements, stated to BASA Nicolae Timofti, chairman of CEC. Timofti said that 18 candidates are registered as members of the commission, except the representative of the movement Echitatea (Equity), as the latter was not registered at the Ministry of Justice. He added that according to the law on parliamentary elections, the last term for parties and movements to register is 40 day before the elections and for the candidates 30 days before elections.

PSDM Leaders Seek Absolute Majority in Elections

AU0511145893 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2150 GMT 5 Nov 93

[Text] Chisinau BASAPRESS, 4/11//1993—The Moldovan Social-Democratic Party (PSDM) will strive for obtaining in the elections 50 percent of votes plus one, stated today at a press conference Victor Josu, vice chairman of PSDM. Oazu Nantoi, chairman of the party, said that to win the elections the people had to know the activity and the achievements of PSDM over the past three years. He said that PSDM was the only parliamentary party having a European doctrine at its basis. Nantoi also stated that the present program of privatization favors the peasants, especially those working at collective farms, since they will take part in privatization many times. The electoral sign of the party was shown at the conference. It represents two storks (white and black). The leaders of PSDM called on all political organizations to organize roundtable discussions about the political ethics during the electoral campaign.

Kazakhstan

Editor of Socialist Party Newspaper Dismissed

LD0911100593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0934 GMT 9 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Fyodor Ignatov]

[Text] Almaty November 9 TASS—The executive committee of the Socialist Party, the successor to the Kazakhstan Communist Party dissolved in 1991, has surrendered to business people virtually without any resistance its press body, the newspaper "RESPUBLIKA".

In its first issue the new publication stated the readiness to conduct an honest and open dialogue with readers. This striving has been confirmed by the publication of a number of items on acute social and economic problems of Kazakhstan. And when the newspaper published in its second issue mild criticism of Kazakhstan's top leaders, the newspaper's editor-in-chief, writer Viktor Miroglov was immediately dismissed.

It became known from reliable sources that the decision has been taken for the reason that the newspaper's attitude does not suit its founders and sponsors. They include a large joint-stock company Asia-IMM and a prosperous firm Incomebel. The sponsors did not like the fact that the newspaper criticised the top echelon and had taken a stand in defence of the mass of the people who grow poorer with every day.

Republic's New Merchant Navy Inaugurated

PM0911111193 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Nov 93 p 1

[Untitled item from roundup of PRAVDA, ITAR-TASS reports]

[Text] Kazakhstan has set about forming its own merchant navy. It started when Almaty's diversified company "Ansat" acquired three foreign-made dry cargo ships. The ships, which have been named "Nursultan," "Ansat," and "Almaty", are sailing under the flags of other states and have been registered at foreign ports.

Tajikistan

Government Holds Emergency Session on Border Problems

LD0811155893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1205 GMT 8 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[Text] Dushanbe November 8 TASS—Tajikistan's government held an emergency session on Monday to discuss the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border which has seriously worsened as a result of continuing clashes between Afghan government troops and rebel forces near the border.

Advancing rebel units are forcing Afghan government troops across the Pyandzh River separating Tajikistan and Afghanistan and into the Tajik territory.

Since Saturday November 6, 100 people, including three generals, have surrendered their arms and themselves to Russian border guards and requested political asylum in Tajikistan. Russian military and Tajik Interior Ministry officials visited the area and pledged to reinforce the border guards.

Tajik parliament chairman Imamali Rakhmanov who chaired the emergency session said all arriving refugees will be provided with medical assistance and other help. However, he did not rule out the possibility of returning refugees to Afghanistan after talks with Afghan authorities.

Supreme Soviet Committee Discusses Media Issues

LD0811172193 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Russian 1000 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] A sitting of the Supreme Soviet Committee on Culture, International Affairs and Nationalities Relations, chaired by Rahmonkul Atoyev, has taken place.

Among the issues discussed, particular attention was paid to the implementation of the Tajikistan law on press and other mass media. Rapporteur Usmon Nazirov, senior expert of the committee, has pointed out that after the 16th session of the parliament, the press and other mass media employees began to work seriously to implement this decree and to truthfully describe the situation in the country and strive for civil peace.

The proposals of the leadership of the republic on increasing the wages of the journalists of the oblast and rayon newspapers to the level of employees of the oblast and town executive committees and on privatization of houses and other benefits for journalists were discussed at the sitting.

Foreign Minister Rashid Olimov and Press and Information Minister Bobokhon Makhmadov were present during the sitting of the committee.

Uzbekistan

Government Committed to 'New-Type Ruble Zone'

MK0611131093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Nov 93 p 1

[Vera Kuznetsova report under the "Ruble Zone" rubric: "Uzbekistan Stays True to the Ruble, But Would Not Mortgage Gold"]

[Text] After the Uzbekistan president and his comrades in arms started saying, "We are being pushed out of 'the ruble zone,'" one could have expected Uzbekistan to quit the ruble zone on Kazakhstan's cue. But this did not happen yesterday at talks between the deputy prime ministers of Uzbekistan and Russia, Bakhtiyar Khamidov and Aleksandr Shokhin. Admittedly, Khamidov reacted negatively to the Russian side's latest terms. "We are getting rubles as credit," Uzbekistan's deputy prime minister clarified. "Correspondingly, we will be obliged to pay interest. Besides, under these terms we have to mortgage 40 tonnes of gold. This is unacceptable for us."

Also yesterday (late in the evening) the deputy prime minister signed a protocol. In it Uzbekistan states (officially this time) that Russia's terms are unacceptable and that it introduces the coupon (the som) as a temporary measure while the country confirms its commitment to "a new-type ruble zone." Further talks will be handled by a bilateral commission. The result of its work should be a merging of Uzbekistan's and Russia's monetary systems. Mr. Khamidov said he was optimistic on this score.

Tashkent Plans 'Urgent Measures' Toward Currency

PM0911092793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Nov 93 First Edition p 3

[Vladimir Berezovskiy report: "Tashkent Cannot Afford the Ruble"]

[Text] Tashkent—"Moscow is forcing the republic out of the ruble zone and wants to turn our Central Bank into a subsidiary of the Bank of Russia. But Uzbekistan will not accept these shackling conditions," Vice Premier Bakhtiyar Khamidov stated at an emergency press conference in Tashkent. He accused Russian politicians of neoimperial aspirations and attempts to talk to everyone from a position of strength.

The stumbling block is the exchange ratio of "Soviet" rubles to Russian rubles [R]. The Uzbek leadership believes that the rate must be one to one. The argument runs like this: In terms of the main parameters—GDP, national income, the volume of industrial and agricultural output, and consumer goods—the Uzbek economy is growing faster than the Russian economy. All these indicators are higher than last year, according to the official statistics.

Russian Vice Premier A. Shokhin recently went to Tashkent, where he visited commercial stores and saw for himself that the "Uzbek" ruble is far from a match for the new Russian ruble. The numerous money changers who have literally occupied the capital's Alayskiy Rayon are giving almost three "Soviet" rubles for one Russian ruble. The correlation of prices in the commercial trade is roughly the same. A bottle of champagne sells at R15,000 and Bulgarian cigarettes cost R750 a pack.

Admittedly, prices for the main foodstuffs issued in exchange for coupons are being held by means of subsidies at roughly the level of Russian prices, while the price for bread is considerably lower.

Uzbekistan considers the exchange of old money at a ratio of three to one unacceptable, because for that it would need around a trillion. In addition, it does not agree that the supply of cash should be made in the form of interstate credits by the transfer of security—approximately 40 tonnes of gold—in favor of the Central Bank of Russia.

Bakhtiyar Khamidov stated that Uzbekistan will adopt urgent measures to elaborate a program for the transition to a national currency. At the same time Tashkent intends to coordinate its steps with Kazakhstan and is planning to create a single Central Asian market in the future.

During a recent visit to Paris, Uzbek President Islam Karimov said that sooner or later his republic will acquire its own currency anyway and will not tolerate Russia's diktat under any circumstances. He stressed that Tashkent has a clean credit record, since its past debts have been assumed by Russia as successor in law to the USSR.

In two years of independence Uzbekistan has deposited 3,200 standard gold bars in Western banks as surety for credits received. Karimov also took several suitcases of gold to Paris to show to correspondents there.

However, Uzbekistan probably cannot afford to settle up in this way with Russia, which accounts for almost 70 percent of its commodity exchange, even though it is eighth in the world in terms of the "yellow metal" and fourth in cotton production.

Armenia

Azerbaijan Shells Border; No Major Actions in Karabakh

NC0811172293 Yerevan Radio Yerevan in Azeri 1430 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Excerpts] Dear listeners, we now present a report on the latest situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR] and the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

No serious incident has occurred in NKR's front lines in the past day. Only localized incidents have taken place. The clashes have been mainly in the form of positional fighting. The Armenian side has refrained from retaliating against Azerbaijan's provocative activities. In short, the Armenian forces have continued to heed the orders they received from their military command headquarters not to shoot.

According to NKR's military intelligence groups, Azerbaijan's military command headquarters is trying to deploy a large force of reinforcements and armored vehicles in several areas close to the battlefronts. Meanwhile, preparations are being made in Azerbaijan for the deployment of reinforcements in the battlefronts. A large number of refugees from Armenia and the rayons under NKR's control are among the reinforcements to be deployed. Observers believe that Azerbaijan is preparing to try to redeem the defeats its army has suffered in the clashes. That is an indication that tension may escalate in the front lines once again.

Viewing last week's incidents in the region will be enough to establish the side responsible for the deterioration of the situation. Azerbaijan's military forces fired on the Armenian defense positions in Fizulinskiy and Mardakertskiy Rayons with various types of arms on 1 November. They also fired on the Armenian positions on the night of 2 to 3 November. The NKR forces took retaliatory measures in all cases. Nevertheless, they remained committed to the decision the Armenian side has made to unilaterally observe the cease-fire agreement.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan's mass media organs, which serve that republic's military command headquarters, claimed that NKR's defense units crossed into Beynagan Rayon. Such an incident did not take place. The Armenian forces remained in the positions they took on 27 October. In fact, they did not even return the fire that was directed at them from Beynagan Rayon. Obviously, the objective behind such unfounded reports is to describe the Armenian side as the aggressor in the dispute. However, the Armenian side's main objective is to maintain the NKR people's security. All the peoples in the world have the right to maintain their security. The NKR leaders and military command headquarters have warned several times that Azerbaijan's deadly military positions will be rendered ineffective. They also called on the enemy to end its provocative activities. Unfortunately, Azerbaijan has failed to heed NKR's warnings. In fact, that republic has stepped up its provocative operations and broadened its attacks on NKR's defense units. [passage omitted]

The unstable political situation in Azerbaijan is the main reason for the violation of the cease-fire agreement between the two sides. International observers, politicians, and experts are convinced that the opposition forces in Azerbaijan do not wish to relinquish their position. Regardless of Geydar Aliyev's coming to power, the power struggle in that republic has not ended. In fact, it has entered a new stage. The Azerbaijan People's Front is still a considerably strong force in that republic. Undoubtedly, it will try to recoup the losses it has recently suffered. It is no wonder that several leaders in that republic have attributed the Azerbaijan National Army's recent defeats to the desertion from the battlefronts of several units made up of opposition elements. Several reports have said that they fled from the front lines even before the peaceful residents moved to safer areas.

Azerbaijan's provocative activities have violated the cease-fire agreement. That is an indication that the political crisis in Azerbaijan obstructs the effort made to find a peaceful solution to the dispute between the two sides. NKR's leaders have disclosed at every level that they are prepared to hold talks with Azerbaijan whenever that republic's leaders agree to do so. However, the ambitions in the neighboring republic prevent Azerbaijan's leaders from acting in a similar way. [passage omitted]

Nevertheless, we wish to hope that Azerbaijan's leaders will realize the threat their republic will be faced with if the confrontation further worsens and move to focus attention on the talks between the two sides. Obviously, it is better to hold talks for 100 days instead of fighting a war for 24 hours. In view of that, it is time to refrain from sacrificing the lives of people for the sake of political ambitions.

We wish to conclude with a report on the situation on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Tension continues to exist in the region. However, serious clashes and exchanges of gunfire have not occurred during the past week.

Further on Shelling, 'Calm' in Karabakh

NC0811191893 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1800 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] The relative calm established on Nagorno-Karabakh fronts in the last days of October is basically holding. The Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army's press service reported, however, that in some sectors considerable massing of Azerbaijani troops and military hardware is being observed.

In the opinion of the military experts in Stepanakert, the concentration of the offensively deployed troops and equipment and other active mobilization measures show that the Azerbaijani ruling circles are thinking to (?avenge) their latest reverses in the southern and southeastern battle fronts.

Incidents were registered on the borders of Noyemberyanskiy and Idzhevanskiy Rayons of Armenia yesterday. The armed formations in Kazakhskiy Rayon used various weapons to shell the defensive positions near Pergavan in Noyemberyanskiy Rayon, and the highway near Diran in Idzhevanskiy Rayon between 1230-1500. The Armenian fighters refrained from retaliating.

Armenian Defense Ministry press service also reported that the armed formations in Kubatlinskiy Rayon opened tank and howitzer fire on the defensive positions on the borders of Gorisskiy Rayon last night. There are casualties.

The situation has been calm on the other border sectors of Armenia since last night.

Karabakh, Baku Exchange 22 Hostages

NC0811161993 Yerevan SNARK in English 1230 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] Stepanakert, November 8 (SNARK)—The Karabakh and Azerbaijani sides have performed the next exchange of hostages. As SNARK was informed at the Department of Information and Press of Karabakh, this action was initiated by the Karabakh government, which gave 16 persons to Azerbaijan yesterday, who basically originated from Kelbazharskiy region. Azerbaijani side set free 6 Armenians. Among them is Anush Avetisyan, 21 years old, the inhabitant of Stepanakert, who was a captive for two years.

According to the words of Aleksander Agasaryan, the chairman of the Karabakh State Commission on captives and hostages' affairs, this exchange should be considered as a goodwill gesture of the Karabakh government since the unequal terms of its fulfillment are obvious. "That proves once more that the readiness of Karabakh to make the first step forward to settle the conflict", [said] Aleksander Agasaryan.

Yerevan Releases 18 Hostages

LD0911070293 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0500 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] The Armed Forces of Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh have exchanged hostages. The Armenian side has released 18 people and Azerbaijan—several people from Stepanakert, the News and Information Agency [ANI] reports.

Vice President Leaves on Brief Visit to Moscow

NC0811190493 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1800 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] Armenian Vice President Gagik Arutyunyan left for Moscow today on a brief working visit.

Yerevan Radio Kurdish Program Denies Turkish PKK Claim

NC0811200693 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1800 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] The Kurdish Programs Department of Armenia's radio is authorized to declare the following in the name of Kurdish intellectuals:

Reports are circulating in neighboring Turkey to the effect that there are PKK [Kurdish Workers Party] bases in Armenia. The September and October issues of (ABTUL) magazine has even gone further. The magazine published a map where all the Kurdish settlements in Armenia have been shown as being bases of the PKK militants. According to the Turkish press, allegedly there are Kurdish bases near the Armenian nuclear power plant and in Lachin corridor.

We declare with full responsibility that there are no PKK bases in Armenia, and there cannot be any. The reports circulating in Turkey about Lachin corridor are also not true, and have no relation to reality.

None of the cultural centers of the Kurds of Armenia are terrorist structures. RIYA TAZA paper touches on problems of interest for Kurds exclusively to satisfy their interest in Kurdish affairs. And today it is impossible to hide from the people what is going on in the world.

Only Soviet Rubles To Be Used in Trade

NC0811164193 Yerevan SNARK in English 1317 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] Yerevan, November 8 (SNARK)—Today Armenia starts trade operations only with the Soviet roubles of 1961-1992. The decision of the State Commission on regulation of the currency circulation says no permission to use Russian roubles, dollars and other hard currency in trade operations. Tigran Sargisyan, Chairman of the State Finance and Budget Commission, told SNARK the Government undertakes such measures to regulate currency circulation. Those who are going to violate the order will be of material responsibility.

Government Preparing To Privatize 5,000 Enterprises

NC0811195993 Yerevan SNARK in English 1617 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] Yerevan, November 8, (SNARK)—Today the deputies of Armenian Parliament discussed the program of the privatization for this and next years. Simon Ghonaghchian, the chairman of the State Commission of Privatization, said to SNARK that it is supposed to privatize 5 thousand enterprises. One third of the balance cost of industrial and other establishments will be privatized by the way of free of charge certificates distribution to population, the printing of which has already begun.

The privatization will not concern military enterprises, the enterprises which deal with the precious metals, the establishments of energetics, communications, the gas mains, roads, metro, TV etc. This year it is scheduled to privatized 10 per cent of the basic funds of the republic.

Azerbaijan

Aliyev Speaks to New Volunteers Joining Army

NC0811220793 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri 1630 GMT 7 Nov 93

[Address by President Geydar Aliyev to "N" Military Unit on 7 November; place not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] You, Azerbaijan's young sons serving in the Azerbaijani Army, know well the situation faced by the Republic nowadays as a result of the aggression by the Armenian armed forces. Responding to our call, to be specific following my address to the nation on 2 November, the spirit of military patriotism has soared in our republic, and those from among our republic's people who are able to serve and participate in the defense of the country are voluntarily reporting to the conscription centers and applying to serve in the Army ranks. In recent days we have been witnessing this positive development. I express my gratitude to you and to all those who want to participate in Azerbaijan's defense under these grave war conditions. And I hope that hundreds and thousands of brave sons of Azerbaijan like you will enroll in the Army, voluntarily strive for the defense of the homeland, will undergo the necessary training, and will then go to Azerbaijan's battle regions and render their services for Azerbaijan's defense. [passage omitted] You and our Azerbaijani sons like you should know that Azerbaijan's present and future, its territorial integrity and state independence is on your hands, it depends on you, on your courage, on your determination to defend Azerbaijan's territories. We are relying on you and trusting you, people have put their trust in you. [passage omitted] Everyone has pinned his hopes on you, on our Army. Look at those who have voluntarily been applying in recent days to enroll in the Army ranks and go to the fronts to defend the Republic. It is nice that these processes are following an ever more positive trend every day. Each day, Azerbaijani citizens, our youth, and those able to defend the country have been discharging their citizenship duties more profoundly, and fully realize the difficult and dangerous situation that the Republic is in. We are pleased that there is a general popular upsurge, our people are rising up, and like you, brave sons from among the people, are coming forward voluntarily to do military service. We welcome this trend. Therefore, I express my gratitude to the Republic's citizens and patriotic people, and I hope that this surge and upsurge, and this revival of patriotic feeling will continue and our people capable of acts of bravery will gather the necessary force to defend their lands.

I wish you success in your training, wish you health. I hope that while here you will make positive use of every minute and hour, and immediately after training you will be sent to the region determined by the Army command, and once there you will defend our lands.

It is obvious that you have difficulties in your training. The conditions here probably do not satisfy us and you. But what else can we do under the present grave condition of the Republic? I would have liked the conditions of our servicemen and officers to be better at the front and in the training camps. We will work to improve these conditions. We are taking and will take additional measures to (?improve) our Army. We will do whatever we can do. [passage omitted]

It is also our God's command that a person should not shy away from difficulty when protecting his land and home, and if need be he should sacrifice his life. There cannot be a war without casualties and martyrs. But only those who are martyred bravely while defending the homeland gain people's deep respect. [passage omitted] You must walk on the road of heroism, you should fight like heroes, defend the people and lands like heroes, and you must provide new examples of heroism. Therefore, I again wish you health, success, victories, and [word indistinct]. Thank you.

Mobilization, Martial Law Said To Be Imminent

PM0811193593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Nov 93 First Edition pp 1, 6

[Report by Arif Useynov: "Azerbaijan: Authorities Prepare To Introduce Martial Law"

[Text] Baku—Vice Premier Rasul Guliyev has been elected speaker of the Azerbaijan parliament, replacing Geydar Aliyev. Discussion of the military-political situation following the Armenian armed formations' latest offensive in the Dzhebrail-Zangelan region was postponed until the next session of parliament. This is because a number of statutes is being prepared, according to news agency reports. Information has reached the press that parliamentary commissions are allegedly working on a draft decision on introducing complete or partial martial law in the republic.

The Azerbaijani Defense Ministry also refused to comment on another report—on the partial mobilization of citizens aged 18 to 35.

Mobilization is taking place, though, as evidenced, in particular, by restrictions on reservists [voyennoobyazannyye] up to 40 years of age leaving the republic. The visa and registration department has stopped issuing foreign passports to males up to 40. Battalions of volunteers are being formed. They are made up of people who have done military service and have military occupational specialties.

"The fatherland is in danger!"—this slogan accompanies meetings in refugee camps and labor collectives. Azerbaijani television showed Geydar Aliyev visiting a military training area during a rehearsal of combat operations.

Foreign observers do not rule out the possibility of a radical change in the military-political situation in the region with the introduction of martial law in Azerbaijan. A declaration of war on Armenia [obyavleniye voyny Armenii], which can no longer conceal its aggressive designs following the latest offensive, is not ruled out either.

Experts reckon that Azerbaijan is capable of placing 500,000-600,000 men under arms in the next few weeks. People are tired of the five-year war that has been imposed on them and are prepared to accept hardship in order to put down the aggressor, the parliamentary paper AZERBAIJAN believes.

Another sign of martial law is the decision by the mayor of Baku that all restaurants, places of entertainment, and video hire clubs will close by 2000 hours local time. Casinos and other gambling establishments have been closed. The National Security Ministry is quite open about the situation and has urged citizens to be vigilant. Bandit groups and formations in the republic have plenty of weapons.

Government Mobilizing Economic, Military Resources

LD0811193693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1750 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] Azerbaijan is out to mobilize its economic and military resources, a senior member of the president's office told Interfax. "The country has to live under laws of the day", he said.

Apart from military build up, Azerbaijan is also intensifying diplomatic effort to try to bring a political solution to its conflict with Armenia, he said. Baku says no diplomatic effort can be effective unless backed up by proper defences.

In this light, the source pointed to the country's successful mobilization campaign which can help reinforce the Azeri army.

He said the president's office sees as good the latest shake up of higher echelons of power including the appointment of Rasul Guliyev as new Parliamentary Chairman. Shrewd both in political and economic matters, Guliyev is the figure capable of coordinating work by different government structures, the source said.

Gasanov Returns From Visit to France, Turkey

NC0911081193 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri 1600 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov returned to Azerbaijan tonight after visiting France and Turkey. He gave an interview to our correspondent on his visit.

[Begin recording] [Gasanov] Although diplomatic relations were established between Azerbaijan and France, comprehensive diplomatic ties have not been forged. This was the first time an Azerbaijani delegation had the opportunity to meet the highest echelons of the French leadership. Meetings were held with French President Francois Mitterrand, Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, and with the deputy chairman and members of the French Senate. I also spoke at the UNESCO meeting. All these things will make it possible to broaden our ties with France. This is only the beginning. President Mitterrand will invite Geydar Aliyev to France. We will work out the technical aspects through diplomatic channels and finalize the trip, which we could agree should take place in December. [words indistinct] France occupies an important place in Azerbaijan's foreign policy because France is one of the wealthiest countries and helps to shape international relations. France's relations with Armenia are good, which is another reason we should enhance our ties with it.

[Unidentified correspondent] Perhaps France is the friend of the Armenians, but not the enemy of Azerbaijan.

[Gasanov] [words indistinct] I told the French foreign minister that [words indistinct] if France is Armenia's friend and not Azerbaijan's enemy, then we must build our relations on the understanding that France is not the enemy of Azerbaijan and that normal bilateral relations of friendship should be established. [Correspondent] What was the main reason for your visit to Turkey?

[Gasanov] My visit to Turkey was also important. [words indistinct] On my return from France, I met Suleyman Demirel, Tansu Ciller, Hikmet Cetin, deputies, ministers, and [words indistinct]. We reiterated that Turkey is one of the most essential and important countries in Azerbaijan's foreign policy. Turkey remains the real partner in our foreign policy and our political cooperation with Turkey will continue. [pasage indistinct] [end recording]

Parliament Speaker Guliyev on War, Economic Issues

LD0811205493 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1700 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Video report by correspondent V. Nakhysh from Baku; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] According to officials in Baku, Yerevan presently is drawing up plans for new large-scale offensives. According to some information, the proposed blows may be delivered mainly against the northwestern rayons of the republic, where major power and fuel lines are concentrated. Today our correspondent had a conversation with Rasul Guliyev, the new speaker of the Azerbaijani parliament.

[Begin recording] [Nakhysh] What is the policy of the new leadership of the Azerbaijani parliament with regard to Armenian aggression against Azerbaijan?

[Guliyev] We stated several times before and we are stating again that we do not want war. It is also quite natural that we cannot be mere onlookers when our land is being occupied, and in no way can we allow Azerbaijan to have 1 million—over 1 million refugees.

[Nakhysh] The speaker also dwelt on the problems of the economy. He stressed that Azerbaijan will not join the ruble zone, explaining this by the fact that such a step would benefit neither Russia nor the republic itself. This means that signing contracts with foreign oil companies would be of great help in extricating the economy from the crisis.

[Guliyev] No one should have any doubt about us concluding contracts with foreign companies. [end recording] [video shows Nakhysh, Guliyev]

PFA Leader on Political 'Destabilization' by Moscow

NC0811190593 Baku TURAN in English 1308 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] Baku, November 8 (TURAN)—Today chairman of Executive Committee of the PFA [People's Front of Azerbaijan] Ibragim Ibragimov stated: Scenery of June coup and leaders of present Government of Azerbaijan coming to power was drafted by anti-Yeltsin powers in Russia, which had been crushed in October. This fact predetermines fate of our government too.

As I. Ibragimov told, official Moscow did not back present Azerbaijani Government, which is doomed to failure.

I. Ibragimov stressed, definite forces of Moscow drafted the scenery of civil war in Azerbaijan. So, at present opposition Geydar Aliyev - Suret Guseynov is warming up. As Ibragimov thinks Moscow is interested in destabilization of political situation to keep control over Azerbaijan.

I. Ibragimov told, our aim is to guard opposition and population of the country from involving into planned opposition. As he stressed, the last campaign of aspirations addressed to the PFA was aimed at provoking opposition on active resistance.

Georgia

Government Troops Reach Abkhaz Border

LD0811173593 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1700 GMT 8 Nov 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Georgian Government troops have reached the Abkhaz border, according to reports from Tbilisi. A curfew has been introduced in all regions of Georgia under the control of government troops, which is in force from 2200 to 0600.

Russian Troops Enter Zugdidi

LD0911095793 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0900 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Excerpts] A meeting of the provisional Committee for the State of Emergency in western Georgia was held in Zugdidi yesterday under the chairmanship of head of state Eduard Shevardnadze. [passage omitted]

A column of heavy equipment with Russian troops entered Zugdidi yesterday evening. Their final deployment area is yet unknown.

Black Sea Fleet Marines Guard Transportation

LD0811183093 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1600 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] According to a report from the Black Sea Fleet headquarters, the interim commandant's office was established in Poti today. According to data provided by the headquarters, a total of 750 marines of the Black Sea Fleet, supported by 40 armored vehicles, landed on the territory of Georgia within the provisions of the humanitarian operation. They are guarding the republic's transport junctions, railways, highways, and bridges.

Three ships of the Black Sea Fleet are monitoring the situation in Poti area from the sea. A spokesman for the fleet headquarters noted that the humanitarian action proceeds without any excesses. No cases of attacks on marines have been recorded.

Black Sea Fleet Denies Sailors Killed in Poti

LD0811215393 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 2015 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] Sevastopol—The Black Sea Fleet headquarters has informed a UNIAN correspondent that, as of 8 November approximately 800 servicemen of the Black Sea Fleet and 40 units of military hardware are in the region of the Georgian town of Poti. Sub-units of the Black Sea Fleet are in full control of the highways and railroads. Commandants' offices have been deployed in all main directions. The Black Sea Fleet leadership denies that Black Sea sailors have been killed in Poti, confirming only its previous report that several have been wounded.

A UNIAN correspondent has been informed by reliable sources that in the next few days the Black Sea Fleet hospital ship, the "Yenisey", is expected to leave Sevastopol bound for the Georgian town of Poti.

Black Sea Fleet Warships, Marines Leave for Poti

LD0811224493 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 2200 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Excerpt] According to a Radio Moscow correspondent, another group of warships of the Black Sea Fleet carrying marines has left Sevastopol for Poti in West Georgia. The marines are expected to land in Anaklia near Poti. The water space and transport lanes are guarded by 500 marines brought before. They should also assume control over the port of Batumi, bridges, and other important facilities in West Georgia. [passage omitted]

Unidentified 'Militants' Beat Russian Officers

LD0811172393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English GMT 1647 GMT 8 Nov 93

[by ITAR-TASS correspondent Albert Kochetkov]

[Text] Tbilisi November 8 TASS—Unidentified Georgian militants attacked Russian senior officers in Georgia on Sunday and heavily beat them.

The incident occurred in the village of Varketili-2 late on Sunday. Several armed young people clad in Georgian Army uniform approached a group of Russian officers who were returning home from a party at Colonel Vladimir Shcherbina's and demanded that they produce their identification cards.

Shcherbina introduced himself as a deputy medical service chief of the Russian troops in the Transcaucasia. But the assailants would not listen and tried to search the officers at gun point, firing several shots in their direction.

Local law enforcement bodies did not respond to shooting despite the state of emergency which is still in effect in Tbilisi.

The incident occurred just several weeks after the signing of a package of military agreements between Russia and Georgia, under which the latter pledged to ensure the safety and social rights of Russian troops and their families in the republic.

Shevardnadze Meets Black Sea Commander in Poti

PM0811164593 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Nov 93 p 1

[Vitaliy Alekseyev and Sergey Prokopenko report: "Navy Returns to Poti"]

[Text] On 4 November Eduard Shevardnadze visited Poti, where he met with Admiral Eduard Baltin, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, under whose flag a combined detachment made up of eight Black Sea Fleet ships had come to the port. The conversation primarily concerned the seamen's peacemaking mission to guard all types of communications. As for the status of the naval forces on the territory of Georgia and within its territorial waters, then Eduard Shevardnadze stated that a preliminary agreement on the status of the naval forces and resources is being prepared. As Vladimir Pasyakin, a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent who was in Poti, reported, the plan was to sign it 5 November. As far as the landing of a marine force numbering up to 500 men from two large amphibious warfare ships in Poti seaport was concerned, Eduard Baltin said the following: "A formerly flourishing territory must not be turned into a heap of ruins." The Black Sea Fleet naval infantry and coastal units have started deployment in the area of the combat positions in accordance with a plan for to guard and protect the port of Poti. Cooperation has been organized between the Black Sea Fleet and units of the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus, which are carrying out a peacemaking mission.

According to reports from certain sources, discussing the prospects for the development of events after the arrival of the government troops at the Inguri river (the border with Abkhazia), the Georgian head of state did not rule out the possibility of creating the institution of a joint command. According to Eduard Shevardnadze, even after all automobile and railroad routes right up to the Russian border have been cleared, it is expected that the bandit formations will step up their activity, and joint patrol groups will be mobilized to fight against them.

As for the Russian troop posts of protecting bridges and tunnels, the situation around them remains calm. Incidentally, according to a poll carried out by the SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA newspaper, 21 percent of Tbilisi inhabitants polled consider it undesirable for units of the Russian Group of Forces in the Transcaucasus to participate in guarding the main routes, 41.7 percent of those polled approve of the assistance given by the Russian military, and one in three has a neutral attitude to it. But whatever the opinions are, it was specifically with the help of the Russian servicemen that it was possible reopen the Senaki-Kutaisi rail route 3 November.

Shevardnadze Deplores Killing of Journalist

LD0811203093 Tbilisi First Program Television Network in Georgian 1700 GMT 8 Nov 93

["Appeal to international organizations and all journalistic associations by Georgian Head of State Eduard Shevardnadze," dated 8 November—read by announcer]

[Text] I am writing these lines in western Georgia near the place where a dreadful crime has been committed. On 28 October, in the town of Khobi, a journalist, Davit Bolkvadze was shot dead. He was 24 years old. He was carrying out professional duties of a Georgian television and WTN company reporter in the combat area. He was collecting and dispatching unbiased information about tragic events in western Georgia. He was shot by those who initiated this tragedy. His killers were intending to kill the truth together with Dato [familiar form of Davit].

Gamsakhurdia's clique, who declared war against their own people, has ignored freedom—which is inseparable from human life—and the right to the truth. Davit Bolkvadze fully performed his civic, patriotic, and professional duties. At the cost of his own life he showed us the truth about criminals fighting against the motherland and mankind. His work, life, and death call on us to perform our humane duties.

A journalist is protected by law and his skill during the war. His life is inviolable if he is not taking part in combat activities as a soldier, is armed with nothing other but his professional apparatus, and acts within the limits of international truth and professional ethics. However, those who do not shrink from mass revenge against civilians, as happened in Abkhazia and western Georgia, have no scruples about killing a journalist. Ethnic purges are followed by professional purges. Reporters are being annihilated.

We do not know anything about the fate of over 30 Georgian journalists who were covering events in Abkhazia. The editor of the DEMOKRATICHESKAYA ABKHAZIYA, Yuri Gavva; an officer of the joint press center, Aleksandre Berulava; and others are kept in dungeons in Gudauta. The way they are treated and the way that any information about their whereabouts and fate is concealed looks clearly identical to the handwriting of the Moscow coup organizers who instigated an assault on journalists. Crime committed by Zviadists to the actions by inspirers and patrons of the genocide of Georgians [sentence as heard].

Sasha Ioseliani was killed with a camera in his hand at the Gumista. Dato Bolkvadze was killed absolutely unarmed. There have been many instances of punishment of journalists during recent years but nothing like this has ever happened. I was terribly shocked by all this.

By the blessed memory of Dato and all his slain colleagues, I appeal to international organizations and all journalistic associations to raise the voice of protest against the elimination of suppliers of information, to have their assassins handed over to an international tribunal, to demand liberation of all imprisoned workers of the press, and to help us search for all those missing. I do hope that my friends, journalists of all countries of the world will demonstrate corporate solidarity and use all your power. In such situations this is of primary importance. I do hope to get support from the law-enforcement movement and from all those who are well aware that a force which takes lives of journalists is a threat to peace, freedom and democracy.

70% of Kobalia's Troops Reportedly Refuse To Fight

LD0811194693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1706 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] The government troops which undertook an offensive in western Georgia have taken prisoner deputy commander of Vakhtang Kobalia's units, Bulia, competent sources report from Tbilisi.

During an interrogation, Bulia stated that almost 70 percent of Kobalia's soldiers had refused to fight on the side of Gamsakhurdia and decided to go home. To quote Bulia, Gamsakhurdia urged his supporters to move to Chechnya, where President Dzhokhar Dudayev had allegedly allotted 100 hectares of land to them.

The Kobalia grouping is the nucleus of Gamsakhurdia's armed supporters.

Abkhazia Forms Own Border Troops

AU0911090293 Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA in Russian 3 Nov 93 p 1

[GIA (Georgian Information Agency) report under rubric "According to Reports From Correspondents and Information Agencies"]

[Text] Abkhazia is forming its own border guard detachment. Its command will be situated in the city of Sukhumi. The tasks of this detachment include protecting the borders of Abkhazia along the Inguri and Psou Rivers where two control points and three border posts will be located. Marganiya, the former commander of the Abkhazian border troops, has not been appointed to this post. Mayor Igor Mikamba has been confirmed as commander of the border troops.

Zemskiy Meets With Russian Envoy on Abkhazia

LD0811214993 Tbilisi CONTACT INFORMATION AGENCY in 1700 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] Georgian Vice Premier Tamaz Nadareishvili met Vladimir Zemskiy, the Russian ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Georgia, at the latter's request. The ambassador provided information concerning developments in routine consultations on the Abkhazian issue and expressed the conviction that it is necessary to hasten the beginning of talks.

Mr. Nadareishvili stressed the territorial integrity of Georgia and the restoration of its borders as the primary point to be discussed at the talks. He also insisted that the issue of refugees deported from Abkhazia requires an immediate settlement.

Reporter Views Ramifications of Zugdidi's Fall

PM0911094993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Nov 93 First Edition p 1

[Valeriy Russu report: "Zugdidi Taken. Government Troops Prepare For New Fighting"]

[Text] Tbilisi—None of the assumptions about the fierce fighting for the city of Zugdidi—Zviad Gamsakhurdia's capital—have been borne out. The city has moved under the control of official Tbilisi virtually without any fighting, since the ex-president's supporters have retreated.

The head of state's press center reported that government troops have not entered the city. The military police, who are combating looters, are currently at work there.

The ex-president's rapid loss of Zugdidi could have been foreseen following the seizure by government troops of the town of Chkhorotsku and other population centers around Zugdidi. This completely demoralized Gamsakhurdia's supporters. As Bulia, one of the leaders of the ex-president's armed formations who was captured in the village of Mukhuri, reported, 70 percent of the ex-president's men have laid down their arms and are ready to end resistance.

In this situation virtually nothing is known of the ex-president's whereabouts. According to certain information he is in Abkhazia in the vicinity of the town of Gali, from where he plans to fly to Groznyy. Other sources report that Zviad Gamsakhurdia is already in the Chechen capital. Incidentally, although having lost, the ex-president has not forgotten about his supporters. In particular, he is calling on them to fly to Chechnya, where he guarantees them a quiet life. It is thought that he plans to set up home on 100 hectares of land which have allegedly been allocated to him or bought by him in the republic.

But it is still too soon to talk about the emergence of peace. And an act of terrorism aimed at destroying the leadership of the Georgian Defense Ministry confirms this. The car in which Minister Georgiy Karkarashvili was traveling hit a mine. The large explosion completely destroyed the vehicle, injuring the driver. The general himself received contusions.

Russian troops guarding the main rail lines, like Black Sea Fleet units, are staying completely neutral and are not interfering in the sovereign state's internal affairs. The Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus Press Center reported that the situation around guard posts along the entire length of the main rail line has been quiet over the past few days.

Anti-CIS Parties Demand Access to Mass Media

AU0911120093 Tbilisi REZONANSI in Georgian 2-3 Nov 93 p 1

[Statement by leaders of five opposition parties issued in Tbilisi on 30 October]

[Text] Political organizations functioning in Georgia have made the following statement:

"The statement made by the Georgian head of state on 8 October of this year on the Republic of Georgia becoming a member of the CIS has aroused a mixed reaction among the population.

"Those political organizations functioning in Georgia that are opposed to entry into the so-called CIS do not have the chance to formulate their position before society, the main reason for which is the blockade of the mass media, in particular Georgian television and newspapers, by the higher echelons of power. To prevent the situation from becoming complex and to establish true democracy, one section of the political organizations functioning in Georgia demands that the appropriate bodies open up the mass media; that the papers SAKARTVELOS RESPUBLIKA, SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA, and TBILISI give up their pages twice a week to politicians holding differing views, while the heads of Georgian Television Channel One allocate 20 minutes airtime three days a week to the same organizations.

"We hope that the authorities will not permit an unexpected escalation of the situation and will take timely steps to resolve the aforementioned in a positive way."

[Signed] Tedo Paatashvili—"Charter-91"
Akaki Asatiani—"The Union of Georgian Traditionalists"
"The Freedom Party"
Vazha Adamia—"The All-Georgian Merab Kostava Society"
Tamar Chkheidze—"The Ilia Chavchavadze Society"
Nodar Natadze—"The Georgian Popular Front"
[Dated] Tbilisi, 30 October 1993.

Estonia

Kazakh Foreign Minister in Tallinn for Talks

PM0811155393 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Nov 93 First Edition p 7

[Report from ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, ITAR-TASS column]

[Text] Tallinn—A delegation from the Kazakhstan Republic headed by Foreign Minister Tuleutay Suleymenov has paid an official visit to Estonia. The purpose of the visit was to see what opportunities there are for economic cooperation.

According to Reyn Otsason, president of the credit bank, Kazakhstan is particularly interested in the creation of permanent transport channels via Estonian ports, in shipbuilding, and also in the sale of its own raw materials. Hitherto the establishment of economic links has been hindered by the unregulated money supply in Kazakhstan, which consists in printing worthless monmey.

But the Estonian side managed nonetheless to find a bank through which it can convert Kazkahstan's rubles into Estonian kroons on the basis of the dollar rate.

Vienna To Be Regional 'Diplomatic Headquarters'

AU0811133093 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 6 Nov 93 p 5

["b.b."-signed report: "Estonia's Plans in Vienna"]

[Text] Vienna—Small Estonia is having great plans in Vienna. The embassy of the Baltic republic in the Austrian capital will become the diplomatic headquarters for all of Central Europe. In an interview with DIE PRESSE, the new Estonian ambassador to Austria, Sven Juergenson, says that the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Switzerland will be represented diplomatically from Vienna. Austria does not have an embassy in Tallinn; Estonia is taken care of by the embassy in Helsinki.

Ambassador Juergenson set up the Estonian mission in the Finnish capital. He has been at work in Vienna for several weeks now to "create one of our most important diplomatic centers here." He and his diplomatic counterpart, Kalev Stoisescu, Estonian ambassador to the CSCE and other international organizations based in Vienna, hope that by next year, seven Estonian diplomats will work in the mission in the third Vienna district.

Ambassador Juergenson says that even though the relations between Austria and Estonia have been developing "well and swiftly," the young and dynamic diplomats from Tallinn still have to cope with unexpected "technical" problems. For instance, they have been waiting for a telephone to be installed for several weeks.

Lithuania

Brazauskas Meets Chinese Leaders in Beijing

LD0911111093 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] Here is the first rather detailed report from Beijing. Correspondent Audrius Braukyla reports by phone from Beijing:

[Braukyla] Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas has received Li Peng, head of the government of China, at his residence in Beijing today.

According to the president, China is greatly interested in access to the Baltic Sea, through which it could ship its goods to Western states. Brazauskas stressed that Lithuania supported the implementation of such a project; however, many technical problems would have to be solved first.

According to Brazauskas, the Chinese Government has now become absolutely convinced that small farm agriculture does not have any future. Brazauskas added that this was also a pressing problem in Lithuania; therefore, China's experience in this area was worth closer examination.

The Chinese prime minister was interested in cooperation between the Baltic states and the relations with Scandinavian countries. It is evident that China regards us as a constituent part of this region, the Lithuanian president said.

Meanwhile, when asked by Li Peng about his vision of the future of the CIS, Brazauskas said quite frankly that he did not see any great future for the Commonwealth.

The Lithuanian state delegation headed by the president visited China's Great Wall this morning.

Talks With Russia's Shumeyko Begin 6 Nov

LD0611125393 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1200 GMT 6 Nov 93

[Text] ELTA reports that a meeting between Lithuanian Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius and Russian Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Shumeyko started today at 1300 hours at the Auksines Kopos rest home in Nida. They are discussing transit transport through Lithuania from Kaliningrad and the visa regime.

The meeting is attended from the Lithuanian side by Commodore Eugenijus Nazelskis, first deputy minister of national defense; Deputy Foreign Minister Vladislovas Domarkas; Virgilijus Bulovas, chairman of the state delegation for negotiations with Russia; and Transport Minister Jonas Birziskis. The Russian side is represented by Yuriy Matochkin, head of the Kaliningrad region administration, and many officials from the Russian ministries of internal affairs, security and defense, from the customs offices, and several officers from the Baltic Fleet.

Transit, Visa Issues Discussed

LD0611143993 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1300 GMT 6 Nov 93

[Text] A meeting between Lithuanian Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius and Vladimir Shumeyko, Russian first deputy prime minister, ended in Nida half an hour ago.

Matters ensuing from the results of the meeting of Presidents Algirdas Brazauskas and Boris Yeltsin—notably, transit through Lithuania to Kaliningrad and back, visa regulations, and other problems of bilateral relations—were discussed.

Adolfas Slezevicius and Vladimir Shumeyko examined issues linked with the signing of documents during the expected visit to Lithuania by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. Let us recall that this visit is planned for 15-16 November.

Shumeyko Meets Slezevicius

LD0811065793 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0200 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] Vladimir Shumeyko, first deputy prime minister of the Russian Government, has held talks with Lithuanian Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius. The talks were attended by Yuriy Matochkin, head of the Kaliningrad Oblast administration. They discussed issues of relations between Russia and Lithuania. Progress toward preparing a package of documents to be signed during Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's visit to Vilnius from 15 to 16 November was examined at the meeting.